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Abstract
The exploitation of women’s labor is central to the international political economy. Since
the 1980s, the trend has been towards a ‘feminization of labor’ in which women are confined to
low-skilled, low-paying, and mostly part-time work. The exploitation of women’s labor is not
just confined to waged labor, as women’s domestic and subsistence labor is necessary to make
the economy function but remains unpaid and undervalued. Despite these findings, studies on the
oil political economy have not sufficiently dealt with oil’s impact on women’s labor. These
studies—albeit in different ways—undertheorize the link between oil, women’s labor (waged
and unwaged), and women’s resistance. My dissertation fills this gap by examining the ways in
which women’s labor in the Niger Delta—the oil-producing region of Nigeria—is integrated
into, impacted by, and shaping the Nigerian oil political economy. I argue that the Nigerian oil
political economy exploits the waged labor of women oil workers and unwaged labor of rural
Niger Delta women by integrating these labors into precarious positions and shifting costs onto
households. However, women in the Niger Delta are organizing against structures that make
laboring as women exploitative.
In Chapter 2, I synthesize the different literatures on women’s labor and oil economies
and argue that using a theory of capitalist patriarchy is the best way to look at the relationship
between oil and women’s labor in the Nigerian oil political economy. Using a theory of capitalist
patriarchy allows me to theorize the exploitation of women’s waged and unwaged labor and link
labor exploitation to resistance.
Because my dissertation is influenced by African feminist research methodologies,
Chapter 3 explains the ways in which I navigate issues of positionality and ethics during my

fieldwork trips to Nigeria and how these issues influence data collection and the final
dissertation.
Chapter 4 argues that for women oil workers in the Port Harcourt branch of NUPENG
(Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers), their labor is exploited not just because
they experience casualization and redundancy as other oil workers do. These women’s
exploitation also results from gender ordering (exclusion and segregation) and sexual harassment
in the workplace as well as the interaction between workday constraints and the domestic
division of labor in the household.
Chapter 5 argues that oil pollution in the Niger Delta is best understood as part of a
Nigerian oil political economy—consisting of states, elites, and oil multinational corporations
(MNCs)—that prioritize profits at the expense of the environment. These foreign and domestic
actors effectively shift pollution costs from themselves onto rural women’s domestic labor,
destroying the women’s agricultural livelihoods and causing reproductive harms.
Lastly, in Chapter 6, I argue that the work done by the Women Committee of NUPENG’s
Port Harcourt zone and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around Port Harcourt
continue a Niger Delta tradition of organizing against structures that make laboring as women
exploitative. The dynamics observed in women’s ‘peasant resistance’ in the Niger Delta—
shadow work and counterplanning from the commons—can be found (although not in the exact
ways) in the work done by NUPENG’s Women Committee and these local NGOs.
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Chapter 1__Introduction
An Unjust, Rather than a “Just,” Economic System
From November 2-3, 2018, Environmental Rights Action (ERA)/Friends of the Earth
Nigeria, an environmental rights non-governmental organization (NGO), convenes an
international conference on the theme, Just Energy Transition. By this time, I am two months
into my second dissertation fieldwork trip in Nigeria. As I discuss in Chapter 3, I partner with
ERA’s Port Harcourt branch during my fieldwork trips to Nigeria. Thus, I am invited to
participate in this conference. The two-day conference, held at the Reiz Continental Hotel in
Nigeria’s capital city of Abuja, includes all-day panel sessions and small working groups focused
on moving Nigeria away from a fossil fuel economy to a sustainable economy based on
renewable energy.
Conference participants receive, among other things, a pamphlet titled “Just Energy
Transition for Nigeria: A Manifesto.” The manifesto is a call to action for an energy future that is
clean, healthy for the environment, and provides green jobs for all. For this to be done, Nigeria
must divest from fossil fuels and invest in renewable energy. The goal is for people and
communities to be both producers and consumers (“prosumers”) in energy production and supply
so that they can reap the benefits.1 In other words, big corporations cannot be allowed to
dominate renewable energy as they do with oil. As the former executive director of ERA/Friends
of the Earth Nigeria, Godwin Uyi Ojo, says in his opening remarks, “The energy
transition…should not recolonise Africa and perpetrate inequalities.”2

1

. Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria. (2018). Just Energy Transition for Nigeria: A Manifesto,
1-2
2
. Ojo, Godwin Uyi. (2018, November 2). Life Beyond Oil: Time to Switch from Fossil Fuels to Renewable Sources of
Energy. [Speech transcript]
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While there are panelists from—and thus speaking on—other parts of the world (e.g., the
United Kingdom, South Africa, the Netherlands, Uruguay), most of the presentations focus on a
Just Transition in Nigeria (or how other countries can support a Just Transition in Nigeria). The
speakers and panelists include government officials, NGO workers, labor union representatives,
and academics. Throughout the conference, presentations converge on the fact that Nigeria’s
economic system is not viable. Therefore, it is necessary for Nigeria to transition from a
capitalist system dominated by oil multinational corporations (MNCs) to a democratized
renewable energy system controlled by the people. In other words, a lot of the conference
emphasize the ills of capitalism. Panelists after panelists make clear that a just energy transition
does not only mean clean energy. The conference is as concerned with the “just” as the “energy”
in just energy transition. Thus, a few panelists argue that a just transition must move away from
patriarchal relations, noting that patriarchy works with capitalism to reinforce hierarchies that
oppress women. Other panelists mention the importance of keeping labor involved in the
process—specifically, oil workers—so that the transition can provide “decent jobs for all.”
Nigeria’s current economic system, the conference implies, is not “just.” It is
exploitative. My dissertation delves into this issue by exploring women’s labor exploitation in
the Nigerian oil political economy.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section I previews my research questions (discussed
more thoroughly in Chapter 2) and discusses the importance of the research (discussed more
thoroughly in Chapter 7). In Section II, I provide background information about the Nigerian oil
and gas industry, most of which is discussed more thoroughly in my empirical chapters. And
Section III provides a structure of the dissertation and summarizes the rest of the chapters.
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Section I. Research Overview
Research Questions
The main research question of this project is: How are different types of labor (waged
and unwaged) performed by different classes of women (urban and rural) in the Niger Delta—the
oil-producing region of Nigeria—integrated into, impacted by, and shaping the Nigerian oil
political economy? To answer this question, I divide my project into three sub-questions (with
each question answered in separate empirical chapters [Chapters, 4, 5, and 6]):
•

Sub-question 1: How are Nigerian women oil workers integrated into the Nigerian oil and
gas industry in the Niger Delta?

•

Sub-question 2: How does the Nigerian oil political economy create the oil pollution that
impacts rural women’s domestic/agricultural labor in the Niger Delta?

•

Sub-question 3: How are women in the Niger Delta shaping the Nigerian oil political
economy?

To address these questions, I use a theory of capitalist patriarchy, conduct over six months of
fieldwork (semi-structured interviews and focus groups)—with women (and men) who work in
the oil and gas industry, who live in oil-polluted communities, and who work in local NGOs
around oil-related issues—and analyze primary and secondary source materials. I conclude that
the Nigerian oil political economy exploits the waged labor of women oil workers and unwaged
labor of rural Niger Delta women by integrating these labors into precarious positions and
shifting costs onto households. However, women in the Niger Delta—through oil labor unions
and NGOs—are organizing against structures that make laboring as women exploitative.
Why is this Important?
In Chapter 2, I situate my research in the different literatures on oil and women’s labor,
highlighting how my dissertation fills gaps in these literatures. But my research is more than an
academic exercise.
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The exploitation of women’s labor is central to the international political economy. Since
the 1980s, a global pattern has emerged around the treatment of such labor. Women’s labor is
treated as “disposable,” thus creating the “feminisation of labour” in which women are confined
to low-skilled, low-paying, and mostly part-time work.3 In export processing zones (EPZs)
across the Global South, women are the preferred labor force because ideologies about gender
and “real” work justify paying women cheap wages.4
The exploitation of women’s labor is not just confined to waged labor. Cynthia Enloe
(1990) demonstrates that military bases and banana plantations rely on women as wives and sex
workers to make these places function as smoothly as they do. Wives tend to be responsible for
the domestic labor that makes the household—and thus economy—work.5 Since household labor
is treated as part of a woman’s marital duty and couched in terms of a “labour of love,” this work
is undervalued.6
Thus, recognizing where African women (and all women) labor and under what
conditions makes fighting for an equitable and less-exploitative economic system possible. As I
detail in Chapter 7, WoMin—a Pan-African ecofeminist alliance—has led campaigns urging
African countries to adopt an ecologically-just model of development. One such campaign, the
Mogale Declaration, lists 26 principles/practices that characterize an African ecofeminist just
transition. This transition would be “a radical shift to a paradigm which places people and care at
the centre of development.”7 The Declaration, agreed upon in July 2018 by a group of feminists
3

. Pettman, Jan Jindy. (1996). Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics. London and New
York: Routledge, 163
4
. Elson, Diane and Ruth Pearson. (1981). “‘Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers’: An Analysis of Women’s
Employment in Third World Manufacturing.” Feminist Review, 7, 92-93
5
. Enloe, Cynthia. (1990). Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press
6
. Pettman, 186
7
. WoMin. (2016). Women Building Power: Towards Climate and Energy Justice for Women in Africa. Johannesburg:
The WoMin African Gender and Extractives Alliance, 42
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and climate justice activists, is a response to just energy transition proposals that do not
conceptualize a just transition from an African feminist perspective.8 As I mention above, some
panelists at the Nigerian Just Energy Transition conference speak about the need to dismantle the
patriarchy in order to transition Nigeria to a just economic system. However, what this would
entail is not conceptualized. This is partly due to a lack of discussion about the specific role
patriarchy plays in creating Nigeria’s current unjust economic system. WoMin asks, “If another
world is possible, who is doing the imagining?”9 To create another world, you must first
critically assess the status quo. This dissertation attempts to do just that.
Section II. Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Industry at a Glance
Background, Facts, and Statistics
In 1956, Shell D’Arcy (later renamed Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of
Nigeria Limited) discovers oil in Oloibiri in what is now Bayelsa state (located in the Niger
Delta). Nigeria first starts producing oil in 1958, with the well producing 5,100 barrels of oil per
day. By the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, Nigeria is producing over 2 million barrels of crude oil
per day. Nigeria sees a decline in the amount of oil produced in the 1980s, but production
recovers by the 2000s.10 Nigeria crude oil production peaks in 2005, with 2.44 million barrels per
day, but starts to decline due to increased militancy in the region.
By 2009, production of oil increases due to an amnesty with the militants and the increase
in deepwater offshore production. Deepwater production begins in 2003 and has become the

8

. WoMin. WoMin Just Transition Pamphlet, 1-2
https://womin.africa/mogale-declaration-living-the-future-now/#
9
. Our Work: Development Alternatives. Womin. https://womin.africa/development-alternatives/
10
. History of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/IndustryHistory.aspx
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main focus of oil exploration in the Niger Delta.11 For example, by early 2014, offshore
production accounts for 70% of Nigeria’s total oil production.12
As of 2019, Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa,13 and the 19th largest producer
in the world.14 The same year, Nigeria produces 2 million barrels per day of petroleum and other
liquids, with 1.65 million barrels per day being crude oil.15 Nigeria also has the second largest
proven crude oil reserves in Africa—the majority of which are offshore.16 Nigeria also holds the
largest natural gas reserves on the continent and is the 5th largest exporter of liquefied natural gas
(LNG) (as of 2018).17 Revenue from crude oil natural gas exports amounts to $55 billion (as of
2018).18
In 2019, India is the top destination for Nigeria’s crude oil exports (receiving 20% of all
crude oil exports). Spain (11%), the Netherlands (10%), the U.S. (10%), and France (7%) round
out the top five destinations of Nigeria’s crude oil.19 The U.S.’s share of Nigeria’s oil has been
oscillating over the past decade. In 2012, it accounts for 18%.20 In 2015, it accounts for 3% of
these exports.21 Europe continues to be the largest importer of Nigeria’s crude oil by region (47%
of Nigeria’s crude oil), importing about 1 million barrels per day.22

11

. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2020). Country Analysis Executive Summary: Nigeria, 3
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Nigeria/NigeriaCAXS_2020.pdf
12
. Ibid., 13
13
. Ibid., 1
14
. Total energy production 2018. U.S. Energy Information Administration.
https://www.eia.gov/international/rankings/world?pa=12&u=0&f=A&v=none&y=01%2F01%2F2018
15
. Country Analysis Executive Summary: Nigeria, 2
16
. Ibid., 2
17
. Ibid., 1
18
. Ibid.
19
. Ibid., 5
20
. International Monetary Fund. (2013). Nigeria: IMF Country Reports No. 14/103, 7
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14103.pdf
21
. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2015). Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria, 9
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Nigeria/archive/pdf/nigeria_2015.pdf
22
. Ibid., 5

7

The Niger Delta—The Oil-Producing Region of Nigeria
Map 1—The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

The Niger Delta, in
geopolitical terms, is made
up of nine oil-producing
states: 1) Abia; 2) AkwaIbom; 3) Bayelsa; 4) Cross
River; 5) Delta; 6) Edo; 7)
Imo; 8) Ondo; and 9) Rivers.
Image credit: “Niger Delta
States,” by Gozar at English
Wikipedia, licensed under CC
BY-SA 3.0

Most of Nigeria’s oil industry is located in the Niger Delta. As I discuss in Chapter 5, The
Niger Delta has been called one of the most polluted places in the world.23 A major source of oil
pollution in the Niger Delta is pipeline oil spills. A large network of oil pipelines connecting
many oil and gas fields cuts across the Niger Delta. These pipelines are located next to homes
and farmlands and go through rivers and swamps, and yet they are poorly maintained. Thus,
pipeline oil spills cause enormous damage to the landscape and communities in the Niger
Delta.24
Gas flaring—the burning of gas as waste—is another source of oil pollution in the Niger
Delta. Flaring gas contributes to air pollution because it releases harmful gases like carbon

23

. Niger Delta Negligence: How 3500 activists are taking on two oil giants. Amnesty International.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/niger-delta-oil-spills-decoders/
24
. Amnesty International. (2018). Negligence in the Niger Delta: Decoding Shell and Eni’s Poor Record on Oil Spills,
10. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4479702018ENGLISH.PDF
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dioxide and methane into the environment.25 In 2018, Nigeria is the 7th largest gas flaring country
in the world (in terms of the yearly volume of natural gas flaring).26
In response to this pollution, communities in the Niger Delta have mobilized against oil
operations on their lands. One of the most famous social movements that have emerged out of
the Niger Delta is MOSOP, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. In the 1990s,
with Ken Saro-Wiwa as the spokesperson, MOSOP argues that Shell is polluting their lands and
demand compensation for the destruction of their livelihoods.27
There is also a long history of women in the Niger Delta protesting against oil grievances
in their communities. In Chapter 6, I discuss the ways in which women in the Niger Delta are
organizing against oil exploitation.
Oil Multinational Corporations Operating in Nigeria
The major oil MNCs operating in Nigeria are Royal Dutch Shell (a British/Dutch
company), ExxonMobil (a U.S. company), Chevron (a U.S. company), Total/Elf (a French
company), and Eni (an Italian company). There are also smaller oil MNCs operating in the
region—e.g., Addax Petroleum and Statoil—as well as a host of Nigerian indigenous
companies.28
Nigeria’s oil and gas projects are mostly funded through joint ventures (JVs) between oil
MNCs and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), with the NNPC as the major
shareholder. The rest of the projects, e.g., deepwater projects, are funded by production sharing

25

. Okonta, Ike and Oronto Douglas. (2001). Where Vultures Feast: Shell Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta.
New York: Sierra Club Books, 73
26
. Country Analysis Executive Summary: Nigeria, 13
27
. Okonta and Douglas
28
. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2016). Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria, 3
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Nigeria/nigeria.pdf
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contracts (PSCs).29 There are four basic elements of a JV: a mutual interest in an objective; the
sharing of production profits; the bearing of production losses proportional to the share in the
venture; the ability to oversee the conduct of each other; and a close relationship between the
parties.30 In a JV, NNPC and the oil MNC are co-owners in the project. A PSC, on the other
hand, functions like an agreement between the NNPC and an oil company. The two are not coowners. The contract usually spans 10 to 30 years with the oil MNC funding all the costs. The
company does have a right to recoup its costs, known as ‘Cost Oil.’ What is left, ‘Profit Oil,’ is
shared between the NNPC and the oil company.31
In the below section, I discuss the oil companies operating in Nigeria. The section
focuses on their upstream activities.32 The NNPC (Nigeria’s state controlled oil company) is
discussed first, the major oil MNCs next, and some indigenous Nigerian companies last.
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
In 1971, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) is founded to engage in oil and
gas production in Nigeria. In 1977, NNOC merges with the Ministry of Petroleum Resources and
paves the way for the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).33 NNPC, established
by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, is responsible for all activities related to
the petroleum industry. Duties of NNPC include exploring, refining, and purchasing petroleum

29

. Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria (2016), 3
. Ariweriokuma, Soala. (2009). The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in Africa: The case of Nigeria. London and
New York: Routledge, 59
31
. Ibid., 61
32
. Upstream refers to the extraction and production of raw materials. This is often juxtaposed with downstream
activities, which refers to the post-production process such as the refining, marketing, and distribution of oil and
natural gas. See Kramer, Leslie. (2020, February 25). Upstream vs. Downstream Oil & Gas Operations: What's the
Difference? Investopedia. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/060215/what-difference-betweenupstream-and-downstream-oil-and-gas-operations.asp
33
. Ariweriokuma, 56
30
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as well as operating oil pipelines. It also, among other things, regulates the granting of leases and
permits and sets environmental standards. 34
Royal Dutch Shell
In 1936, the Royal Dutch Shell Group forms Shell D’Arcy to explore for oil in Nigeria.
As I mention earlier, Shell D’Arcy discovers oil in the Oloibiri well in 1956. That same year, the
company changes its name to Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited
(SPDC).35 Shell—through SPDC—has a joint venture with NNPC for onshore and shallow water
oil and gas production. This JV, the sixth participation agreement, is signed in July 1993. In this
JV, NNPC has a 55% share, SPDC has a 30% share, Total/Elf has a 10% share, and Agip/Eni has
a 5% share.36 Shell is also part of a liquified natural gas (LNG) joint venture—Nigeria LNG
(NLNG)—incorporated in 1989 to produce LNG and natural gas liquids for exports. Located on
Bonny Island, it is one of the biggest natural gas liquefaction plants in the world. In this JV,
Shell holds a 25.6% share, NNPC has a 49% share, Total/Elf has a 15% share, and Agip/Eni has
a 10.4%.37
Shell operates its deepwater projects in Nigeria through the Shell Nigeria Exploration and
Production Company Limited (SNEPCo). SNEPCo, formed in 1993, develops Nigeria’s offshore
oil and gas reserves. Through its PSC with NNPC, SNEPCo operates the Bonga oil field.
However, SNEPCo also has partnerships in the the Erha/Erha North oil field (ExxonMobil-

34

. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act: Chapter 320. Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990. Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEXFAOC067455
35
. The History of Shell Nigeria. Shell Nigeria.
https://www.shell.com.ng/about-us/shell-nigeria-history.html#vanityaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2hlbGwuY29tLm5nL2Fib3V0c2hlbGwvd2hvLXdlLWFyZS9oaXN0b3J5L2NvdW50cnkvZmlyc3Qt
c3RlcHMuaHRtbA
36
. Ibid.
37
. Who we are. Shell Nigeria. https://www.shell.com.ng/about-us/who-we-are.html
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operated) and Zabazaba/Etan oil field (Eni-operated).38 The Bonga reserve is estimated to have
about 600 million barrels of crude oil.39 Bonga has the production capacity of 200,000 barrels
per day and 150 million standard cubic feet of gas per day.40
ExxonMobil
In 1955, ExxonMobil begins operating in Nigeria through its subsidiary, Nigeria Mobil
Producing Nigeria Unlimited (MPN) (formerly the Mobil Exploration Nigerian Incorporated
[MENI]). MPN’s current JV with NNPC, agreed to in 1979, gives MPN a 40% share and NNPC
the remaining 60%.41 MPN and NNPC produce natural gas liquids through the Oso Natural Gas
Liquids project. This venture has expanded into the Natural Gas Liquids (NLG II) project which
has the potential to add 45 thousand barrels per day to ExxonMobil’s production.42
ExxonMobil operates mostly in deepwater offshore in Nigeria.43 In 1993, ExxonMobil
establishes Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (EEPNL) for deepwater
exploration and signs a PSC with NNPC the same year. In December 1999, EEPNL discovers
Erha field, a major deepwater oil and gas field in OPL (Oil Prospecting License) Block 209 (now
OPL 133). Erha has the potential to produce 150,000 barrels of oil yearly. EEPPNL currently has
a 56% share in OML 133, while SNEPCo holds the remaining 44%.44 ExxonMobil also holds a
30% share in the Usan oil-field (operated by Total), which has an estimated proven and probable
reserves of more than 500 million barrels.45

38

. Who we are. Shell Nigeria Website.
. Ariweriokuma, 73
40
. Who we are. Shell Nigeria Website.
41
. Ariweriokuma, 76
42
. Mobil Producing Nigeria: Unlimited MPN operations. ExxonMobil.
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/Locations/Nigeria/Mobil-Producing-Nigeria-Unlimited-MPN-operations
43
. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2013). Nigeria, 5
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Nigeria/archive/pdf/nigeria_2013.pdfNigeria
44
. Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited. ExxonMobil.
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/Locations/Nigeria/Esso-Exploration-and-Production-Nigeria-Limited
45
. Usan. ExxonMobil. https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/Crude-oils/Crude-trading/Usan
39

12

MPN and NNPC have over 90 offshore platforms that consist of about 300 wells. These
wells produce over 550 thousand barrels a day of crude, condensate, and natural gas liquids.46
Qua Iboe, a crude blend made from different offshore fields in Nigeria, is ExxonMobil’s biggest
asset in Nigeria. Qua Iboe is Nigeria’s largest crude blend and averages about 400,000 barrels of
oil per day in the early 2010s.47
Chevron
Chevron begins operations in Nigeria in 1913. Chevron operates in Nigeria through its
subsidiary, Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL). It has a 40% share in its JV with NNPC, with
NNPC having the remaining 60%. Through this JV, CNL has interests in 8 concessions onshore
and near-onshore.48 CNL operates the Escravos Gas Plant (EGP), which has a total capacity of
680 million cubic feet per day of natural gas. Chevron has the largest share (36.7%) in the West
African Gas Pipeline Company Limited, which operates the 421 mile West African Gas
Pipeline.49
Chevron also operates in the deepwater offshore. It operates 3 deepwater blocks and has
partnerships in 6 other blocks, with its shares ranging from 20% to 100%. Chevron operates the
Agbami Field—discovered in 1998—on the coast of the Niger Delta. Chevron has a 67.3% share
in that field. The Agbami Field and the Usan deepwater field—which Chevron has a 30% share
in—are Chevron’s major projects.50
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Total/Elf
Total has been operating in Nigeria since 1962. In May of that year, SAFRAP, a French
company, registers in Nigeria.51 SAFRAP is eventually renamed Total E&P Nigeria Limited
(TEPNG). TEPNG has a 40% interest in a JV with NNPC and produces oil and natural gas from
many onshore and shallow water concessions. TEPNG also owns a 15% share in Nigeria LNG, 52
and produces natural gas through its Obite Gas Project. Additionally, Total operates in offshore
fields, with some of these being the Amenam-Kpono, Akpo, and Usan deepwater fields.53
Eni
In 1962, the Exploration and Production Division of ENI begins oil exploration in
Nigeria through its subsidiary, Nigeria Agip Oil Company (NAOC)—which is commonly known
as Agip. In 1973, the Nigerian government is given a 35% share in Agip’s operations, but that
share has subsequently increased.54 Agip currently has a 20% share in its JV with NNPC, with
NNPC having a 60% share and Oando (a Nigerian oil company) a 20% share. Agip operates 4
onshore mining leases and 2 onshore exploratory leases.55
Eni also operates in Nigeria through two other subsidiaries. Agip Energy and Natural
Resources Limited (AENR) is incorporated in 1980 to focus on shallow water exploration.
Nigerian Agip Exploration Limited (NAE) is incorporated in 1996 for deepwater exploration.56
A large share of Eni’s production comes from onshore fields that produce Brass River, a crude
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blend. In addition to its share in Brass LNG Limited (20.8%), Eni also has a 10.4% share in
Nigeria LNG.57
Table 1—Major Joint Ventures in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry
Oil Multinational
Corporation and its
Nigerian subsidiary

Oil MNC’s
share in JV

Royal Dutch Shell/
Shell-BP Petroleum
Development
Company of Nigeria
Limited (SPDC)
ExxonMobil/
Nigeria Mobil
Producing Nigeria
Unlimited (MPN)
Chevron/
Chevron Nigeria
Limited (CNL)
Total/
Total E&P Nigeria
Limited (TEPNG)
Eni/
Nigeria Agip Oil
Company (NAOC)

Other companies
involved in the
JV

30%

Nigerian
National
Petroleum
Corporation’s
(NNPC)
share in JV
55%

40%

60%

N/A

40%

60%

N/A

40%

60%

N/A

20%

60%

Oando: 20%

Total/Elf: 10%;
Eni: 5%

Indigenous Companies
There are many indigenous oil companies in Nigeria, including Consolidated Oil Limited
(Conoil), Dubri Oil Company (Dubri Oil), Solgas Petroleum Limited, Atlas Petroleum
International, Allied Energy Resources, and AMNI International. This section will briefly give
the history of two of the companies, Conoil and Dubri Oil. Conoil registers in Nigeria in 1984.
By the mid-1990s, Conoil starts producing 7,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Dubri Oil is
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registered in Nigeria in 1987. It drills its first well in 1991 and is producing oil in the Ovia field
by 1995.58
Labor in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry
As I discuss in Chapter 3, there are two main labor unions in Nigeria’s oil and gas
industry—PENGASSAN (Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria) and
NUPENG (Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers). PENGASSAN is considered
the “white-collar” workers union of the oil and gas industry, while NUPENG is the “blue-collar”
workers union.59 Historically, PENGASSAN is a more conservative union, while NUPENG is
more radical/militant. Although these ideological leanings are less explicit today, these
characteristics are still said to apply.60 PENGASSAN and NUPENG have zonal offices (or
branches) in Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, and Kaduna—major trading/oil centers in Nigeria.61
Precise statistics about labor force employment in the oil and gas sector are not easily
accessible. However, some data do exist about employment statistics in the Nigerian oil and gas
sector. A 2012 study of 6 oil companies states that these companies employ about 26,696
people.62 This number is likely on the low end since it only focuses on a small number of
companies. In contrast, a 2003 estimate of Nigerian workers in the oil industry puts the number
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at 55,800. Gender breakdowns for workers in the oil industry are even more difficult to find.
Women are estimated to account for about 15% of the estimated 55,800 workers.63
Section III. Structure of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 synthesizes the different
literatures on women’s labor and oil economies and argues that using a theory of capitalist
patriarchy is the best way to look at the relationship between oil and women’s labor in the
Nigerian oil political economy. Using (primarily) a theory of capitalist patriarchy allows me to
theorize the exploitation of women’s waged and unwaged labor and link labor exploitation to
resistance. Each empirical chapter focuses on one aspect of this theory, but they also use other
frameworks to elucidate the labor women perform in the Nigerian oil political economy.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that my dissertation is influenced by African feminist research
methodologies. First, I show that my research questions and methods (semi-structured interviews
and focus groups) are based on (African) feminist goals, e.g., combatting Western and
patriarchal biases in social science research and de-hierarchizing the research space. Second, I
explain the ways in which I navigate issues of positionality and ethics during my fieldwork trips
and how these issues influence data collection and thus the final dissertation.
Chapter 4 focuses on the waged labor a particular class of women (women oil workers)
perform in the Nigerian oil political economy. I argue that waged labor precarity, a defining
feature of the capitalist economy, is a defining feature of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. In the
Nigerian oil and gas industry, labor precarity for oil workers in the Nigeria Union of Petroleum
and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) manifests as casualization and redundancy. However,
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conversations on labor precarity in the Nigerian oil and gas industry need to expand to include
the experiences of women oil workers. For women oil workers in NUPENG’s Port Harcourt
zone, their labor is exploited not just because they experience casualization and redundancy as
other oil workers do. These women’s exploitation also results from gender ordering (exclusion
and segregation) and sexual harassment in the workplace as well as the interaction between
workday constraints and the domestic division of labor in the household.
Chapter 5 focuses on the unwaged labor a particular class of women (rural women)
perform in the Nigerian oil political economy. I argue that foreign and domestic actors involved
in the Nigerian oil political economy (e.g., states, elites, oil MNCs) create oil pollution in the
Niger Delta by making decisions that prioritize profits at the expense of the environment. By
engaging in illicit financial outflows (through tax avoidance and tax evasion), shirking
environmental responsibilities (by claiming sabotage, taking advantage of the parent
company/subsidiary structure, lobbying for anti-climate change policies, and flaring gas), and
devising weak (whether intentional or not) environmental/community protections, these actors
shift pollution costs from themselves onto rural women’s domestic labor in the Niger Delta.
Chapter 6 examines the work of women (and men) in oil labor unions and local NGOs. I
argue that the work done by the Women Committee of NUPENG’s Port Harcourt zone and local
environmental rights NGOs around Port Harcourt continue a Niger Delta tradition of organizing
against structures that make laboring as women exploitative. I argue that the dynamics observed
in women’s ‘peasant resistance’ in the Niger Delta—shadow work and counterplanning from the
commons—can be found (although not in the exact ways) in the work done by NUPENG’s
Women Committee and these local NGOs.
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Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by returning to the idea of a “just” economic system.
By highlighting the efforts of WoMin, I show how African feminist organizations are engaged in
knowledge production around extractivism and imagining a more just economic system—
through the Mogale Declaration—for African women, their communities, and the environment.
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Chapter 2__The (Oil) Political Economy and Women’s Labor: Literature Review and
Theory
Contextualizing my Research Questions
In Chapter 1, I explain that my dissertation examines the ways in which women’s labor in
the Niger Delta—the oil-producing region of Nigeria—is integrated into, impacted by, and
shaping the Nigerian oil political economy. Therefore, this chapter contextualizes my
dissertation by situating it in different literatures and explaining the theory I use to answer my
research questions.
Oil’s effect on women’s labor has been studied—in part—in different fields of study
using a multitude of approaches. These approaches need to be synthesized to better understand
this issue in general and in Nigeria in particular. I do this by highlighting the gaps and
discrepancies in the literatures and emphasizing how/if these literatures are useful in answering
my research questions. What I find is that these literatures miss the different ways in which the
Nigerian oil political economy exploits women’s labor in the Niger Delta. I then argue that a
theory of capitalist patriarchy is a better way to understand the effects of oil on women’s labor
(broadly defined) in the Nigerian oil political economy because it focuses on gendered labor
exploitation in a capitalist political economy. As I detail later, I use capitalist patriarchy to
indicate that the gendered dimension of labor exploitation in the Niger Delta is more nuanced
than the term “exploitation” (often used in capitalist explanations of the political economy)
conveys.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section I reviews literature on oil’s effects on
women/gender relations in the Niger Delta. While these studies focus on the effects of oil
(pollution) on women in the Niger Delta, they do not link these effects to the Nigerian political
economy. I argue that oil pollution’s effect on women is better understood as part of a larger
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system of capitalist patriarchy that exploits women’s labor. In Section II, I outline literature on
the African political economy. I review studies on capitalist accumulation in Africa in general
and Nigeria in particular, with the latter focusing on accumulation in the oil sector and how this
impacts the Niger Delta. I use these studies as a starting point for my project. However, to
understand the effects of this accumulation on women’s labor in the Niger Delta, a lens of
capitalist patriarchy is necessary. Section III focuses on the “resource curse” literature. This
literature contends that oil rents limit the demand for and supply of female labor in oil-producing
countries. I argue that this literature can tell us some general insights about the impact of oil on
women’s labor. However, it gets specific details about Nigeria wrong since it does not deal with
capitalism in the oil political economy and the way in which it intersects with patriarchy. Thus, it
misses the ways in which the exploitation of women’s labor (both waged and unwaged) fuel the
oil political economy. Section IV focuses on rural sociology literature on capitalist patriarchy
and finds that it deals with a variant of my theory that emphasizes the meanings assigned to
gender in oil economies. My project, in contrast, is mostly concerned with the gendered
structures in oil economies that impact women’s labor. In Section V, I articulate a theory of
capitalist patriarchy that links capitalist exploitation with women’s labor (waged and unwaged)
and their resistance. Section VI provides a conclusion.
Section I. Literature Review: Oil’s Effects on Women/Gender Relations in the Niger Delta
Economic Effects of Oil on Women
Some studies explore the activities that are destroyed from oil exploration in the Niger
Delta and the subsequent impacts on women in the different spheres of the economy. For
instance, Francisca I. Omorodion’s (2004) study shows that oil has particular effects on women’s
labor activities in the Niger Delta. She writes,
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Oil explorations were accompanied by changes in the sexual division of labor, and a new
social order emerged in which women and children [sic] economic activities were
destroyed and made invisible. Rather than incorporate women in…alternate incomegenerating activities in [the] oil industry, women were seen as irrelevant and insignificant
in the policies and programs of oil multinationals.64
Women become irrelevant in the development of their communities, she argues, because they
lose their income-generating activities but are not considered for jobs in the oil sector. This then
confines them to the home.65 Augustine Ikelegbe (2005) similarly argues that women in the
Niger Delta are discriminated against in the oil sector. She writes,
[W]omen have been victims of the economic crisis. This has induced greater women
participation in the informal sector, as they struggle to absorb the deficits and scarcities in
the family economies. Women have also borne the greater consequences of the social
disruption and disarticulation arising from the economic crisis.66
According to Ikelegbe, women’s exclusion from the oil sector and scarce economic opportunities
have pushed them into the “informal” sector to provide food for their families. Oluwatoyin
Oluwaniyi (2011) makes a similar claim in her study of four communities in the Niger Delta.
Oluwaniyi argues that since the women’s traditional means of acquiring food and money are
destroyed, they often rely on the black market to make ends meet, putting their lives at risk to do
so. Some engage in selling oil products on the black market, while others engage in sex work,
often providing their services to oil workers. Poorer women are less likely to enforce safe sexual
practices with these richer men. Thus, sexually transmitted diseases, e.g., HIV/AIDS are
pervasive in this region.67 Adaora Osondu (2012) also discusses sex work in the Niger Delta. She
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writes that oil workers “entice young women with money (that they [can] no longer make from
their farming and fishing business due to a degraded environment) and [lure] them for sex.”68
The high unemployment rate and the destruction of women’s traditional economic activities have
pushed women into the “informal” sector, including sex work.
There has also been scholarship on how oil pollution affects women’s ability to generate
income and maintain their household labor. Omorodion argues that oil spills reduce the amount
of water-based food sources, e.g., periwinkle snails, making women’s fishing expeditions take
longer than they used to. Sometimes women come back from these expeditions with little or no
fish. Also, some women have found that their traditional fishing tools are not adequate for
fishing in deep waters. Women’s status in their economy is thus devalued and the women must
seek other ways to generate income. This makes them vulnerable to STDs and HIV/AIDS.69 The
Kebetkache Women Development & Resource Centre (2015) also conduct a study on the impact
of oil pollution on women’s household labor in the Niger Delta. In their study in Ibeno, Nigeria,
the organization finds that women are responsible for fishing and farming in Ibeno, but the
ExxonMobil oil spillage in the area has adversely impacted the women’s ability to do so. The
crayfish, crab, and other aquatic animals that used to be found in the sea are no longer there. This
seafood is what the women use to feed their families and sell for income. The study explains,
“When farmlands are polluted and destroyed, economic activities of women are disrupted, and
family income is affected and finding alternative source of income is challenging.”70
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Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas (2001) show that gas flaring, the burning of gas as waste,
is a source of pollution in the Niger Delta. It often reduces crop yields in the surrounding areas.71
Edward Uche Omeire et al. (2014) argue that this reduction of crops disproportionately affects
women since they are the ones responsible for food production in the Niger Delta. This often
leads to high levels of poverty for the women.72
Health Effects of Oil on Women
Some scholars have looked at how women are affected by health effects of oil extraction.
The literature argues that women are disproportionately affected by oil extraction because they
have more direct contact with polluted waters and farmlands. Oluwaniyi claims, “As well as
women bearing the burden of oil spillages, they are the ones responsible for fetching drinking
water from brackish oil-polluted rivers and wells, [and they] and their families…suffer health
problems after drinking toxic water.”73 Ikelegbe also argues that women are disproportionately
burdened by oil pollution due to fetching water. She writes, “Women and their children are also
most affected by the pollution of communal ponds and rivers that provide drinking water. The
health hazards from toxic waste and the pollution of drinking water are borne mostly by women
and their children.”74 Similarly, Charles Ukeje et al. (2002) write,
Just like men, women have suffered the adverse effects of soil degradation, pollution, and
health hazards associated with toxic wastes. But they tend to bear the burden much more
than men. For instance, women source for firewood in an ecologically degraded
environment. They source for potable water in a situation in which pollution has rendered
communal ponds and stream water undrinkable. The risk of ill health is also
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disproportionately borne by women when there is an outbreak or epidemic due to
environmental pollution effects.75
As these quotations explain, it is because of their role in food production—the process of
fetching water, farming, fishing, etc. to procure food—that women have more direct contact with
pollution and may suffer more health effects. For instance, women in the Kebetkache study
report experiencing miscarriages after coming into contact with oil pollution.76
While these studies document oil’s impact on different types of women’s labor, they do
not link these effects to larger structural issues. First, there is no analysis on how Nigeria is
situated into the global capitalist economy. Without this analysis, one cannot see the ways in
which oil pollution is integral to the Nigerian oil political economy. Second, these studies do not
consider that global structures often shift costs onto women. Pollution in the Niger Delta is
another example of this. Without these analyses, these studies describe how oil (pollution) affects
women in the Niger Delta, but they do not quite describe why. My project fills this gap.
Literatures on how Africa in general and Nigeria in particular are integrated into the global
capitalist economy are useful here.
Section II. Literature Review: African Political Economy
Africa’s Position in the Global Capitalist Economy
Walter Rodney (1972) argues that African underdevelopment is a function of its
incorporation into the international capitalist economy. Beginning with pre-colonial Africa
(during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), Rodney describes how the exploitation of
Africa and African labor for capitalist accumulation in Western Europe distorts growth in Africa.
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During this period, human captives are used as slave labor in many places around the world.77
Once Europeans are dependent on slave labor, Rodney argues, they have to rationalize this
exploitation on racist grounds. Thus “[racial] [o]ppression follows logically from exploitation, so
as to guarantee the latter.” 78 However, Cedric J. Robinson ([1983] 2000) argues that racism
predates imperialism since “[r]acism…was not simply a convention for ordering the relations of
European to non-European peoples but has its genesis in the ‘internal’ relations of European
peoples.”79 This ordering structure comes to permeate capitalism. Robinson, often credited with
coining the term ‘racial capitalism’ argues that “the development, organization, and expansion of
capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions.”80 Whether or not racism precedes
capitalism is not the point here. What matters is that both agree that capitalism relies on a racial
order.
Rodney continues that imperialism necessitates that African labor is used to harvest raw
materials (e.g., palm products, groundnuts, cotton, and rubber) to fuel the metropolitan sectors of
Western Europe.81 This control of African labor continues under European colonial rule. African
workers are paid paltry wages, so that profits could accrue to European businesses. The need to
feed accumulation in Europe is disastrous for Africans. African social institutions do not reflect
the goals of the indigenous members of society.82 African businesses are not able to flourish
since Africans do not have enough capital to invest. Instead, they are dependent on Europeanowned capital and local capital owned by minority groups (Lebanese, Syrians, Greeks, and
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Indians).83 This exploitation of Africa does not stop after independence, however. Rodney argues
that Africa continues to be under (neo) colonial control since colonial powers are able to “hijack
the African revolution”84 by turning over power to handpicked leaders who continue to work on
behalf of the colonial powers. Rodney thus provides a framework to think about labor, racist
capitalist accumulation, and class relations in post-colonial Africa.
A Second Scramble for Africa?
Since African raw materials—especially oil—continue to be important for many Western
countries and their multinational corporations (MNCs), many authors (Michael Watts 200685;
Chris Nwachukwu Okeke 200886; Raf Custers and Ken Matthysen 200987; Pádraig Carmody
201188; Douglas Yates 201289) have concluded that this interest in Africa amounts to a
new/second scramble for African raw materials.90
While these authors appear to be using a similar framework to Rodney, what they
perceive as the crux of the issue and the solution to the problem shows otherwise. The solutions
that are offered for this scramble fall under the “good governance” framework. Mari-Lise du
Preez (2014) defines ‘good governance’ as the principles of “participation, fairness, decency,
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accountability, transparency, and efficiency.”91 For instance, Custers and Matthysen argue,
“[T]his issue [scramble for African raw materials] raises concerns about good governance and
corruption.”92 Okeke writes that “the bane of Africa's economic underdevelopment lies in its lack
of democratic accountability.”93 In other words, these authors argue that the best way for Africa
to deal with this new scramble is to end corruption and strengthen their institutions. These
authors working under the global governance framework do not see the ways in which this
‘corruption’ is capitalist accumulation at work. Therefore, in my analysis of Nigeria, my project
utilizes frameworks that underscore the importance of capitalist accumulation.
Nigerian Oil Political Economy
Colonial Nigeria
As Rodney describes, the Nigerian colonial state is imposed on Nigeria to further the
interest of British capitalism.94 In fact, the Nigerian state starts out as the United Africa
Company (later named the Royal Niger Company), a British commercial trading firm seeking to
control mineral trade along the Niger River.95 Samir Amin (1972) argues that colonial Nigeria is
a trade economy characterized by a dominant trade monopoly.96 In the urban areas, Mark Anikpo
(1985) adds, the British own the means of production while Nigerians supply the labor.97 In the
rural areas, the peasants produce surplus goods that are sold in the urban areas. Colonial
authorities install the old ruling leaders as warrant chiefs to quell any dissents among the
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peasants. In return, these chiefs receive favorable treatment from the colonial authorities.98 This
results in the underdevelopment of Nigeria. When Nigeria becomes independent in 1960, some
relations of production are altered. But others do not change substantially.
Post-independence Nigeria—until the 1990s
Early scholarship during this period focus on the positive effects of oil on Nigeria. In
1956, Shell D’Arcy (Royal Dutch Shell) discovers oil in Oloibiri in what is now Bayelsa state
(located in the Niger Delta). Nigeria first starts producing oil in 1958, with the well producing
5,100 barrels of oil per day. By the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, Nigeria is producing over 2
million barrels of crude oil per day.99 Scott Pearson (1970) argues that “private foreign
investment in Nigeria has been responsible for net direct and indirect benefits” for Nigeria.100 He
does add that there may be concerns “emanating from the [Nigerian] government’s dependence
on oil-related revenues,”101 but he still does not see that as a threat.
Later scholarship, having benefitted from time, come to a different conclusion. These
scholars argue that oil has contributed to the underdevelopment of Nigeria. Anikpo writes that
the exploitative economic relations in Nigeria continue in the post-colonial period because the
British help “to install in office a crust of indigenous politicians with similar bourgeois
orientations and interests” 102 in exploiting the resources of the country. In the oil sector, Terisa
Turner (1976a) argues, these ‘exploitative economic relations’ take the form of a triangular
relationship between oil multinational corporations, local middlemen, and the state comprador.
Multinational corporations in Nigeria are able to get access to markets by going through
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middlemen. These middlemen then collect a fee for their services.103 State compradors in Nigeria
also help MNCs get access to markets. In return for using their positions to assist the MNCs, the
compradors get a cut of the profits. Turner (1976b) adds that the state also consists of
technocrats, whose job is to “[reduce] national reliance on foreign goods and services.”104
However, these technocrats are unable to reduce Nigeria’s dependence on oil MNCs because the
middlemen, state compradors, and MNCs have resisted transferring oil technology into
indigenous hands.105 Turner writes, “The political economy of Nigeria, and the country’s
‘pragmatic’ political culture are defined largely by efforts to establish these triangular
relationships and to operate them profitably” 106 to the detriment of Nigeria’s development. Other
scholars mention this triangular relationship or a similar type of alliance. For instance, Tom
Forrest (1982) argues that “oil is a double-edged weapon which is difficult to wield effectively
under the class conditions of accumulation that have emerged in Nigeria.”107 This alliance is
between “foreign capital and bureaucratic and managerial elements of the bourgeoisie.”108 This
alliance shapes oil policy in Nigeria because there is “an absence of any independent industrial
bourgeoisie.”109 Bade Onimode (1983a) argues that there is “collusion between the MNCs and
the dominant strata of the Nigerian bureaucratic bourgeoisie,” which “confers mutual advantages
on both group of exploiters.”110 The MNCs get entry into the country and access to oil
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concessions, while those in the state get appointments in MNCs, kick-backs, and other
benefits.111 He (1983b) continues that “the operations of the [oil] MNCs occur in the familiar
triadal relationships. These involve the metropolitan head offices of the multinationals, other oil
and mining MNCs with which they alternatively cooperate and engage in bitter acrimony, and
the Nigerian client state itself which the multinationals strive to ‘bribe or break.’”112 Similarly,
Tunde Adeniran (1983) argues that “the Nigerian economy constitutes a satellite region whose
metropolitan control centre lies within the advanced capitalist countries. The country’s economic
policy gives room for economic infiltration, through foreign capital investments…It also
encourages the emergence and growth of the big bourgeois compradors [italics in original] and
paves the way for the total control of the country’s life style, orientation and goals by the
MNCs.”113 According to Onimode and Adeniran, all of this leads to the underdevelopment of
Nigeria.
Although Claude Ake (1985) is not speaking specifically about the Nigerian oil economy,
he argues that the Nigerian political economy works to stifle development. According to Ake, the
main social forces are foreign capital, the indigenous bourgeoisie (capitalists) in charge of the
state, labor/workers, and peasants. Each one is discussed in turn. Foreign capital represents the
economic power base in Nigeria, while the indigenous bourgeoisie represent the political power
base. While there are some contradictions between foreign capital and local capital, the
relationship between the two has been one of accommodation.114 Nigerian labor is in a class
struggle against capital. Yet the struggle is weak given that the size of labor is relatively small;
many wage-earners work for the state, complicating the ability of workers to struggle; and ethnic
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consciousness sometimes inhibits class identity in Nigeria. Lastly, peasants continue to be
economically important for Nigeria, producing the surplus that is sold to the world market.
However, they are politically marginalized.115
Cyril Obi and Kayode Soremekun (1995) give an overview of state involvement in the
Nigerian oil industry. The first phase is characterized by Britain’s exploitation of Nigeria’s oil
resources. 116 The second phase is defined by an emerging ruling class using the state to access
oil resources. Oil becomes the means of accumulation, and the ruling class fight to control it.117
This fight for control, they explain, “fueled the crisis in Nigeria’s political economy.”118 The
third phase (current phase when Obi and Soremekun are writing) is defined by Nigeria’s
participation in the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Restructuring under SAP deepens
the Nigerian state’s dependency on oil and foreign capital and continues the underdevelopment
of Nigeria.119
Contemporary Nigeria
Daniel A. Omoweh (2005) describes three main social forces in the Nigerian oil
economy. First, there is the state that formulates policies and creates an environment that is
conducive to capitalist accumulation. Second, foreign capital provides the technology and the
capital for crude oil production.120 Third, there are the exploited workers who supply the labor
for crude oil production.121 Speaking on the relationship between the state and MNCs (Shell
specifically), Omoweh writes,
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[T]hough both the state and Shell constitute the capitalist class in Nigeria’s petroleum
industry since together, they own the means of production, the latter has used its control
of oil technology to subordinate the former. In essence, Shell is not only exploiting the
state but using it to underdevelop its Niger Delta in the process of capitalist
accumulation.122
Like the previous authors, Omoweh argues that the main actors (although he misses Nigerian
elites) in the Nigerian oil political economy accumulate capital and underdevelop Nigeria,
specifically the Niger Delta.
From Rodney to the aforementioned studies on the Nigerian oil political economy, these
studies are useful to understand the ways in which the different elements of the Nigerian oil
political economy—the Nigerian state, oil MNCs, and the Nigerian capitalist class—exploit
labor to accumulate capital in the oil sector. Profits are generated for the Nigerian state, oil
companies, and Nigerian elites. However, this devastates Nigeria and its Niger Delta.
While the exploitation of labor is an important part of the oil political economy, there are
only a few studies that specifically focus on oil workers. Julius Ihonvebere (1998) examines the
labor control strategies of the Nigerian state and oil companies. He shows that oil companies use
threats, blackmail, bribery, etc. to destroy oil labor activism. This works in tandem with the
Nigerian state, as it uses its military to destroy labor activism.123 However, since there is no
focus on gender, Ihonvebere misses the ways in which the exploitation of women’s labor (waged
and unwaged) is crucial to the oil political economy. Nuzo Eziechi’s (2014) dissertation focuses
on the occupational stress of Nigerian offshore oil workers.124 As I detail below, my project
focuses on labor precarity among oil workers (specifically women oil workers) in the Nigerian
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oil and gas industry. I use some of Eziechi’s insights in my project since she identifies labor
precarity as a source of occupational stress for both the men and women working offshore.
Section III. Literature Review: “Resource Curse”
A few scholars writing in the “resource curse” tradition in political science have written
about oil’s effect on women’s “formal” employment. For instance, Valentine Moghadam
(1993125, 2001126, and 2013127) argues that oil booms limit the demand for and supply of female
labor in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Oil booms lead to the expansion of
oil-related industries, which limit the expansion of manufacturing jobs. This is the sector where
women tend to be concentrated, thus the demand for them decreases. He also argues that oil
revenue limit the supply of female workers because high wages earned by men have reinforced
“a patriarchal gender contract—the implicit and often explicit agreement that men are the
breadwinners and are responsible for financially maintaining wives, children, and elderly
parents, and that women are wives, homemakers, mothers, and caregivers.”128 Massoud
Karshenas (1997) makes a similar argument and claims that oil revenue allow patriarchal family
structures—where there is one (male) breadwinner—to exist. However, for Karshenas, this is not
the only reason why male participation rates outpace female participation rates in the labor
market. In these societies, he continues, the education of boys (future breadwinners) is more
important than the education of girls. Thus, boys attain education at a higher rate than girls do.
This leads to more educated male workers than female workers. This can explain low female
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participation rates (vs. male participation rates) in the MENA region.129 Similarly, Ragui Assaad
(2004) explains that oil revenue account for the differences in female labor force participation in
Egypt and Morocco. He argues that oil revenue harms export-oriented sectors in Egypt, which
tend to employ women, by making these sectors less competitive in the international market.
This then limits the demand for female labor.130
Also focusing on the Middle East, Michael Ross (2008) claims that oil production, and
not Islam, is the reason women lag in the region. He argues that oil production reduces the
number of women in the labor force and thus decreases their political influence. Therefore, oilproducing states are left with strong patriarchal norms, laws, and institutions. Using a modified
model of the “Dutch Disease”—adding gender-based segregation in the labor force to the
model—Ross explains that oil wealth shifts the economy away from the “traded sector” (where
women are concentrated) towards the “nontraded sector” (where men are concentrated). This
increases the demand for male labor and decreases the demand for female labor. Female wages
subsequently decline, which makes women more reluctant to enter the labor force. This
reluctance has an impact on female representation. First, women are not socialized into politics.
Second, their absence in the labor force means that the government can ignore them. It then
follows that, according to Ross, female political influence is reduced.131
Politics & Gender organizes a special issue to respond to Ross’s article. Some of the
responses focus on whether oil can be said to contribute to gender inequality in the Middle East
rather than the general relationship between oil and gender inequality. For example, Mounira M.
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Charrad (2009) argues that the patriarchal societies in the Middle East predate the oil economy
and that Ross’s argument does not sufficiently explain the differences in female political
participation in the Maghreb.132 Similarly, Pippa Norris (2009) argues that Ross underestimates
cultural explanations in accounting for the persistence of patriarchy in the Middle East. She also
challenges his link between oil rents and female political participation and the structure of the
labor market in the Middle East.133
Other responses to the Ross article attempt to take on the relationship between oil
economies and gender inequality. Alice Kang (2009) argues that Ross omits gender quotas in his
analysis and thus does not consider the ability of political institutions to mitigate the effects of oil
on women’s political participation.134 Terri L. Caraway (2009) critiques Ross because his
measure of the workforce does not include the “informal” sector or agricultural jobs. Thus,
Caraway argues, the extent of oil’s impact on women’s employment is not clear. For instance,
women may be forced from the “formal” sector to the “informal” sector and thus their place in
the economy devalued. Caraway also critiques Ross for arguing that the reason women do not
enter the labor force is because the wages are not sufficient to entice them. According to
Caraway, “the main constraint on women’s employment in oil economies is not that employers
do not offer wages high enough to entice women into the workforce but that employers usually
do not want to hire women in the first place.”135
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Ross (2012) updates his 2008 article by adding a “theory of female empowerment.”136 He
claims that oil rents affect both the demand for and supply of female labor. Oil rents “reduce the
demand for female labor by shrinking the number of jobs in export-oriented [manufacturing]
factories.”137 Similar to the patriarchal contract idea Moghadam advances, Ross argues that oil
rents also “discourage women from seeking work outside the home by diminishing their
families’ need for a second income.”138 This then limits the supply of female labor. While Ross’s
2008 article focuses on the Middle East, Ross claims that this research has implications for the
study of the status of women in other resource-rich states.139 His 2012 article modifies this claim
by arguing that “[n]ot all oil-rich countries fit this model, so not all of them are susceptible to
these problems…[I]n countries where women face barriers to working in the service sector, oil
wealth is liable to retard their economic, social, and political progress.”140 He continues, “Many
of these countries are in the Middle East and North Africa.”141
In his study on oil production in the U.S., Joel Simmons (2010) likewise argues that
“resource abundance increases women’s nonlabor income and thereby reduces their participation
in the workforce.”142 He argues that although women do not usually work in the oil industry,
their husbands often do. Thus, “even though resource abundance need not have much of an effect
on women’s earned income, it increases their nonlabor income by increasing household
income.”143 This makes them more likely to choose leisure (staying at home) over labor.
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Responding to earlier critiques of Ross’s work that it is actually culture rather than natural
resource abundance that explains the lack of female political participation, Simmons argues that
“rather than conclude that culture makes immaterial the effect of resource wealth, we learn that
resource wealth and inegalitarian gender attitudes combine to suppress even more [italics in
original] women’s economic participation and political influence.”144 He explains that “women
socialized according to inegalitarian views of gender roles will have indifference curves that
reflect a more intense ‘taste for leisure’ than do women socialized according to more egalitarian
ideas.”145 These ideas combined with high household incomes decrease women’s labor market
participation rates and political influence.
Other works on this issue, while not explicitly focusing on oil, also argue that there is a
relationship between natural resource abundance and female labor force participation. Quy-Toan
Do, Andrei A. Levchenko, and Claudio Raddatz (2011) study the relationship between the
composition of a country’s economy and female labor force participation. They “find a lower
gender gap in countries that export more goods that require female labor to be produced.”146 And
in contrast to previous works, Andreas Kotsadam and Anja Tolonen (2016) argue that the impact
on natural resource abundance on female labor force participation rates has not been uniformly
negative. Studying mining in Africa, Kotsadam and Tolonen contradict Ross and Simmons’s
work by arguing that even if the manufacturing sector shrinks, this does not have to have
negative consequences for female labor force participation. This is because “[w]omen are
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overrepresented in sales and services in SSA [Sub-Saharan Africa], but underrepresented in
production and manufacturing.”147 They conclude:
In total, our results suggest that industrial mine openings constitute a mixed blessing for
women in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand they cause a decline in agriculture, but
on the other hand there is an increase in service sector jobs. The decline in agriculture is
large and by far outweighs the increase in service sector jobs so in total female
employment is reduced. The new jobs created are, however, likely to be better in the
sense that remuneration is more likely to be in cash and since such employment is less
seasonally dependent.148
Kotsadam and Tolonen’s findings suggest that the debate on the “resource curse” is not quite
settled.
This literature provides some general insights about the ways in which oil affects
women’s waged labor and political participation. It acknowledges that women and men
experience waged labor differently in oil economies; that there is a connection between labor
(broadly defined) and political participation (broadly defined); and that money (rents in this
literature) is integral to the oil economy. My project touches on all these issues. However, this
framework misses and undertheorizes key concepts that ultimately make it inadequate to analyze
women’s labor in the Nigerian oil political economy. In this chapter, my critiques center on the
first two points. The last one is discussed briefly in my theory section and more in depth in
Chapter 5. My first set of critiques focus on the lack of analysis on capitalist relations in the oil
political economy. Second, I critique the lack of theorizing about gender in this literature. I
problematize: 1) how women’s labor force participation is conceptualized and 2) the link
between waged labor employment and political participation. Each critique is discussed in turn.
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Where is the Oil Political Economy?
Criticizing the “resource curse” tradition, Garth le Pere (2014) argues that this literature
omits the social and political forces shaping the natural resource landscape and the global
dynamics that affect natural resource economies on the African continent.149 Similarly, Adam
Hanieh (2015) argues that the “resource curse” tradition/ Rentier State Theory is drawn from a
Weberian framework of class and society, thus “categories such as class and capitalism either
disappear from view or are considered derivate and subordinate to the policies of the state.”150
This is where the literatures on the African/Nigerian political economy are useful. As I mention,
I will use these literatures as a starting point while incorporating a theory of capitalist patriarchy.
Assumptions about Women’s Labor Force Participation
Re-conceptualizing Oil’s Impact on Women’s Waged Labor
As I mention above, Kotsadam and Tolonen argue that women are overrepresented in
service sector jobs in Africa and underrepresented in manufacturing jobs. Thus, the mechanism
Ross (2012) and others outline for oil’s impact on female labor force participation may not hold
for that region. What Kotsadam and Tolonen demonstrate is that Ross—and many of the other
authors in this literature—undertheorize women’s waged labor. They do not understand why
women work and how women are incorporated into waged work. Without this understanding,
oil’s impact on women’s “formal” labor cannot be analyzed.
Women seek waged work for a variety of reasons; need is one of them. But many of the
authors in this tradition do not seem to understand this. Ross and Simmons argue that women
only work when they need a second income. If it is not for this need, women will prefer leisure
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(staying at home). In oil economies, they argue, oil rents decrease a family’s need for a second
income. This deters women from working. But in many places around the world, women’s
second income is necessary for the survival of the household. And in many other households,
women do not merely provide a second income to a household; they are the only income. V.
Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan (1999) argue that women who work outside the home
are often seen as only working for “pin money” (a second income) even though they are the sole
breadwinners in their families.151 Thus, arguing that women only work when their families need
a second income downplays the number of women involved in waged labor. More importantly,
this assumption leads one to overlook the conditions under which these women work and
contributes to the exploitation of their labor.
Jan Pettman (1996) argues that the exploitation of women’s labor is central to the
international political economy. Women’s labor is treated as “disposable,” thus creating the
“feminisation of labour” in which women are confined to low-skilled, low-paying, and mostly
part-time work.152 Peterson and Runyan (1999) similarly argue that globally, women are mostly
confined to “low paying, nonunionized, and relatively unregulated [work] in terms of health and
safety requirements.”153 Thus, women are not incorporated into waged labor in the same way as
men. Carolyne Dennis’s (1983) study on male and female workers at Odu’Atex textile factory in
southern Nigeria shows this differential incorporation of labor. She finds that men and women at
the factory are incorporated into industrial labor on different terms despite having similar
qualifications and ambitions. The men are incorporated as skilled or unskilled labor. Women are
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only incorporated as unskilled labor. This differential incorporation results in less pay and no
career advancement for the women. 154 Diane Elson and Ruth Pearson (1981) argue that
assumptions about women not being the primary income-earner and gender stereotypes about
what is considered “real work” justify paying women cheap wages.155
Sylvia Walby (1990) explains that there are two different patriarchal strategies used to
control women’s labor in the waged economy—exclusion and segregation. The exclusion
strategy aims to prevent women from gaining access to a labor sector.156 Caraway is alluding to
this strategy in her critique of Ross. But what Caraway misses is the segregation strategy. This
strategy aims to separate men from women’s work and relegate the latter to a lower status and
wage than the former.157 This strategy is what Dennis observes in the Odu’Atex factory.
As I detail in the theory section, examining the impact of oil on women’s waged work
necessitates analyzing the conditions under which women work in the oil industry,
De-Centering Waged Work: Investigating Unwaged/Domestic Work
Kotsadam and Tolonen argue that future work must assess the effect of natural resources
on women’s “household bargaining power,”158 therefore suggesting that waged work must be decentered in these analyses in order to fully understand the effect of natural resources on female
labor force participation broadly defined. De-centering waged work allows for the other spheres
of the economy to come into view.
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Since the “resource curse” authors do not theorize domestic labor, they do not see labor
in the household as work. Ross and Simmons argue that if women do not need to work, they
would prefer leisure (staying at home). But women who stay at home—whether they prefer to or
not—still work. Referring to this time at home as ‘leisure’ misunderstands the work involved in
maintaining the household and the importance of this work to the economy. For instance,
Cynthia Enloe (1990) demonstrates that military bases rely on women as wives to make these
places function as smoothly as they do. Wives tend to be responsible for the domestic labor that
makes the household—and thus economy—work.159 Pettman explains that household labor is
treated as part of a woman’s marital duty and couched in terms of a “labour of love,” thus this
work is undervalued.160 As I detail in the theory section, the household labor of those affected by
the oil industry must be considered in order to thoroughly gauge oil’s impact on women’s labor.
Women’s Labor Force Participation and Women’s Political Participation/ Political Influence
As I mention above, Ross (2008) argues that oil rents limit female political influence in
oil-rich countries because these rents reduce the number of women in the waged-labor force.
Women who are not engaged in waged work, Ross argues, are not socialized into politics. This
leads to less influential women’s movements and groups, decreasing the chances of gender
reforms including more female representation in the government.161 However, this argument
rests on multiple assumptions that my theory section challenges. First, Ross assumes that waged
work is what socializes women into politics and does not consider other avenues that socializes
people into politics. Second, Ross prioritizes the formal political process when counting political
influence. But political influence can be measured in a variety of ways. For instance, women in
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the Niger Delta have used protests to air out their grievances against the oil industry, continuing
a long trend of women’s protests in Nigeria.162 These protests are important in and of
themselves, regardless of whether they lead to more women involved in the formal political
process. Thus, oil economies do not necessarily reduce female political participation. They can
spur participation.
In her dissertation, Sharon Shocat (2014) uses Nigeria as a case study to challenge Ross’s
conclusion about female labor force participation in oil-rich countries. Using a “Dutch Disease”
model, she argues that oil has decreased women’s labor force participation and subsequently
disempowered Nigerian women in formal political institutions but has increased women’s nonformal political participation in the Niger Delta. She finds that the economic stresses of oil are
higher in the Niger Delta region than in other regions of Nigeria, resulting in higher non-formal
political participation—protests and non-governmental organization (NGO) activity—among
women in the Niger Delta than in other regions.163 As I detail in my theory section, I similarly
focus on the ways in which oil spurs women’s participation in the Niger Delta by focusing on
NGOs (as well as oil labor unions). My framework, however, focuses on the ways in which
capitalist labor exploitation spurs women’s participation in NGOs. And while Shocat only
focuses on waged labor, my project argues that the exploitation of women’s unwaged labor is
part of the story of women’s mobilizations in the Niger Delta.
Section IV. Literature Review: Rural Sociology
This question about how natural resources/oil affects gender relations has also been taken
up by those in rural sociology. In this literature, the concern is about the meanings of masculinity
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and femininity that are constructed by working in/being around the extraction of natural
resources. For instance, Shannon Elizabeth Bell and Yvonne A. Braun (2010) argue that the coal
industry in Central Appalachia has shaped the meanings of masculinity and femininity in the
region. The coal industry personifies masculinity in Central Appalachia, and the gender identities
of men (coal miners) in the region are intimately tied to coal. Therefore, these men are
discouraged from criticizing coal’s ecological effects lest they be seen as less “manly.” Women
in the region (usually the wives of the coal miners) have more room to criticize the effects of the
coal industry because their concerns are perceived as stemming from their identities as mothers.
These differences in gender identities can explain why there are more women in the
Environmental Justice movement in the region.164 Similarly, Matthew R. Filteau (2016) argues
that “[u]nder a capitalist patriarchy, gas industry representatives and longtime residents in this
region [Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale region] police gender…by reprimanding men and
women who threaten economic growth, which restricts cultural gender maneuvering[,]…limits
residents’ ability to protest development, and ensures the superordinate position of the capitalist
patriarchy.”165 To reiterate, this literature focuses on the meanings assigned to gender in oil
economies. My project, in contrast, is mostly concerned with the gendered structures in oil
economies that impact women’s labor.
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Section V. Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy
Zillah Eisenstein (1979, 1999166) argues that a socialist feminist understanding of the
political economy necessitates understanding the “interdependence of capitalism and
patriarchy.”167 She explains,
[M]ale supremacy, as a system of sexual hierarchy, supplies capitalism (and systems
previous to it) with the necessary order and control… [and] is thus necessary to the
smooth functioning of the society and the economic system…[P]atriarchy (as male
supremacy) provides the sexual hierarchal ordering of society for political control and as
a political system cannot be reduced to its economic structure; while capitalism as an
economic class system driven by the pursuit of profit feeds off the patriarchal ordering.
Together, they form the political economy of the society.168
In other words, conceptualizing the political economy must take into account that capitalism
needs patriarchy, as the latter provides the former the ordering structure necessary to run
smoothly. Thus, the political economy is defined by a capitalist patriarchy. An integral part of
this system is the gendered division of labor. The gendered division of labor is the hierarchal
division in the economy between masculine and feminine labor, and the devaluation of labor
associated with women and femininity.169 While all laborers are exploited in a capitalist system,
women bear more of a burden because their labor is often undervalued and ignored.
This is not to say that there are not significant differences among women. Eisenstein
argues,
A feminist class analysis must begin with distinctions drawn among women in terms of
the work they do within the economy as a whole—distinctions among working women
outside the home (professional versus nonprofessional), among houseworkers
(houseworkers who do not work outside the home and women who are houseworkers and
also work outside), welfare women, unemployed women, and wealthy women who do
not work at all. These class distinctions need to be further defined in terms of race and
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marital status. We then need to study how women in each of these categories share
experiences with other categories of women in the activities of reproduction,
childbearing, sexuality, consumption, maintenance of home.170
In other words, there are significant class, race, etc. distinctions among women, and these
differences need to be considered in any analysis of the political economy. Recall the
aforementioned discussion of racial capitalism. And as Eisenstein states, “Capitalist patriarchy as
an hierarchal, exploitative, oppressive system requires racial oppression alongside sexual and
class oppression.”171 Black feminist writer Claudia Jones (1949) explains how these systems
affect Black women. She argues that “Negro women—as workers, as Negroes, and as women—
are the most oppressed stratum of the whole population.”172 Carole Boyce Davies writing on
Jones explains,
Jones’s essay ‘An End to the Neglect of the Problems of Negro Women’ makes…[a] major
argument: that the black woman ‘as mother, as Negro’ occupies a crucial position in the
defense and support of the black family, and that this position is then superexploited by
capitalist interests…. Her superexploitation thesis rests on the fact that black women, by
virtue of being located as they are in society, among the most exploited and most underpaid
of workers, tend to be the ones whose value of their labor power various other class fractions
(including other exploited workers) benefit from…Black women, in this analysis, are
therefore not remunerated in any way equivalent to their labor power nor for the amount of
labor they are assumed to deliver voluntarily in and out of their homes. The black woman’s
labor is therefore multiply exploited (superexploited).173
As the quotation explains, Black women—by virtue of their race and gender—are superexploited
in a capitalist political economy. However, there are intra-group differences as well.
Chandra Talpade Mohanty ([1988] 1991) argues that Western feminist political analyses
often essentialize the experiences of women in the Global South and fail to take into account
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within-group differences. In literatures on the development process, she argues, there is a
tendency to view women as either “affected positively or negatively by economic development
policies.”174 However, she explains, “the interests of urban-middle-class, educated Egyptian
housewives, to take one instance, could surely not be seen as being the same as those of their
uneducated poor maids. Development policies do not affect both groups of women in the same
way.”175 Teresa A. Barnes (1999) similarly shows the importance of noting these intra-group
differences in her study on women and work in colonial Zimbabwe. She argues that the term
“differentiation” is useful in distinguishing among the types of urban women found in colonial
Zimbabwe—those with economic status and relationships to men that make them “proper” and
those that do not.176
Thus, a feminist socialist analysis must take seriously that gender structures and
meanings are context specific. Mohanty concludes,
[C]oncepts such as reproduction, the sexual division of labor, the family, marriage,
household, patriarchy, etc., are often used without their specification in local cultural and
historical contexts. Feminists use these concepts in providing explanations for women’s
subordination, apparently assuming their universal applicability…That the sexual
division of labor does indicate a devaluation of women’s work must be shown through
analysis of particular local contexts.177
Therefore, I will now turn to scholarship on gender in Africa.
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A debate exists among African scholars about whether it is appropriate to talk about
patriarchy and the gendered division of labor in the African context. Carole Boyce Davies (2015)
articulates this divide. On one side, you have Molara Ogundipẹ-Leslie (1993)178 who:
[provides] an assessment that illustrated a range of oppressions: colonialism, tradition,
neo-colonial realities of underdevelopment and poverty, male power, and race, which she
[divides] along class and race lines. Ogundipẹ’s discussion then [presents] a line of
reasoning that analyzed African women’s realities along a class/gender system.179
The intrusion of capitalism into Africa, Ogundipẹ-Leslie argues, makes African women “the
‘proletariat’ of the proletariats” since these women “[become] more subordinated in the new
socioeconomic scheme…often losing their old and meaningful roles within the older production
process.” 180 On the other side, scholars “[take] up the critique often levied at feminism as a
Western import by situating itself within particular ethnic/cultural paradigms.”181 For example,
Ifi Amadiume (1987) “[provides] the model of using very specific examples from particular
ethnic groups to contest overarching definitions of Western unitary understandings of gender.”182
She argues that in the 19th century, the Igbo in Nnobi, Nigeria practice a flexible gender system,
where terms such as “daughter,” “son,” “wife,” and “husband” do not correspond to sex but to
familial and social responsibilities. Thus, not all women occupy subordinate positions vis-à-vis
men in this society.183 Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmi’s (1997) work follows in the same tradition. She
argues that pre-colonial Yorùbá life does not have a gender system that subordinates women and
femininity and privileges men and masculinity. Instead, she counters, this “fact” has been
178

. Ogundipẹ-Leslie, Mọlara. (1993). “African Women, Culture and Another Development. In James, Stanlie. M and
Abena P.A. Busia (Eds). 1993. Theorizing Black Feminisms: The Visionary Pragmatism of Black Women. London and
New York: Routledge
179
. Davies, Carole Boyce. (2015). “Gender/Class Intersections and African Women’s Rights.” Meridians: feminism,
race, transnationalism, 13:1, 3
180
. Ogundipẹ-Leslie, 108
181
. Davies 2015, 3
182
. Ibid.
183
. Amadiume, Ifi. (1987). Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society. London: Zed
Books Ltd

49

retroactively ascribed to Yorùbá life by Western feminist studies.184 Oyěwùmi’s (2003) edited
volume continues the tradition of critiquing the Western understanding of gender. Mojúbàolú
Okome (2003) writes that “Of course [,] there is considerable inequality between men and
women, this is incontrovertible. To argue, however, that all men stand in a position of privilege
vis-à-vis women is absurd.”185 She continues that “one cannot attribute the condition of all
women to a universal experience of patriarchy. Experiences of patriarchy are mediated by class,
status, and degrees of hierarchy.”186 Similarly, Oyěwùmi (2003) writes, “The reduction of gender
relations to the economics of women’s lack of access to land, labor, men, and jobs is a function
of both the application of public/private concept and the economic monism of the West.”187 A
similar argument is articulated by Olufemi Taiwo (2003) who decries the division of labor
argument found in many Western feminist writings, arguing that work in Africa is not divided by
gender all the time and when it is, it is not necessarily oppressive to women.188 The authors are
trying to fight back against the tendency to ignore the specificity of the context one is theorizing
about. Africa, they argue, has a different set of gendered relations that might make these feminist
claims about labor irrelevant to Africa.
However, as Davies notes,
[t]hat there has been similarly in feminist studies an internal critique that has created a
many-layered and textured analytical field does not factor into her [Oyěwùmi]
considerations. To create a monolithic feminist studies field, feminist legal studies and
critical race theory must disappear; black feminist studies disappear; Latin American and
Caribbean feminist scholarship disappear; socialist feminist work that challenges
184
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bourgeois feminist assumptions are definitely not represented; and lesbian feminist
scholarship that has continued to challenge gendered assumptions about unitary
definitions of women and sexuality disappear.189
In other words, the criticisms that Oyěwùmi levies at ‘monolithic’ Western feminist studies has
been taken up by feminist scholarship from Black, Indigenous, and people of color. Also, what
scholars like Oyěwùmi miss is that capitalism has homogenizing tendencies. Davies writes,
The implications [of gender-free scholarship] are that some post-colonial societies,
already affected by Western organizational systems, can remain outside of these analyses
that keep gender in the mix, whether we are talking about political leadership or salary
equity. In this case, the gender-free argument can remain valid only as an idealized
historical reflection.190
Thus, where there are capitalist relations, there will be an exploitative gender system. Davies
explains that this focus on ethnicity ignores the intent of early African feminist scholarship, 191
which is a “critique of particular economic/class systems that disempowered the majority of
women in contemporary Africa.”192 Patriarchy in Africa may not have existed prior to colonial
capitalism (although Ogundipẹ-Leslie [1993] disputes this193), but that is beside the point. What
matters is that postcolonial Africa is structured by patriarchy because European colonial
capitalism integrates it into Europe’s former colonies. Thus, gender in the context of this
dissertation refers to structures ordering women’s labor à la Ogundipẹ-Leslie and the ideas
around femininity and masculinity that make this so.
Amina Mama (2018) explains that imperialism, as in the “militarized expansion of
capitalism,” implant these patriarchal relations into African states.194 She argues that Walter
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Rodney (1972) persuasively shows the way in which Europe’s development is tied to African
underdevelopment via unequal colonial relations. What is missing is the ways in which gender is
intertwined with the colonial processes that made this development and underdevelopment
possible.195 According to Mama, African underdevelopment can also be traced to colonial states
who, with the power of their militaries, force capitalist labor relations onto African states. These
relations are modeled after “industrial man”—who faithfully serves industry in waged labor—
and the stay-at-home wife—whose domesticity makes this system of male labor possible. This
concept is foreign to African women, as they have always taken part in the production process.
Thus, this ideology alters relations of production, as women are not integrated into the colonial
economy.196 Mama argues that the consequences of this are still felt today, as “women across
Africa remain underrepresented in the formal sector, left to eke out marginal livelihoods in an
unregulated and exploitative informal sector, valorized under the spurious guise of
‘entrepreneurialism.’”197
The aim of this project is thus to examine the workings of these ‘altered relations of
production’ in the Nigerian oil political economy. In other words, it investigates the ways in
which different classes of women are integrated into different spheres of the Nigerian oil
political economy. V. Spike Peterson (2003) explains that the political economy can be
disaggregated into various spheres. In this project, I focus on two of these spheres, what she
deems the productive sphere (labor force participation)198 and the reproductive sphere (the
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household economy).199 In my dissertation, I refer to them as the spheres of wage labor and
unwaged/domestic labor.200
Disaggregating the economy in this way does not mean that these spheres are
independent of each other. Women often labor in multiple spheres, and my analyses will reflect
this. However, what I do in this dissertation is focus on different classes of women for each
sphere. Doing this allows me to engage with multiple aspects of women’s labor in the Nigerian
oil political economy.
The following section re-iterates my main research question and sub-questions and
explains how a theory of capitalism will be used to answer these questions.
Research Questions and Expected Outcomes
The main research question of this project is: How are different types of labor (waged
and unwaged) performed by different classes of women (urban and rural) in the Niger Delta—the
oil-producing region of Nigeria—integrated into, impacted by, and shaping the Nigerian oil
political economy? To answer this question, I divide my project into three sub-questions. My
three empirical chapters correspond to the three sub-questions (described below). While a theory
of capitalist patriarchy is the main framework, each chapter provides a specific framework that
links capitalist patriarchy to the type of labor women perform in the Nigerian oil political
economy. The section below is only meant to introduce the specific frameworks. The empirical
chapters discuss the different frameworks with more depth.
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1. How are Nigerian women oil workers integrated into the Nigerian oil and gas
industry in the Niger Delta?
This question focuses on the waged labor a particular class of women (women oil
workers) perform in the Nigerian oil political economy. Understanding wage labor under
capitalism necessitates understanding the capitalist labor process. The capitalist labor process,
according to the Brighton Labour Process Group (1977), involves capital dominating labor by
owning the means of production and controlling the production process.201 The purpose of the
production process is to maximize profit, and that goal must supersede all “conflicting
objectives.”202 This includes subordinating labor to the whims of production. Thus, making labor
mobile and replaceable is necessary.203
Samir Amin (2004) explains what the replaceability of labor looks like in the current
stage of capitalism, a stage he terms the “liberal virus.”204 According to Amin, the majority of
workers around the world are among the popular classes, the wage-earners.205 Some wageearners are integrated in secure positions due to, among other things, their professional
qualifications. This gives them bargaining power with their employers.206 Other wage-earners are
integrated into precarious positions due to inadequate professional qualifications, citizenship
status, or gender. This gives them poor bargaining power with their employers, which affects
their material and social conditions.207 According to Amin, most of the world’s workers are
integrated into precarious positions.208 Additionally, the number of workers in precarious
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positions differ between the Global North and Global South, with the latter having a greater
number of workers in precarious positions than in more secure positions.209
The above helps us understand why wage labor is replaceable under capitalism and the
manifestation of such replaceability—precarious labor. A theory of capitalist patriarchy helps us
understand how gender structures this precarity. Heidi Hartmann ([1976] 1979) explains,
When women participated in the wage-labor market, they did so in a position as clearly
limited by patriarchy as it was by capitalism…In the labor market the dominant position
of men was maintained by sex-ordered job segregation. Women’s jobs were lower paid,
considered less skilled, and often involved less exercise of authority or control. Men
acted to enforce job segregation in the labor market; they utilized trade-union
associations and strengthened the domestic division of labor, which required women to
do housework, child care, and related chores. Women’s subordinate position in the labor
market reinforced their subordinate position in the family, and that in turn reinforced their
labor-market position.210
In other words, even though men and women wage-earners can occupy precarious positions,
women often experience a more profound type of precarity. Of course, these experiences are
mediated by race and other structures—recall Jones’ super-exploitation theory of Black women.
To address the above research question, I explore how (racial) capitalist patriarchy
manifests labor precarity the Nigerian oil and gas industry. I specifically examine the gendered
structures that make Nigerian women oil workers experience precarity differently. For example,
Sarah Kunz (2019) traces the imperialist history of Royal Dutch Shell’s labor practices in the
Global South, highlighting the racial and gender logics underlying these practices. Historically,
she argues, “expatriates” always mean male workers of European origins, and they are given
privileged status over “local” labor.211 And while these systems are challenged by anticolonial
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struggles, these logics remain in some form today.212 Although, Kunz’s analysis does not gender
the “local,” this too has often been male.
As I mention above, Walby (1990) argues that there are two different patriarchal
strategies used to control women in formal employment, exclusion and segregation. I expect to
see oil companies use the segregation strategy to control the labor of Nigerian women oil
workers in the Niger Delta. Segregation might lead to the confinement of women in low-status
jobs and low-waged jobs. For example, Omorodion finds that Nigerian women might be hired in
the oil sector to provide janitorial and catering services in offices and residential houses of
foreign oil workers. 213 And because, as mentioned above, women are responsible for domestic
labor even when they are engaged in waged labor, I expect to find that this ‘double-day’ figures
into women’s accounts of precarity.
2. How does the Nigerian oil political economy create the oil pollution that impacts
rural women’s domestic/agricultural labor in the Niger Delta?
This chapter focuses on the unwaged labor a particular class of women (rural women)
perform in the Nigerian oil political economy, specifically the ways in which the Nigerian oil
political economy creates oil pollution that affects rural women’s domestic labor in the Niger
Delta. Doing so necessitates understanding how domestic labor and the environment are
exploited in a capitalist political economy.
A theory of capitalist patriarchy helps us understand the importance of domestic labor to
the capitalist political economy. Zillah Eisenstein (1979) explains,
It [domestic labor] is unpaid work that is sexually assigned. Domestic labor—the work
necessary to the maintenance of the home—involves production, consumption, reproduction,
and maintenance of labor power. It is the work of bringing children into the world and trying
to raise them within the home (i.e., cooking, cleaning, laundering, loving, mothering).
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Domestic labor is indispensable to the operation of capitalist patriarchal society as it now
exists [italics in the original]. It is socially necessary labor.214
In other words, domestic labor involves all the unpaid labor women do to maintain their
households. This labor is not only necessary to maintain households. As Andaiye (1994)
explains, this labor keeps economies afloat since it includes “daily replenishing the energies of
the present labor force.”215 She explains that this labor is often devalued because it is not given a
monetary value.216 When this work is not counted, it is easier to exploit. For example, Andaiye
explains that for women in the Caribbean (and other parts of the world), Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) and the likes have burdened women’s work since they “[shift] activities
from the public sector to the household/community sector as though what happens in that sector,
being unwaged, carries no cost.”217 But it carries a cost, as women are subsequently tasked with
more domestic responsibilities.
My project argues that the Nigerian oil political economy similarly burdens women’s
domestic labor, specifically rural women’s domestic labor in the Niger Delta. However, the
project is not primarily focused on documenting how oil pollution burdens this labor, although I
do provide evidence to support this. Instead, the project primarily focuses on the policies and
decisions that create the pollution in the Niger Delta that subsequently burdens this labor. To
understand why capitalist economies exploit the environment in this way, one must understand
how the environment is viewed.
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David Harvey (1996) argues that current ideas about the environment can be traced back
to the Enlightenment period. Enlightenment principles stress that good can be attained by making
men the masters of nature, and those ideas still shape thinking about the environment today.218
Harvey explains that “this tends…to breed a highly instrumental view of nature as consisting of
capital assets—as resources—available for human exploitation.”219 Thus, the capitalist political
economy “dictate[s] profit-driven transformation of environmental conditions and an approach to
nature which treats of it as a passive set of assets to be scientifically assessed, used and valued in
commercial (money) terms.”220 This can lead to the devaluation of nature, which makes
environmental degradation possible. Nnimmo Bassey (2012) makes a similar argument, claiming
that resource extraction in Africa is leading to ecological devastation because foreign companies
have commodified nature. Instead of attempting to stop the pollution, they look to the “market”
and do a cost-benefit analysis when determining a solution.221 But racial capitalism is also at
play. Bassey argues, “The extractive industries would like to have everyone believe that they
operate a level playing field whether they are working in North America, Europe, South
America, Asia or Africa,” 222 however there are many cases that show this is untrue. He explains
global policies often disadvantage Africa, as they reflect the idea that “anything that secures the
wealth of the mighty even if it kills or diminishes the capacity of the weak to survive”223 is
acceptable. This means that pollution is not an “accident” but a cost oil companies are willing to
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accrue. Thus, the accumulation of capital and the prioritization of profits over African lives
contribute to the Niger Delta being among the most polluted places in the world.
My project argues that foreign and domestic actors involved in the Nigerian oil political
economy (e.g., states, capitalists, oil multinational corporations [MNCs]) make decisions that
burden women’s domestic labor in the Niger Delta. I expect to find accounts of these actors
engaging in practices that puts profits over concerns of the environment, effectively shifting
pollution costs from themselves onto the environment/rural women’s domestic labor in the Niger
Delta shifting pollution costs onto the Niger Delta. I also expect to find (as previous studies
argue) that these costs have affected rural women’s health and ability to provide food for their
families.
Some eco-feminists argue that environmental pollution disproportionately affects women.
For example, Vandana Shiva (1993) argues that ecological destruction creates “costs that are
invariably heavier for women” because women are more often engaged in the subsistence
economy.224 However, whether oil pollution disproportionally affects rural women vis-à-vis rural
men in the Niger Delta is not what I am exploring here. Instead, I am interested in exploring the
relationship between oil pollution in the Nigerian oil political economy and the domestic labor of
rural women in the Niger Delta.
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3. How are women in the Niger Delta shaping the Nigerian oil political economy?
As mentioned above, Ross (2008) argues that oil not only reduces women’s labor force
participation but female political participation/political influence as well. However, this
argument rests on multiple assumptions. First, Ross assumes that waged work is what socializes
women into politics and does not consider other avenues that socializes people into politics. A
theory of capitalist patriarchy recognizes this. Eisenstein (1999) explains,
The potential for revolutionary consciousness derives from the fact that women’s lives
under capitalist patriarchy are being squeezed from the most intimate levels, such as how
they feed their children, to the more public levels of their monotonous, tiring, low-skill,
sex-defined, low-wage jobs. Women are working in the labor force, and for less, and they
are maintaining the family system, having less to make do with. This is the base from
which consciousness can develop.225
In other words, because women are ‘being squeezed from the most intimate levels’ of their lives
under capitalist patriarchy, most of the labor they do—whether waged or unwaged—allows them
to be socialized into politics/ develop consciousness. Thus, because Ross cannot see that labor
exploitation fuels consciousness and that women’s labor happens outside of waged work, he
cannot see how organizing, etc. in oil economies can enable the type of consciousness needed for
women to exert political influence.
A second Ross assumption is that one can only measure political influence by looking at
formal political processes. But political influence can be measured in a variety of ways. And in
many countries where the formal political sphere is not accessible to women—including oil-rich
countries—women have still been able to exert influence. Thus, oil political economies can spur
women’s political participation.
Because of these assumptions, Ross does not see the way that Niger Delta women have
been engaged in politics in and around the Nigerian oil political economy. To address the above
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research question, I examine accounts of women in oil labor unions and local NGOs to see how
they organize against structures that make laboring as women exploitative. I focus my analysis
on women in oil labor unions and local NGOs because they correspond to the exploited labor I
analyze in the previous questions.
There is a history of protests among rural women in the Niger Delta, and these protests
have been written about extensively (as I detail in Chapter 6). Terisa E. Turner and her coauthors explain that the proliferation of these ‘peasant’ resistance movements are due to women
‘being squeezed from the most intimate levels.’ For example, Terisa E. Turner and Craig S.
Benjamin (1995) adapt Ivan Illich’s concept of ‘shadow work’ to women’s protests in the Niger
Delta. They argue that rural women often engage in shadow work—hidden work in a capitalist
economy that produces labor power and the labor power of others—through their work as
subsistence laborers. 226 When these women’s livelihoods are threatened by environmental
pollution, they “develop the potential social power rooted in the particular relationship between
themselves and the basis of their own survival and autonomy”227 and engage in resistance. I do
not expect the mechanisms Turner outlines for shadow work resistance to be the same as the
resistance/activist work I analyze in labor unions and local NGOs. But I do expect to see the
women in these labor unions and NGOs expressing similar levels of consciousness and engaging
in work that challenges the exploitation of labor usually done by women.
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Section VI. Conclusion
In this chapter, I situated my dissertation in different literatures, highlighted some of the
gaps and discrepancies in these literatures, and described the ways in which these literatures are
useful for my project. I also presented a theory that fills in these gaps and allows a better
understanding of the effects of oil on women’s labor (broadly defined) in the Nigerian oil
political economy. I argued that a theory of capitalist patriarchy—which focuses on the
relationship between capitalist exploitation and the gendered division of labor—is better suited to
explain the ways in which women’s waged and unwaged labor are exploited within the Nigerian
oil political economy.
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Chapter 3__African Feminist Research Methodologies
Why a Methodology Chapter?
In Chapter 2, I contextualize my research questions by synthesizing the different
literatures on women’s labor and oil economies—both specific to Nigeria and more generally. I
then argue that using a theory of capitalist patriarchy is the best way to understand the
relationship between oil and women’s labor since it links capitalist exploitation with women’s
labor (waged and unwaged) and their resistance. But contextualizing my research questions—
and the dissertation at large—requires more than situating them in literature and explaining the
theory that underlies the project. It also requires explaining the methodology that motivates this
project, hence a methodology chapter.
In this chapter, I demonstrate that my dissertation is influenced by African feminist
research methodologies. First, I show that my research questions and methods are based on
(African) feminist goals. Second, I explain the ways in which I navigate issues of positionality
and ethics during my fieldwork trips and how these issues influence data collection and thus the
final dissertation.
Because this chapter is concerned with describing my experience conducting fieldwork in
the Niger Delta, there are some things you need to know about me. As a Black woman born in
the United States, I am a Black American in some contexts. Because I am the child of Nigerian
immigrants, I am in other contexts—still Black—but more specifically, Nigerian-American,
Nigerian, and/or Igbo. My middle-class background, my status as a U.S.-based graduate student,
my American accent, the ability to switch from an American accent to an (almost) Nigerian
accent, my Igbo name, and the way I can understand and speak Nigerian pidgin small small all
afford me the opportunity to conduct the research I do in Nigeria.
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This does not mean that fieldwork always goes according to plan. I am read in many
ways by the people I meet during my stays in Nigeria. Most times, I am read as a friend. I am at
other times regarded suspiciously—and rightly so. Research (especially based on Western
approaches) sometimes functions as another means of extracting from Africa. And I am a
researcher schooled in the West. And the Niger Delta is an over-researched place. Thus, my
close proximity to the folks I meet in Nigeria does not absolve me of the privileges and power I
possess. Therefore, I enter the field with hopes of subverting power dynamics, building
meaningful relationships, and capturing the experiences of those I meet.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section I describes the ways in which African feminist
research goals, e.g., combatting Western and patriarchal biases in social science research, inform
my research focus and research questions. In Section II, I describe the ways in which African
feminist concerns of de-hierarchizing the research space leads me to pursue feminist ethnography
in my research project—specifically semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Both tools are
helpful in meeting feminist research aims of allowing women to speak for themselves. In Section
III, I describe my fieldwork sites, the city of Port Harcourt and two communities that I will call
Madu and Amada.228 In Section IV, I focus on the ways I navigate fieldwork through the lens of
positionality. Specifically, I highlight how the ebb and flow of my insider/outsider status in the
field affect the data I collect and do not collect. Section V describes the ways I navigate issues of
ethics in the field. First, I illustrate some of the ways I am forced to recognize and confront
ethical dilemmas as I collect data. Second, I describe attempts at promoting ethical research
practices in the field through what Amina Mama (2011) calls an “activist research ethic.” Section
VI provides a conclusion.
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Section I. African Feminist Approaches: Research Focus and Questions
My dissertation is informed by African feminist goals of counteracting Western and
masculine knowledge production in social science research. Selena Makana (2018) describes
African feminist ethnography as thus:
I posit that African feminist ethnography ﬂips the script of Western ways of writing
African women’s lives as “othered subjects” and redresses this history through a process
of recovery and historical analysis. As a contextual and experientially based approach to
the production of knowledge, feminist ethnography challenges the false dichotomies of
positivism. To this end, I contend that African feminist ethnography is manifested in our
self-conscious positioning as African women who research the lived experiences of
women on the continent. Our identities thus become a crucial point of departure for our
theorization and, at the same time, a point of entry for our ﬁeldwork.229
In this quotation, Makana stresses the importance of redressing research that otherizes African
women and allowing them to tell their own stories. Thus, African feminist approaches to
research emphasize that African women should be involved in the production of knowledge
about themselves. Patricia McFadden (1997) explains that everyone in a society is engaged in
knowledge production, but some knowledges are privileged over others. The knowledges that are
privileged and those that are marginalized, she argues, map onto societal hierarchies such as
gender. In the African context, letting African women theorize their own lives disrupts this
hierarchy.230
My dissertation asks: How are different types of labor (waged and unwaged) performed
by different classes of women (urban and rural) in the Niger Delta—the oil-producing region of
Nigeria—integrated into, impacted by, and shaping the Nigerian oil political economy? To
answer this question, my project is divided into three sub-questions aimed at understanding the
different types of labor different women perform within the Nigerian oil political economy in the
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women’s own words. Therefore, my project prioritizes knowledge production and allowing
women to speak for themselves. In the dissertation, this takes the form of polyvocality. Bagele
Chilisa (2012) explains that postcolonial indigenous research methods engage in polyvocality, so
that research “[preserves] the voices of research participants.”231 Thus, I include many block
quotations from my interviewees into my dissertation to center and ‘preserve’ their voices.
Section II. African Feminist Approaches: Methods
My project is also informed by African feminist goals of combatting unethical
approaches in social science research. Amina Mama (2007) argues that those who study Africa
can make their research less unethical by employing a democratic epistemology—which
acknowledges that the research participants are capable of producing knowledge—and
democratic methods—which allow research participants some control over the research format
and data, thus de-hierarchizing the research space.232 Makana similarly argues that those who
identify as African feminist ethnographers must utilize research practices that foster empathy and
undermine power relations in the field. 233 She (citing Lila Abu-Lughod 1990) warns feminist
ethnographers researching women about the tendency the ignore the power relations between
researcher and participants under the guise of a universal ‘women’s experience.’ 234 Taking these
concerns seriously has the potential to make the research more of a collaborative endeavor. The
methods used in this study and my interactions with participants in the field reflect these
concerns.
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As I mention above, my dissertation project examines the ways in which different types
of labor (waged and unwaged) performed by different classes of women (rural and urban) in the
Niger Delta—the oil-producing region of Nigeria—are integrated into, impacted by, and shaping
the Nigerian oil political economy. To do so, I conduct semi-structured interviews and focus
groups—with women (and men) who work in the oil and gas industry, who live in oil-polluted
communities, and who work in local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around oil-related
issues—and analyze primary and secondary source materials. These methods are described
below.
Ethnographic Methods
Shulamit Reinharz (1992) argues that fieldwork can be an important method for
correcting the masculine bias in social science research. However, fieldwork is not inherently
feminist. Instead, feminist researchers can use fieldwork research methods, like ethnography, if it
is used to make “women’s lives visible… [and] women’s voices audible (italics in the
original).”235 Thus, feminist ethnography stresses documenting women’s lives, understanding
women’s lives from their point of view, and understanding women in context.236 This is what my
research strives to do, making this an appropriate method to answer my research questions.
Ethnographic fieldwork includes many research tools. This project uses two of these
tools—semi-structured interviews and focus groups. In total, I interview 30 participants. The
preferences of my interviewees determine whether I use a digital recorder, specifically a
Livescribe pen, to record the interviews and focus groups. If my interviewees do not consent to
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being recorded, I take notes by hand. All audio is transcribed verbatim. I then analyze these
transcripts for themes that occur often or appear analytically important.
Semi-Structured Interviews
The primary ethnographic method I use during fieldwork is semi-structured interviewing.
I use this method to answer my research sub-question 1 (Chapter 4) and sub-question 3 (Chapter
6). As I mention in Chapter 2, research sub-question 1 asks: How are Nigerian women oil
workers integrated into the Nigerian oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta? And research subquestion 3 asks: How are women in the Niger Delta shaping the Nigerian oil political economy?
To answer these questions, I conduct interviews with women (and men) who work in the oil
industry and those who work in local NGOs around oil-related issues in the Niger Delta. I
employ a “branching pattern,” where I tailor the questions to the individual interviewee.237
As Reinharz explains, “Open-ended interview research produces nonstandardized
information that allows researchers to make full use of differences among people” because it
allows participants to talk about their experiences in their own words.238 And, semi-structured
interviewing can be feminist when it is used as “an antidote to centuries of ignoring women’s
ideas altogether or having men speak for women.”239 Because my research questions seek to hear
from women oil workers and women NGO workers about their experiences laboring within the
Nigerian oil political economy, this method is appropriate to use to answer my questions.
Focus Groups
I also employ focus groups during my fieldwork, specifically to answer my research subquestion 2 (Chapter 6). Chapter 2 explains that my research sub-question 2 asks: How does the
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Nigerian oil political economy create the oil pollution that impacts rural women’s
domestic/agricultural labor in the Niger Delta? One of the ways I answer this question is by
convening a focus groups with women who live in oil-polluted communities.
Focus groups are group discussions, where participants are recruited to discuss a
particular issue.240 What makes focus groups different from interviews is that the data is the
interaction between the participants and between the participants and the researcher.241
According to Sue Wilkinson (1998), focus groups can be feminist because focus groups with
women can uncover new issues about their lived experiences242 and produce better data since the
women use their concepts and frameworks as well as build on/challenge the responses of each
other.243 Additionally, focus groups shift the balance of power from the researcher to the
participants since the participants can have more control over the interactions than the researcher
does. This bodes well for African feminist research goals of de-hierarchizing the research space.
With sub-question 2, I seek to understand how oil pollution impacts rural women’s domestic
labor and gender relations in the household. Thus, a method where the participants interact with
each other and expand on each other’s responses is appropriate to answer my research question.
Analysis of Primary and Secondary Sources
While ethnographic methods are the main methods in this project, I also use data from
primary and secondary sources to answer my research questions and complement my interviews.
These sources include the following: newspapers; governmental reports (e.g., Nigerian National
Bureau of Statistics reports, U.S. Energy Information Administration reports); oil company
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reports; NGO reports (e.g., Amnesty International reports); and scholarly and policy
publications.
I use these reports to help me answer all 3 of my sub-questions but particularly subquestion 2. As I mention above, this question seeks to document the ways in which the Nigerian
oil political economy creates pollution in the Niger Delta. These reports are helpful in
documenting the ways in which foreign and domestic actors (e.g., states, elites, oil multinational
corporations [MNCs]) make decisions that prioritize profits at the expense of the environment.
No data is error free, and that includes primary and secondary sources. When analyzing a
document, I consider why, how, and under what conditions a particular document was written. I
also consider who collects the data and for what reasons. I also take into account why particular
information is left out.244 Additionally, I compare documents across different sources as well as
with the interview and focus group data I collect. Using multiple sources allows me to reveal the
biases in each source and construct a better representation of life in the Niger Delta.245
Section III. Fieldwork Sites
This dissertation is primarily based on over 6 months of ethnographic fieldwork in three
sites in the Niger Delta—the oil-producing region of Nigeria.246 From September to December
2017, I conduct research in the city of Port Harcourt. I return to the Niger Delta from September
to December 2018 and again conduct research in Port Harcourt as well as in two communities
that I call Madu and Amada.
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Selena Makana (2018) claims that conducting ethnographic fieldwork in multiple sites
“enabled [her] to see how gender was politicized and institutionalized within various parts of
Angola.”247 This is true for my fieldwork in the Niger Delta, as fieldwork in multiple sites allows
me to speak to different groups of women laboring within the Nigerian oil industry and analyze
the gender dynamics at play.
Fieldwork Sites
Port Harcourt
The Niger Delta traditionally consists of three states—Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers
states—and in terms of oil and oil-related conflicts, these states are key.248 Port Harcourt, the
capital of Rivers state, is the oil hub of Nigeria. It has a population of about 3,122,522, making it
the 5th largest urban area in Nigeria.249 I use Port Harcourt as a base for both of my trips to
Nigeria for two reasons—one strategic and the other practical. First, as the oil capital of Nigeria,
Port Harcourt houses branches of Nigeria’s oil labor unions and is driving distance (a few hours
away) from many oil-polluted communities. Second, I have relatives in Port Harcourt. Thus,
being based in Port Harcourt ensures that I have a reliable place to stay and would not have to
worry too much about food.
In the below sections, I describe each of my research sites. Because Port Harcourt is my
main research base, I spend more time detailing my time there, focusing on how I get entrée into
the field and my daily routine. As I will show, it is through my connections in Port Harcourt that
allow me to conduct the interviews and focus groups I do during my fieldwork trips.
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Entrée into the Field
Issues around oil can be sensitive in Nigeria, therefore I knew fieldwork could not be
possible without partnering with a local organization in the Niger Delta. The goal was to find an
organization that I could collaborate with—the organization could give me legitimacy and
potentially help me find research participants, while I could assist the organization on their
current projects.
Coincidence and luck play a huge part in my ability to gain entrée into the field. In April
2015, I am awarded a research grant by the Syracuse University Maxwell African Scholars
Union (MASU) to conduct preliminary fieldwork in Nigeria. In June of that year, I attend the
Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research (IQMR) Summer Program at Syracuse
University and meet a colleague from Nigeria who could connect me to a former staff in an
environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) in the Niger Delta. With the MASU grant,
I travel to Nigeria for two weeks in July to establish contacts with professors who study oil, visit
relevant archives, and get a sense of the layout of the land to better plan my fieldwork trip. It is
during this trip that I meet with the contact referred to me by my colleague at IQMR. This
contact refers me to the director of an NGO that focuses on gender equality in decision-making
in Bayelsa state. When I return from Nigeria, I speak on the phone with the director, and he
agrees to collaborate with me on my research. But this plan is no longer feasible when I decide
that my fieldwork base would be Port Harcourt. During this 2015 trip to Nigeria, I meet my
relatives who live in Port Harcourt, and we discuss the possibility of me staying there during
fieldwork. Once this decision is finalized after I return from Nigeria, I again must find another
organization to partner with, this time in Port Harcourt.
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The summer before my first fieldwork trip in 2017, I email different NGOs in Port
Harcourt about my upcoming trip. The Port Harcourt branch of Environmental Rights Action
(ERA) is the only organization that responds. ERA/Friends of the Earth Nigeria is a Nigerian
advocacy NGO that deals with environmental human rights issues in Nigeria. It is the Nigerian
chapter of Friends of the Earth International. This email exchange leads to a phone call with the
head of the Port Harcourt branch of ERA. He agrees to collaborate with me for my research. In
our letter of collaboration, ERA agrees to provide me with an office space and help me recruit
participants for my research, including introducing me to prospective participants and/or
providing me with contact information. In exchange, I agree to help with their women leadership
enhancement program and grant proposals. When I return to Port Harcourt in September 2018
for a second fieldwork trip, I work with ERA again and we maintain the same agreement.
My affiliation with ERA proves to be very useful because they have connections to the
resources I need. They have: 1) contacts with other local NGOs working on the intersection of
gender and oil; 2) contacts with of representatives of labor groups; and 3) previous experience
working with oil-communities, specifically women in these communities. For instance, I get the
opportunity to fly with ERA to Nigeria’s capital city, Abuja, to attend their Just Energy
Transition conference in November 2018 (as I discuss in Chapter 1). The conference convenes
many local NGOs and other international branches of Friends of the Earth International to
discuss how to move Nigeria away from a fossil fuel economy to a sustainable/just economy—
one that is based on renewable energy. It is here that I meet a representative of the Nigerian
Labour Congress (NLC), which is an umbrella organization of junior and senior staff trade
unions—including the junior staff oil labor union—in Nigeria. She provides some comments
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about the experiences of women who work in the oil industry that are included in my
dissertation.
My interviews in Port Harcourt are mostly arranged by ERA. One of the ERA staff—the
gender officer of the Port Harcourt office—is essentially “assigned” to me. Lacey, as I will call
her, would contact the local NGOs in the area on my behalf for interviews. She would travel with
me on public transportation to my interviews to make sure I arrive to and from my destinations
safely. And on the day of the interviews, she would introduce me to the necessary people,
essentially vouching for me. I owe a lot of my data collection successes to Lacey’s efforts.
Some of my other interviews, in contrast, I obtain by cold-calling potential interviewees.
For example, I secure interviews from members of the Port Harcourt branch of NUPENG
(Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers)—one of Nigeria’s main oil labor
unions—by calling contacts I find on NUPENG’s website.
Chapter 4 focuses on the experiences of women oil workers, and Chapter 6 focuses on the
ways in which women—through oil labor unions and NGOs—are laboring against structures that
exploit women’s labor. As you will see, the interviews I conduct in Port Harcourt prove useful to
my analyses in these chapters.
Daily Routine
Since I have office space at ERA, I essentially “work” 3 to 4 times a week from about
9:30AM to 4PM. For both of my stays in Nigeria, I contract with a driver (which is set up by my
relatives) to pick me up from home, drop me off at work, and then take me back home at the end
of the day. I use my workday to set up interviews, conduct interviews, go to conferences/events
with my colleagues, and work on my dissertation. I am treated like staff by ERA, so I attend all
the conferences and events that my colleagues attend. There are times that I would “work”
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outside of my schedule if ERA is traveling for a conference and the staff need to be there early or
stay later. My focus groups, which are convened a few hours outside of Port Harcourt, also occur
outside of my workday. When there is no work to be done, no conference to attend, or no
electricity in the area, I would spend the workday sitting around the office conversing with my
colleagues about our lives, Nigerian politics, gender relations, and so on. These moments built
rapport.
Madu
Madu is an oil-producing community in Rivers state. Its population is about 55,000.
Madu is in Ogoniland. As I discuss in Chapters 5 and 6, Ogoniland is the most well-known case
of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. In the 1990s, with Ken Saro-Wiwa as the
spokesperson, the people of Ogoni create the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
(MOSOP). MOSOP argues that Shell is polluting their lands and demands compensation for the
destruction of their livelihoods.250 These claims are validated in 2011 when the United Nations
Environment Programme releases a report that argues that oil pollution in Ogoniland is
widespread because oil MNCs systematically pollute the region. 251
Entrée into the Field
Lacey helps me set up a focus group in Madu on October 4, 2018. The purpose of this
focus group is to have women discuss how oil pollution affects them and gender relations in their
households and community. I hire a driver (found by Lacey) to take us to Madu and bring us
back to Port Harcourt. Lacey fills me in on the expectations for the focus group including the
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need for me to provide each of the participant with a snack, a drink, and 2,000 Naira ([about $6
USD in 2018) “transport money.”
Lacey contacts the Woman Leader, as she is called, in the community and tells her to find
six other women (for a total of seven) for the focus group. In discussing indigenous focus-group
interviews, Chilisa (2012) claims that in African contexts, it may be appropriate for the key
informant to identify who will be in the focus group.252 This proves appropriate in my case since
the key informant (the Woman Leader) is more knowledgeable about other women who could
speak to the issues of the focus group. Also, letting my colleague and the key informant choose
the participants gives them more input into the research process.
I come to the focus group with a set of prepared interview questions. The focus group is
held in the backyard of the house of the Woman Leader. Lacey takes the role of facilitator, while
my role is more of a note-taker. She introduces herself, me, and my research, and facilitates the
discussion. She asks a question, and then the participants take turns answering the question. This
is repeated until all the questions have been answered.
Amada
Amada is an oil-producing community in Bayelsa state. Its population is not readily
accessible. According to a 2013 report by Amnesty International and CEHRD (The Centre for
Environment, Human Rights, and Development), Amada has experienced over 100 oil spills
since 2007. Amada, like many oil-polluted communities in the Niger Delta, has not had an
adequate investigation of its oil spills. As I explain in Chapter 5, when an oil spill occurs in the
Niger Delta, an oil spill investigation process—commonly known as a Joint Investigation Visit
(JIV)—is triggered. The joint investigation team investigates the spill and then writes up a report.
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This report—the JIV report—describes the affected area and cause and volume of the spill. The
team then signs the report and gives it to the affected community to sign. Oil MNCs contend that
oil spills in the Niger Delta are mainly caused from the sabotage of oil pipelines, while oilpolluted communities argue that poor maintenance of these pipelines are to blame. The Amnesty
International report argues that these claims by oil MNC are dubious because the oil spill
investigation lacks transparency. For example, in one JIV report about Amada, Shell writes that
it determines that an oil spill is caused through sabotage at its office. When Amnesty
International asks Shell to explain the process used, Shell does not respond. In another example,
several JIV reports on Amada claim that oil spills are caused by a pipeline cut by a saw
(indicating sabotage). However, Amnesty International’s independent reviewers argue that the
photographs are not consistent with that claim. In another example, the photograph Shell
provides for the JIV does not show enough of the area to adequately determine that a spill is
caused by sabotage as Shell claims.253
Entrée into the Field
Lacey helps me set up a focus group in Amada on November 24, 2018. The purpose of
this focus group is to again have women discuss how oil pollution affects them and gender
relations in their households and community. Lacey again contacts the Woman Leader in the
community and tells her to find six other women (for a total of seven) for the focus group. A
fellow ERA colleague is hired to take us there and bring us back to Port Harcourt. I again bring a
snack, a drink, and 2,000 Naira “transport money” for the participants. The focus group is held
on the Woman Leader’s front porch. My colleague again takes the role of facilitator, while I am
the note-taker.
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Section IV. Positionality and The Ebb and Flow of the Fieldwork Process
Makana explains that researchers conducting feminist ethnography in Africa must
consider the ways in which their identities influence how they can enter the field and collect
data. She explains that fieldwork is filled with complex and dynamic relationships, thus
researchers engaging in feminist research must consider their positionalities. She continues,
Positionality in feminist research provides a space for a dialectical relationship between
objectivity and subjectivity in one’s research. Regardless of whether the researcher
situates herself as an insider or an outsider, her positionality always has a bearing on the
level of trust and openness she has with her interviewees, as well as how she collects,
analyzes, and represents her data. Positionality thus plays a signiﬁcant role for
researchers in and of Africa since notions of diﬀerence and similarity on the continent are
far from homogeneous; they vary from region to region, from country to country, and
from one ethnolinguistic community to another.254
As the quotation explains, reflecting on positionality allows for a researcher to consider the ways
in which the relationship between her and her research participants are impacting the research.
The researcher’s positionality affects how the data is collected as well as the type of data
collected. In other words, taking positionality seriously means reflecting on how one’s identity—
as an insider or an outsider—impacts the research space.
Robert K. Merton (1972) explains that scholars studying the sociology of knowledge
have put out competing claims about insiders—members of a specific group—and outsiders—
non-members. Some argue that there are “Insider truths that counter Outsider untruths,” while
others argue that there are “Outsider truths that counter Insider untruths.”255 In other words,
researchers legitimate their fieldwork and research by alleging either insider or outsider status
depending on which claim they believe. But as Linda Carty (1996) explains, this dichotomy does
not adequately describe researchers who inhabit multiple positionalities. As a Black women born
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and raised in the Caribbean and an immigrant of Canada, Carty finds herself “positioned as an
insider and outsider simultaneously”256 while doing fieldwork in the Caribbean. She explains that
because social science tools are steeped in “white masculinist social thought construction,”257
they cannot capture the experiences of a Black woman researcher and her relationship to “Third
World peoples.”258 Similarly, Makana argues that an insider/outsider dichotomy does not
adequately characterize her fieldwork experience in Africa (specifically, Angola) despite being
African (specifically, Kenyan). Instead, she finds:
While the fluidity of my identity allowed me to move effortlessly through some social
spaces, and despite the fact that I assumed I had the emic knowledge of insiders due to
my Africanness, there certainly were other moments when I bumped awkwardly into the
unpredictable web of social entanglements…Who we want to be in the eyes of our
participants, vis-à-vis how they see us, underlines one of the most complex challenges of
conducting qualitative research. In my case, the delicate dance between us [researcher
and participant] led me to understand our intricate relationship as one that is akin to
waves of the sea. Rather than see my ﬁeld work encounters as shaped by rigid binaries of
insider/outsider, I call this energy the ebb and ﬂow of the ﬁeldwork process [italics in the
original].259
In other words, Makana is never totally an insider or an outsider in the field. Rather, her status is
ambiguous, with these identities ebbing and flowing depending on the context. This characterizes
my experience in Nigeria. In the preface, I discuss my multiple identities to contextualize my
positionality and the ways in which my identities matter in my research. My relationship with my
participants ebbs and flows between insider and outsider status, and this impacts by ability to
collect data. Some of these issues are discussed below.
“Are You Nigerian?”
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Conference participants are told to take a tea break. I and the other participants at ERA’s
Just Energy Transition conference go onto the terrace, make our tea, get a snack, and settle down
into the chairs for light conversation. As I am sitting at my table, from the corner of my eye, I
notice the conference participant sitting to the right of me staring at me. She finally asks, “Are
you Nigerian?” I respond, “Don’t I look Nigerian?” She responds, “No, you look South African.”
I am hardly read as Nigerian during my stay in Nigeria. This misidentification happens
even before I speak. On at least three occasions, I am read as South African. During my time in
Nigeria, I constantly navigate my blackness, pivoting from playing up my “Nigerianness” or
“Americanness”/otherness when necessary. I think both my Nigerianness and otherness facilitate
my research and ability to collect data. For instance, when cold-calling potential interviewees,
those answering the phone seem pleasantly surprised to hear my American accent. But I also
think that the fact that my name is Nneka makes potential interviewees more willing to speak
with me and refer me to other people.
But it is not just because my name is Nneka; the pronunciation of Nneka also matters.
For Nigerians to recognize me as their own (and I want this recognition), I abandon the
Americanized pronunciation of my name and embrace the Igbo pronunciation—Nne is two
syllables long. This results in me having to pause for a few seconds anytime someone asks me
my name so that I could pronounce it “correctly.” And when I inevitably use the Igbo
pronunciation, the name would sound foreign to me. This leads to a paradox—pronouncing my
name “correctly” legitimizes me as Nigerian to other Nigerians, yet this act destabilizes my own
Nigerian identity.
Those around me also play up my Nigerianness or otherness during my time in the field.
My ERA colleague, Lacey, would often introduce me as a “typical Biafran” before my
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interviews. She would explain to the interviewees that even though I do not sound like I am
Nigerian, I am.
Biafra in the Nigerian context can refer to two things. First, Biafra can refer to the
Nigerian civil war, also known as the Biafran War. This war is fought between the Nigerian state
and the secessionist state, the Republic of Biafra from July 6, 1967 – January 15, 1970. Biafra,
led by Colonel Chukwu Odumegwu Ojukwu, represents an attempt of the Igbos to create their
own nation in the Southeast region of Nigeria, which includes the Niger Delta.260 I am ethnically
Igbo, and thus it is possible that Lacey is referring to this Biafra when she introduces me as
Biafran. It seems that she is implying that while Nigeria is a colonial imagination, Biafra
represents the aspirations of a pre-colonial group of people.261 Even so, this allusion to Biafra is
quite puzzling to me, as the Biafran War is still a sore spot in Nigeria. And in 2017—during my
first fieldwork trip—Biafra is again a topic of conversation in the Nigerian political landscape.
The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist group formed in 2012, is active in the
Southeast region of the country, so much so that the government of President Muhammadu
Buhari commences military operations—codenamed Operation Python Dance II—against
IPOB.262
Biafra also refers to the Bight of Biafra (the Bight of Bonny in Nigeria), which is the
name of a bend of a coastline that touches Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.263
This is where the Republic of Biafra gets its name. Regardless of whether Lacey is referring to
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the secessionist movement or the bight, referring to me as Biafran seems to be Lacey’s way to
certify my Nigerianness by, ironically, not calling me Nigerian but referring to a history that is
seen as predating the state.
I do not know for certain whether these introductions impact my ability to get interviews/
develop rapport with my interviewees. But Lacey does this introduction throughout my stays in
Nigeria, thus it matters to her. This is not to say that my careful balance of my Nigerianness or
otherness always works in my favor. In some instances, I think my otherness makes me
suspicious to potential interviewees. I will give an example about my experience trying to get
interviews with NUPENG’s women committee.
Before arriving in Port Harcourt for my second fieldwork trip in 2018, I send an email to
the representative of the Women Committee of NUPENG about my plans to interview women
oil workers. During my first fieldwork trip in 2017, I am able to interview her. As you will see in
Chapter 4, her interview proves insightful in answering my research question about the
experiences of women oil workers. Hence, this motivates me to get other insights from more
interviewees. She does not respond to my email. When I get settled in Port Harcourt, I give her a
call. She tells me to call one of the officers of NUPENG. I also met him during my first
fieldwork trip. In fact, he is the one who introduces me to the Women Committee representative
in the first place. When I call him, he welcomes me back to Port Harcourt and says we can meet.
But when Lacey and I go to his office to meet him, he dances around the issue and says he needs
to talk to the Women Committee representative. He promises to reach out to me after he speaks
with her. I wait for him to get back to me, but I hear nothing. After about 2 weeks, I call him
again. He says that since he had not heard from me since I came into his office, he assumes I
have gone back to the States.
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From there, I am invited to a union meeting on November 16, 2018. I am told I would be
able to address the group and collect contact information from women who want to be
interviewed. Lacey and I go to the meeting. I meet the Women Committee representative there,
and she tells me that she cannot guarantee that many women will attend the meeting. However,
she tells me that I am welcomed to wait and see who shows up. My colleague and I wait for a
few hours before the Women Committee representative can gather four women together in the
lobby so I could tell them about my research. The Women Committee representative tells me I
should conduct a focus group then, but I decline since we are in the lobby of the union building.
The lobby is noisy, and I feel like I will not be able to ask the questions I want with union
management around.
Of the five women I am ultimately able to speak to that day, I am not able to procure
interviews from any of them. I have a sign-up sheet where interested parties can pick a day and
sign up to be interviewed. Only one person picks a day to be interviewed. I end up not being able
to make this interview, and we are not able to reschedule. The other four want me to send them
the questions through email and WhatsApp. I do, but I do not get a response from any of them. I
even send follow-up messages, and I still do not get a response. The fifth person I meet also
gives me her email address, but the email address is not legible.
I think a lack of trust/rapport between NUPENG and I are at play here. ERA does not
have a prior relationship with NUPENG, so there is nobody to vouch for me. Without this
legitimacy, I am probably considered suspicious. It seems like my Americanness is more salient
in this case. Also, I think their suspicions are aroused more because I want to speak to women in
the oil industry. The women gathered by the Women Committee representative seem hesitant to
engage with me until the representative assures them that management knows about my research.

83

Gender Dynamics in the Field
It is not just my Nigerianness I must navigate in the field. Being a relatively young,
unmarried woman also impacts my access to data. Many of the men I met—contacts,
interviewees, etc.—would often remark, rather flirtatiously, about me not being married. This
dynamic, I believe, influences the number of men willing to speak to me and refer me to other
people. Additionally, I think these identities also help facilitate the interviews with many of the
women NGO workers I speak to, as they are often relatively young women working around
issues of gender.
But gender dynamics also complicate my attempts to get interviews with PENGASSAN
(Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria)—the other main oil labor union
in Nigeria. During my stay in Nigeria in 2017, an ERA colleague gives me the contact for a
representative of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), an umbrella organization of senior staff trade
unions in Nigeria in which PENGASAN is a member. I interview this TUC representative, and
from there, he gives me the contact to someone from PENGASSAN. I get in contact with the
chairman of the Port Harcourt branch of PENGASSAN. He tells me that the women of
PENGASSAN are meeting on November 14, and I can come and speak to them. The plan, I tell
him, is to collect the names and numbers of women who are interested in speaking with me so
that I can set up interviews later. I call him the evening before the meeting to confirm that I am
scheduled to address the meeting. The chairman confirms this and gives me the contact
information of two of the women leaders of PENGASSAN so that I could notify them of my
visit. I also call them that evening and inform them that I would be attending their meeting to
discuss my research.
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The meeting is supposed to start at 10AM, and Lacey and I arrive at the destination
around 10:30AM. The meeting has not started yet, and there are not a lot of people there. One of
the women I meet says that I should probably conduct interviews/focus groups that afternoon
since it would be difficult to get the women together again or find time to interview them oneon-one. I reluctantly agree.
The meeting probably starts around 11:30AM/12PM. Soon after that, I address the
meeting. Their reception to me is tepid. One of the women leaders I call the night before says she
has misunderstood my intentions. She thinks I plan to give them a talk about women
empowerment. Another person in the room asks me why I did not come with surveys since that
would be a more effective way to collect data from the group. I respond that I chose to do
interviews and focus groups for my research so that I can speak to people more in-depth and ask
follow-up questions if necessary. That response does not seem to satisfy the group. I pass around
a sign-up sheet for those interested in speaking with me. I tell the group that I would wait until
the end of the meeting so that I can talk to those who sign up. There are not a lot of signatures on
the list, but I am assured that there is interest in my research. The meeting is lasting longer than I
am told that it would. Around 2/2:30PM, my colleague encourages me to talk to one of the
women leaders to see if I can start interviewing people who want to speak with me for the sake
of time. The Woman Leader reassures me that lots of women want to speak with me, so it is best
that I wait until the end.
The meeting ends around 4PM. When I come back into the room, most of the women are
gone. One woman is begging people to stay and talk to me. Even though I am told to start
talking, people are having side conversations. In the end, I do speak to some women. But the

85

conversation only lasts for about 20 minutes. At this point, I am so flustered that I do not really
take good notes. In the end, these notes do not make it into my dissertation.
I think a lot of dynamics are at play here, but two inter-related issues come to mind. I feel
like the tepid response from the crowd has a bit to do with me being (in the Nigerian context)
young. When I enter the room at the end of the meeting, I hear a woman ask dismissively, “Is
this who we’re waiting for?” And it is not just because I look young. Meanings of youth in
Nigeria are intertwined with, among other things, marital status. You cannot really leave your
youth and become a woman or a man unless you get married. In a previous conversation, Lacey
remarks that married women and people more generally do not take unmarried women seriously
in Nigeria. I think this dynamic might have been at play at this PENGASSAN meeting. In this
case, being a young, unmarried woman might have worked against me.
Section V. Ethical Issues During the Fieldwork Process
African feminist methodology also emphasizes: 1) the importance of confronting ethical
dilemmas during fieldwork and 2) taking steps to actively promote ethical research practices.
Each one is described below.
Confronting Ethical Dilemmas in the Field
Amina Mama (2007) asks us to consider: Is It Ethical to Study Africa? In “the context of
profound global and systemic inequality,” Mama argues, we must consider the ways in which
our identities, locations, and epistemological and methodological choices inform studies on
Africa and the ways in which they subvert or reinforce unethical research on the continent.264
She explains,
Ethical questions indeed arise at all levels of the research process— from question
formation, resource acquisition and research design, to field methods, interpretation,
analysis, and dissemination. They arise in the relationship between the research and the
264
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social context, as well as between researchers and the researched communities, all of
whom inhabit bodies that are perceived, received, and related to in ways that convey
histories and historical relations. Perhaps the best we can do is become more conscious of
the ways in which our identities, who we are, influence what we do and how we do it, so
as to make more informed ethical choices—about the good and bad of what we do.265
This section is thus my attempt to document the ethical issues that arise during my fieldwork,
how I navigate these issues, and what they mean for the finished dissertation. The following
sections detail the ethical dilemmas I confront as I conduct semi-structured interviews and focus
groups during my fieldwork trips.
Ethical Issues During Interviews with NGO Workers
During some of my interviews with NGO workers, I learn that some of these
organizations have published research related to the impact of oil pollution on women in the
Niger Delta. This leads to some uncertainty about whether I should continue with my research
topic or cite this research and find another approach to this topic. As a U.S.-based scholar, I am
very aware that work I publish is privileged in the global hierarchy of knowledge production and
likely to be considered more legitimate than research published in Nigeria. I want to ensure that I
am not reinforcing these power dynamics. Thus, what Chapter 5 in my dissertation does is cite
these studies, claim that my interviews support these studies, and then focus instead on the ways
in which the Nigerian oil political economy creates the oil pollution that affects rural women’s
labor in the Niger Delta.
Ethical Issues During Madu Focus Group
I am forced to confront ethical issues during the focus group in Madu. I detail the ethical
dilemmas that arise below.
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While our desired destination is Madu, we (Lacey, the driver, and I) must first stop in a
nearby community that I will call Sota266 before traveling to Madu. Prior to the trip, Lacey
arranges for me to interview the chief of Sota and the youth president (both of whom I met when
I was in Nigeria in 2017). However, when we arrive at the chief’s house, we see a group of men
sitting in the parlor. We do not have enough provisions for this many people, as we have only
enough for the chief and youth president. My colleague mentions this to the chief, but he
declines to get involved in this issue.
The interview is rather awkward. Only the chief and youth president speak. I am not
prepared to be in this focus group setting, but I take the opportunity to ask the men what
challenges they face as men due to oil pollution. No one answers. After the interview, my
colleague gives the provisions to the chief and the youth president. We then leave for Madu.
After the focus group in Madu ends and we start driving back to Port Harcourt, my
colleague gets a call from our key informant (the Woman Leader) to say that some of the men in
the chief’s house visit her to complain about us not giving them provisions. Since she brings us
to the community by agreeing to host our focus group, she is faulted for our “inappropriate”
behavior. My colleague apologizes to her and reassures her that this is not her fault.
This situation shows how difficult it is to balance expectations. The men expect that
whoever is coming will have enough provisions for them since I am a researcher from abroad. I
expect to interview two people and, therefore, bring just enough provisions for them. My budget
necessitates that I plan out my spending. Our expectations clash.
Another ethical dilemma occurs right after I finish speaking to the men at the chief’s
house. I ask if anyone has any questions for me. The youth president asks what my research is
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for and if I am only trying to write a book. Implicitly, I am being asked if I am conducting
research for my own selfish interests or if my research is going to bring changes to their
community. I think I am well prepared to answer this question, but all my prepared answers feel
insincere in the moment. I stumble through my answer.
Additionally, conversations in the focus group leave me feeling like this is not an ethical
exercise. Before I embark on my 2018 fieldwork trip, I read volume 1 of David L. Morgan’s
(1997) The Focus Group Guidebook. Morgan writes that it might not be a good idea to do focus
groups where you ask people about their problems because there is an expectation that you might
be able to/will do something about those problems.267 I push those concerns aside, but I can now
see why this holds true. It is difficult to sit there and hear these women talk about their
challenges. What is even more difficult is bearing their expectations that I can do something now
or in the near future to change their circumstances. They know I am a researcher from the States,
which implies institutional backing and funding. It sounds like an excuse to say, yes, I am a
researcher from the States, but I am a graduate student researcher from the States. Thus, I do not
have access to the funding that “researcher” may imply. But while “graduate student” might be a
more salient identity for me, my location—“the States”—seems to have been more salient for my
participants. I do not blame them. The Niger Delta is one of the most researched places in
Nigeria. Communities are used to researchers from obodo oyibo (white man/people’s country)
coming in and extracting data. Yet, their communities do not change. I am again asked if my
research is for a book or to help them. I stumble through this answer as well.
To make matters worse, my questions are unclear to the women in the focus group, and
they do not quite understand what I am asking them. And it is only after listening to the
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recording that I realize the sound quality is terrible. I use a Livescribe pen to do the recordings,
which seems to work best in quiet surroundings. I do not anticipate that I will be conducting
focus groups outside with a lot of background noise. Thus, the data I collect during this focus
group is not too heavily utilized in this dissertation. The whole experience of this focus group
leaves me feeling like I am conducting the same type of unethical research that I rail against. I
know I must mitigate this dynamic if I conduct focus groups again.
Ethical Issues During Amada Focus Group
Feeling that my focus groups are reinforcing unethical research practices leaves me
hesitant to do another one. Therefore, the time between the first and second focus groups is over
a month. But the need to get better data compels me.
In terms of process, the focus group in Amada goes smoother than the one in Madu. The
questions I prepare are clearer, and the women are answering the questions I want them to
answer. Also, I use other recording devices during this focus group and do not just rely on my
Livescribe pen for audio. Thus, the focus group conversation is well captured. However, this
focus group is not without some frustrations.
I am frustrated because it initially seems like we again do not have enough provisions for
everyone there. There are supposed to be seven women (the Woman Leader and six others) for
the focus group. However, since the focus group is in the front of the Woman Leader’s house,
random women would walk by, see people gathering, and join the gathering. While I have extra
provisions this time (food, drinks, and transport money), I only have enough for a few extra
people. It is only after the focus group that my ERA colleague tells me that she convinces several
women who are not invited to leave before the focus group starts. In the end, the focus group has
eight women. I have enough provisions to accommodate all eight.
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I am also frustrated/unsettled because it is again hard listening to the women and not be
able to offer anything. One participant mentions that she wishes some organization could bring a
skills acquisition training to them. I know at this moment that is what I will do. After the focus
group in Madu, I share with Lacey that I have been feeling unsettled because I feel that I am
extracting data and not offering anything in return. Since then, we have been brainstorming how
I might be able to do something for my participants given my limited funds. One of the things we
discuss is organizing a skills acquisition training. After this focus group in Amada, Lacey comes
up to me and says the focus group conversation reminds her of our discussions about organizing
a skills acquisition training. We agree that this is what we will do. And as I discuss below, we do
set up this skills acquisition training in Amada.
Promoting Ethical Research Practices through an Activist Research Ethic
According to Amina Mama (2011), doing ethical research in Africa requires more than
recognizing the ethical issues that arise during fieldwork. She writes that feminists wanting to do
ethical research in Africa must be committed to an “activist research ethic”268 in the field. This
requires one to “actively relate to and engage with our ‘research subjects’ and explore ways of
joining them and supporting their struggles.”269 I do this in two ways during my fieldwork. First,
I organize a skills acquisition training for my focus group participants in Amada. Second, I—in
collaboration with ERA—conduct women’s leadership trainings in three communities in the
Niger Delta.
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Skills Acquisition Training
As I mention above, the ethical issues during the focus group in Amada reinvigorate my
desire to bring a skills acquisition training to my research participants. With my ERA colleague,
Lacey, we decide to do a skills acquisition training in Amada on December 13, 2018. Lacey
contacts the Woman Leader of the community and tells her about our plans to conduct a skills
acquisition training with the same women who attended the focus group. A fellow ERA
colleague is hired to take us there and bring us back to Port Harcourt.
The woman I hire to lead the skills acquisition training is recommended to me through
the relative—my aunt—who I am staying with in Port Harcourt. The trainer and I agree that she
would teach the women how to make liquid soap, bleach, Izal (a brand of disinfectant products),
air freshener, and perfume so that the women might be able to sell these items in the future. A
few days before the training, I give the trainer money to buy supplies for herself and the women
in the focus group.
For each of the products, the trainer uses a chalkboard to write down the ingredients. She
goes through the different steps and the participants take notes on their notepads. For some
products, the trainer gives a demonstration and participants are invited to help with the recipe.
For example, during the liquid soap making demonstration, participants are invited to mix the
ingredients into the bucket the trainer is using. For other products, there are enough raw
materials so that participants can make the product as the trainer is demonstrating, e.g., the
perfume. At the end of the event, the participants are able to take home a sample of all the
products they are taught to make. I also bring snacks and drinks for the women as well as
“transport” money. There are a couple more people in attendance than I expect, but we luckily
have extra supplies for them.
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While I am glad that Lacey and I could do the skills acquisition training in Amada, I am
disappointed that I am not able to do a skills acquisition training in Madu as well. I am also
disappointed that I do not have the funding to ask about the type of skills acquisition training my
participants desire instead of deciding that on my own. But I am limited in the resources
(including time) I have, and I do the best I can with the circumstances I am given.
Women’s Leadership Trainings
I also engage in an ‘activist research ethic’ by co-leading women’s leadership trainings in
three communities in the Niger Delta—in a community I will call Okadi in Rivers state on
November 29, 2018, in Amada in Bayelsa state on December 5, 2018, and in a community I will
call Kara in Delta state on December 14, 2018.270
ERA generally does women’s leadership trainings every year or so. They usually hire
someone to conduct these trainings, and they decide to hire me that year.271 I ask my ERA
colleague, Lacey, to co-lead the trainings with me. I want to make sure that the presentation I am
putting together is appropriate for the communities where the trainings would take place.
Additionally, Lacey also speaks and understands Nigerian pidgin fluently, an English-based
creole language widely spoken in Nigeria. She is thus able to translate the presentation in pidgin
during the trainings, ensuring better interactions with the participants.
I am told that the format of the trainings is up to me. Before my second fieldwork trip to
Nigeria, I decide to read some material about gender transformative trainings in Africa since I
am aware that ERA puts on women’s leadership trainings. Gender transformative trainings
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emphasize identifying the structures that subordinate women and empowering them to challenge
these structures.272 The PowerPoint presentation I subsequently create, Women’s Leadership
Training: Raising Gender Awareness and Empowering Women to Lead, are based on these
principles as well as ERA’s past leadership trainings. The PowerPoint focuses on the following
key questions and answers: 1) What are some barriers that prevent women from being leaders?
[Answer]: Gender ideas and structures that marginalize women; 2) How can women break these
barriers? [Answer]: Rethink understandings of power; Build community and act; 3) Who are
some women leaders that women can look up to? [Answer]: Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, Margaret
Ekpo, and Dora Akunyili.
It is hard to gauge the “success” of these training. But two moments stand out in the ways
issues of positionality still creep up in my work even when I am not conducting fieldwork.
Women’s Leadership Training in Okadi
The training in Okadi takes place in the community’s town hall on November 29, 2018.
The women’s leadership training in Okadi, and all the other communities, takes place alongside a
political education training. The first half of the workshop is the women’s leadership training,
which Lacey and I lead. The other half of the workshop is a political education training, which
an ERA colleague or another hired trainer leads.
When my ERA colleagues and I arrive in Okadi, I notice that most of the participants in
the town hall are men. Also, the small number of women in attendance are seated near the back. I
ask one of my ERA colleagues if we can do something about the seating arrangement since the
women’s leadership training is particularly for the women in attendance. Using my identity as an
outsider, as an American who does things “differently,” my ERA colleague is able to get the
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women to move to the front of the town hall and some men to move to the back. This shifts the
energy in the room, giving the women in the town hall more power to participate and speak up.
Women’s Leadership Training in Kara
During these women’s leadership trainings, I quickly realize that I need to take a backseat
to Lacey. Although I have intermediate comprehension skills in pidgin, my speaking skills are
not on that level. This issue is very salient during our last training in Kara.
Throughout my stay in Nigeria, I become pretty adept at mimicking the Nigerian
accent—slowing down my speech when necessary and changing the pronunciation of certain
words when relevant. However, there are still times that I am told that my grammar (meaning
my diction in Nigerian pidgin) makes my speech unintelligible.
During the women’s leadership training in Kara, community members make it
abundantly clear that they are not happy that I am leading the training, as they are not
understanding me too well. Thankfully, Lacey is there to help. With her taking the lead and me
switching to pidgin in the moments I can, we get through the presentation.
I reveal all this to say that questions about how identities matters and questions about
ethics are not just confined to conducting research. Even engaging in an activist research ethic in
the field can be fraught with these questions, and researchers must contend with that too.
Section VI. Conclusion
In this chapter, I demonstrated that my dissertation is influenced by African feminist
research methodologies. I showed that my research questions and methods are based on
(African) feminist goals of countering Western and patriarchal biases in social science research
and de-hierarchizing the research space, respectively. Fieldwork research methods, such as
ethnography, are not inherently feminist. But they can be used for feminist aims if they are used
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to make ‘women’s lives visible… [and] women’s voices audible (italics in the original).’ I show
that the ethnographic methods used in my project, e.g., semi-structured interviews and focus
groups, were employed for feminist aims such as understanding women on their own terms.
This chapter also explained the ways in which I navigated issues of positionality in the
field, specifically the way my insider/outsider status ebbed and flowed throughout the fieldwork
process. I was sometimes read as Nigerian or American (or South African in some cases), and
this fluidity impacted the research process. For instance, I have a Nigerian (particularly Igbo)
name—Nneka. When I pronounced it in the right way, I was read as an insider and this helped
me build rapport with potential interviewees. But when I was read as an American or an outsider,
I think it sometimes bred mistrust. For instance, I think that my Americanness was the reason I
had some trouble getting interviews with women in NUPENG (The Nigeria Union of Petroleum
and Natural Gas Workers)—one of the main oil labor unions in Nigeria.
I also navigated insider/outsider status because of gender dynamics in the field. It seems
like being a relatively young and unmarried woman made the male participants more likely to
speak to me, while this may have worked against me when I tried to get interviews with women
in PENGASSN (Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria)—the other
main oil labor union in Nigeria.
In this chapter, I also highlighted the ways in which ethical issues showed up in my
fieldwork process. In my focus groups in Madu and Amada, I was confronted with questions
about the purpose of my research: Was I just trying to write a book, or did I have the means to
help?
But African feminist methodology is not just about recognizing unethical issues but
promoting ethical fieldwork practices through an activist research ethic in the field. I attempted
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to engage in this ethic by putting together a skills acquisition training for my focus group in
Amada and conducting women’s leadership trainings through ERA in three communities in the
Niger Delta. Although, I had to confront ethical dilemmas engaging in this ‘activist research
ethic’ as well.
Lessons Learned?
Reflecting on her fieldwork experience, Selena Makana (2018) concludes:
[R]eflexivity certainly does not guarantee a solution for dilemmas of critical feminist
ethnography. Although as African feminist researchers we aim for an egalitarian,
nonhierarchical relationship with our research subjects, this does not mean that we can
always achieve it. However, reflexivity does provide us with strategies to deal with the
inevitable power relations involved in representing others’ experiences and voices. Thus
the challenge for African feminist ethnographers is to create knowledge that emerges
from the diverse and complex contexts in which we live and work.273
As the quotation explains, acknowledging issues of positionality or ethics does not guarantee that
a researcher’s relationship with her participants will be de-hierarchized or that the research can
be labeled “ethical.” However, considering these issues helps contextualize the knowledge that is
created, brings transparency in the research process, and captures the complexities of research in
the world.
This dissertation—and the directions it takes—comes from a set of research goals and
commitments—that are sometimes met and other times unmet. It is a product of luck and
disappointments. It is a product of my positionality and my relationship with my research
participants. It is a product of those who want to speak to me and the silences of those I could not
build rapport with. Most important, it is an attempt (though unperfect) of capturing the voices
and experiences of women who labor within the Nigerian oil political economy.
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Chapter 4__Women as Oil Workers: Women’s Waged Labor in the Nigerian Oil Political
Economy
Making Women Oil Workers Visible in the Nigerian Oil Industry
In many of the literatures on women’s labor and oil, women are hardly discussed as oil
workers in the oil and gas industry. As I mention in Chapter 2, in the literature on women/gender
relations in the Niger Delta, women are construed as laborers around—but not within—the
Nigerian oil and gas industry. Women are the farmers and fishers whose lands and waters are
damaged by oil pollution. They are engaged in sex work with oil workers to provide for their
families. This is not to say that these things are not important. In fact, Chapter 5 discusses the
impact of the Nigerian oil political economy—specifically oil pollution—on rural women
engaged in agricultural work in the Niger Delta. And while the “resource curse” literature
focuses on women’s waged labor in oil economies, the literature is concerned about the absence
of women in the labor force more generally. Thus, women’s ties to the oil industry stem from
being wives of male oil workers. Oil affects women’s labor force participation indirectly—
through oil rents increasing their husbands’ income, resulting in the women/wives staying home
instead of working. But while this literature is concerned with women’s absence in the labor
force, my project starts with the assumption that women are present in the labor force as oil
workers. In this chapter, I ask: How are Nigerian women oil workers integrated into the Nigerian
oil and gas industry in the Niger Delta?
I argue that waged labor precarity, a defining feature of the capitalist economy, is a
defining feature of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. In the Nigerian oil and gas industry, labor
precarity for oil workers in the Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers
(NUPENG) manifests as casualization and redundancy. However, conversations on labor
precarity in the Nigerian oil and gas industry need to expand to include the experiences of
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women oil workers. For women oil workers in NUPENG’s Port Harcourt zone, their labor is
exploited not just because they experience casualization and redundancy as other oil workers do.
These women’s exploitation also results from gender ordering (exclusion and segregation) and
sexual harassment in the workplace as well as the interaction between workday constraints and
the domestic division of labor in the household.274
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section I introduces the concept of labor precarity and
its relationship to the capitalist political economy. In Section II, I provide some background
information about the two main oil labor unions in the Nigerian oil and gas industry—NUPENG
and PENGASSAN—as well as some labor force statistics about the oil and gas sector. In Section
III, I highlight the forms labor precarity take in the Nigerian oil and gas industry—casualization
and redundancy—and how they affect labor for members of NUPENG. Section IV explores how
women in NUPENG—mainly from the view of a representative of NUPENG’s Women
Committee and a representative from the Nigerian Labour Congress—experience labor precarity
in the oil industry. This experience goes beyond casualization and redundancy and includes
exclusion and segregation; sexual harassment; and the ways in which workplace constraints
interact with household and family responsibilities. Section V provides a conclusion.
Section I. Labor Precarity and the Capitalist Political Economy
This chapter focuses on the waged labor a particular class of women (women oil workers)
perform in the Nigerian oil political economy, specifically in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.
Understanding wage labor under capitalism necessitates understanding the capitalist labor
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process. As I mention in Chapter 2, each labor sphere under study requires the use of a specific
framework that theorizes that labor in a capitalist economy. A theory of capitalist patriarchy is
then used to understand how gender structures that labor.
The capitalist labor process, according to the Brighton Labour Process Group (1977),
involves capital dominating labor by owning the means of production and controlling the
production process.275 The purpose of the production process is to maximize profit, and that goal
must supersede all “conflicting objectives.”276 This includes subordinating labor to the whims of
production. Thus, making labor mobile and replaceable is necessary.277
Samir Amin (2004) explains what the replaceability of labor looks like in the current
stage of capitalism, a stage he terms the “liberal virus.”278 In this stage, “the political
is…conceived and practiced entirely in the exclusive service of…capital.”279 This has
consequences for labor. The dominant classes—those that own the means of production—
represent a small portion of the global population. The majority of workers around the world are
among the popular classes, the wage-earners.280 Some wage-earners are integrated in secure
positions due to, among other things, their professional qualifications. This gives them
bargaining power with their employers.281 Other wage-earners are integrated into precarious
positions due to inadequate professional qualifications, citizenship status, or gender. This gives
them poor bargaining power with their employers, which affects their material and social
conditions.282 According to Amin, most of the world’s workers are integrated into precarious
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positions.283 Similarly, V. Spike Peterson (2003) argues that globalization has made it necessary
to rethink the political economy since production processes and labor have been significantly
altered.284 One of the features of this economic restructuring is flexibilization. Flexibilization
refers to, among other things, a shift from unionized workers to casual workers.285 According to
Peterson, flexibilization results from attempts by companies to become more profitable in a
highly competitive globalized world. The key to do so is to cut labor costs, especially those in
more permanent/secure positions.286
According to Amin, the number of workers in precarious positions differ between the
Global North and Global South, with the latter having a greater number of workers in precarious
positions than in more secure positions.287 This can be explained by imperial/colonial relations.
For example, Sarah Kunz (2019) traces the imperialist history of Royal Dutch Shell’s labor
practices in the Global South. Royal Dutch Shell is initially formed to collect “the fruits of
Empire” starting with oilfields in the Dutch East Indies.288 Thus, racial and gender logics
determine Shell’s labor practices from its inception. Kunz argues that the category of
“expatriate” embeds racist power relations in Shell’s companies around the world.289
“Expatriates” always mean male workers of European origin, and they are given privileged status
over “local” labor.290 And while these systems are challenged by anticolonial struggles, these
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logics remain in some form today.291 Although, Kunz’s analysis does not gender the “local,” this
too has often been male.
Gender and Waged Labor Precarity
The above helps us understand why wage labor is replaceable under capitalism and the
manifestation of such replaceability—precarious labor. A theory of capitalist patriarchy helps us
understand how gender structures this precarity. Heidi Hartmann ([1976] 1979) explains,
When women participated in the wage-labor market, they did so in a position as clearly
limited by patriarchy as it was by capitalism…In the labor market the dominant position
of men was maintained by sex-ordered job segregation. Women’s jobs were lower paid,
considered less skilled, and often involved less exercise of authority or control. Men
acted to enforce job segregation in the labor market; they utilized trade-union
associations and strengthened the domestic division of labor, which required women to
do housework, child care, and related chores. Women’s subordinate position in the labor
market reinforced their subordinate position in the family, and that in turn reinforced their
labor-market position.292
In other words, even though men and women wage-earners can occupy precarious positions,
women often experience a more profound type of precarity due to gender ordering in the labor
force. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Sylvia Walby (1990) explains that men have been able to
control women’s labor in the waged economy through two different patriarchal strategies—
exclusion and segregation. The exclusion strategy aims to prevent women from gaining access to
a labor sector. The segregation strategy aims to separate women from men’s work and relegate
the latter to a lower status and wage than the former.293 As a result, women’s jobs have been
lower-paid, considered lower-skilled, and characterized by less control over their labor.
While my analysis of women oil workers primarily focuses on the sphere of wage labor,
the different spheres of the economy are not independent of each other. In the above quotation,
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Hartmann argues that men have also used their bargaining power to strengthen the domestic
division of labor, tasking women with household labor responsibilities. Of course, these
experiences are mediated by race and other structures.294 Therefore, what I also do in this chapter
is theorize that balancing paid work and domestic labor is a source of precarity for women. The
constraints of their workday interacting with the domestic division of labor are a source of
gender precarity—a structuring force—for women oil workers. Women often labor in multiple
spheres, and my analyses will reflect this. Conditions in the Nigerian oil and gas industry also
affect women’s unwaged/domestic labor.
Peterson (2003), however, offers a different interpretation of the relationship between
gender and precarity. She writes that “flexibilization feminizes the workforce: an increasing
proportion of jobs require few skills, and the most desirable workers are those who are perceived
to be unorganized (undemanding), docile but reliable, available for part-time and temporary
work, and willing to accept low wages.”295 In other words, Peterson sees flexibilization of the
workplace as the feminization of the workplace, meaning that it is women who are concentrated
in these flexible jobs. Peterson’s analyses usually focus on labor-intensive industries, where
assumptions about women and the skills required for the work means that flexibilization is
feminization.296 But in capital-intensive industries—such as the Nigerian oil and gas industry—
such assumptions may not be at play. As I show below, the technical nature of this work and
gender assumptions about women’s ability to do this work likely mean that women are not
considered suitable for these jobs. Thus, flexibilization is not always feminization. And, as I note
above, location in the capitalist political economy matters. More workers are incorporated into
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precarious positions in the Global South, thus both men and women are often integrated into
precarious positions. This is the position I take in this chapter.
Section II. Background Information about Labor in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry
Oil Labor Unions
According to Julius Inhonvbere (1998), the rise of trade unions in Nigeria’s oil and gas
industry can be traced to the unfair treatment workers receive from companies and the support
these companies receive from the state.297 The first trade union in the oil industry is a collective
agreement between Shell and representatives of Shell African Workers Union (SAWU) in 1962.
Shell is one of the first oil companies operating in Nigeria, and efforts by workers to unionize
date back to 1959.298 However, modern trade unionism in Nigeria’s oil industry does not start
until 1978.
There are two main labor unions in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry—PENGASSAN
(Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria) and NUPENG (Nigeria Union
of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers). Both unions are formally registered as trade unions on
August 15, 1978 when the Trade Unions Decree (now Trade Unions Act) divide all unions in
any industry into either a white-collar or blue-collar workers union. PENGASSAN is considered
the “white-collar” workers union of the oil and gas industry, while NUPENG is the “blue-collar”
workers union. 299 Historically, PENGASSAN is considered more conservative, while NUPENG
is considered more radical/militant. Although these ideological leanings are less explicit today,
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these characteristics are still said to apply. Thus, NUPENG initiates more strikes than
PENGASSAN, for example.300
PENGASSAN is comprised of senior and middle management workers in the oil and gas
industry. It is currently affiliated with the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUC), which is an
umbrella organization of senior staff trade unions in Nigeria. Some of PENGASSAN’s
objectives include unionizing all senior and middle management employees in the oil and gas
industry; protecting and improving the working conditions of its members; and ensuring
members receive any necessary health and safety benefits. PENGASSAN has zonal offices (or
branches) in Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, and Kaduna—major trading/oil centers in Nigeria.301
NUPENG is open to all junior workers in the oil and gas industry, including those
involved in prospecting, drilling, the extraction of oil and natural gas, and distributing and
marketing natural gas and petroleum products.302 It is currently affiliated with the Nigerian
Labour Congress (NLC), which is an umbrella organization of junior and senior staff trade
unions in Nigeria. NUPENG categorizes its members as either working in the “formal” or
“informal” sector. The formal sector is comprised of professional workers who are employed by
petroleum companies or third-party contractors who work with petroleum corporations. 303 For
example, these workers may work at Eleme Petrochemicals Limited (EPCL), which
manufactures plastics. Or, these formal sector workers may work at the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which is the oil company the Nigerian government uses to
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participate in and regulate the Nigerian oil and gas industry.304 Those in the informal sector are
usually self-employed and may work in distribution, as tanker drivers, or in gas stations.305 Some
of NUPENG’s goals include unionizing workers; negotiating better working conditions for
members; and solving disputes between members and between members and employers.
NUPENG also has zonal offices in Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, and Kaduna.306
NUPENG also has a Women Committee to support women working in the oil and gas
industry. There is little information available about the NUPENG Women Committee outside of
NUPENG’s website. The formation of the Women Committee can be traced to a few women—
Mrs. Selina Nwokolo, Veronica C. Ogu, Mrs. Onwordi, Mrs. Lola Odu, and others—who fought
for a place for women in the union after the intra-union crisis from 1983 to 1987.307 During this
period, NUPENG’s National Executive Council becomes unstable when, in 1984, the Lagos
High Court grants an injunction against John Enas Dubre that prevents him from occupying the
NUPENG presidency.308 In the aftermath of this crisis, NUPENG undertakes many reforms,
including forming the NUPENG Women Wing. However, the Women Wing becomes defunct
during “the June 12 Struggle,” when the union commences a nine-week strike to pressure the
military government to uphold the results of the winner of the June 12, 1993 democratic
presidential election. After this struggle, the second Women Wing, later renamed the Women
Committee, is re-inaugurated on August 21, 2003.309 A NUPENG member and representative of
the Women Committee describes the Women Committee as thus: “I see it as a platform to
mainstream, mainstreaming women to the main house. Because, at that level, women
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are…trained on leadership qualities, leadership skills. They learn how they can…take care of
other higher responsibilities, both in the union, in their workplaces, and at home.”310
Labor Force Statistics in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry
Labor force statistics in Nigeria are compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
The “Mining and Quarrying” category includes the mining of coal, ire ore, other minerals, and
the extraction of crude petroleum. In 2018, the sector accounts for 11.17% of nominal GDP
(Gross Domestic Product) but accounts for 0.17% of employment.311 The total amount of people
that are employed in this sector312 is 129,705, which is 0.2% of the total working population.313
117,805 are men, which is 90.8% of people working in this sector and 0.2% of the total working
population in Nigeria. 11,900 are women, which is 9.2% of people working in this sector and
0.0% of the total working population in Nigeria.314 The NBS does not disaggregate this category
any further, so it is hard to determine how many people are employed in the oil and gas sector.
Precise statistics about labor force employment in the oil and gas sector are not easily
accessible. The hiding of labor force statistics seems to be done strategically. A NUPENG
representative explains,
When you ask them [oil companies] the numbers of the employees, they hardly give it to
you…For a management that has maybe like 200 workers and now the workers have
reduced to say 30 and they’ve outsourced all the other workers to third party contractors,
such an employer will not...when you ask of the statistics…such an employer will not
come and tell you this is the number of…my employees. He won’t come and tell you
because we…also tag that…employer…that he’s anti-labour…that he does not have the
interest of the union at heart and that is why…he’s…outsourcing some of those
workers…out.315
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Oil companies do not want to give precise data of how many employees they have because they
do not want to be accountable to labor unions. If an oil company is outsourcing most of its
employees and not following the proper regulations, it can be tagged as anti-labor and face
penalties. Oil companies thus prefer to obscure their employment statistics.
However, some data do exist about employment statistics in the Nigerian oil and gas
sector. A 2012 study of 6 oil companies (Nigeria Agip Oil, Chevron Petroleum, Shell Petroleum,
Connoil, Mobil Producing, and NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation]) claim that
these companies employ about 26,696 people.316 This number is likely on the low end since it
only focuses on a small number of companies. In contrast, a 2003 estimate of Nigerian workers
in the oil industry puts the number at 55,800.”317
Section III. Labor Precarity in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry
Colonial Era
As I mention earlier, Kunz (2019) argues that racial and gender logics have historically
regulated Royal Dutch Shell’s labor practices in the Global South. She argues that male
European workers are often given privileged status over “local” labor. These same logics are
evident in Royal Dutch Shell’s labor practices in colonial Nigeria. Royal Dutch Shell discovers
oil in Oloibiri (in commercial quantities) in 1956. However, Shell’s history in Nigeria is longer
than that. Shell/D’Arcy has long clashed with Nigerians over its treatment of Nigerian labor. For
instance, in Phia Steyn’s (2009) work on oil exploration in colonial Nigeria, she finds that Shell
D’Arcy and other European companies are slow to implement the colonial government’s 1948
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Nigerianization policy. By 1954, Shell lists only 3 Nigerians in senior level positions out of a
total workforce of 2,088.318 She explains that Shell’s failure to implement the Nigerianization
policy emanates from a deliberate decision to only train a few Nigerians for these senor
positions.319 In other words, Shell seems to have a policy of not hiring Nigerians, and this policy
is still evident in post-colonial Nigeria.
Contemporary Era
Daniel A. Omoweh (2005) argues that oil MNCs operating in the Niger Delta do not use
much local labor. 320 Oil workers in the Nigerian and gas industry have long complained about
the discriminatory hiring practices of oil MNCs. Thus, oil workers have threatened to strike and
have gone on strike over the anti-labor practices of oil companies, including their racist hiring
policies. For example, some of the reasons given for oil worker strikes between 2000-2004
include “a Managing Director[‘s]…plan to remove Africans from senior management posts” and
“[e]mployers accused of preferential or better treatment to expatriate workers at the cost of
Nigerian workers.”321 These strikes are motivated by concerns that oil companies are hiring
expatriate workers instead of qualified Nigerians.322
There have been attempts to change these discriminatory practices. In 2010, Nigeria
enacts the Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development Act (known as “Nigerian content”) to
increase the number of Nigerian and Nigerian companies participating in the oil and gas
industry. Section 31(1) argues that operators must identify any positions held by an expatriate
and have a Nigerian train for that position for a maximum of four years. At the end of the fourth
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year, that position should be “Nigerianised.”323 Section 32 says that expatriates can only occupy
5% of management positions.324 However, this law has been criticized for not substantively
changing labor conditions in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Jesse Salah Ovadia (2013) argues
that Nigerian content is merely a means for the Nigerian elite to gain more access to oil wealth
and is not intended to increase the number of Nigerians in the oil and gas industry or improve
their working conditions.325 Thus, these racist labor practices remain.
Nuzo Eziechi’s (2014) dissertation on Nigerian offshore workers details these workers
concerns about the ways in which expatriate workers are privileged in the Nigerian oil and gas
industry. One driller is quoted as saying, “I think we are still in slavery.”326 Another engineer
quoted in Eziechi explains,
My dear, the oyibos [white man/white person] have come after many decades of
colonization to colonize us a second time. They have taken our good jobs, they earn
higher, even the contract workers that are oyibo (expatriates) earn more money than
permanent workers in this industry, how much more a contract worker like me. Even now
that there is insecurity in the region, they have refused to go because they don’t earn as
much as they do here in their countries. The security men here guard them like gods and
the local people almost worship them. ‘abeg we don tire for this people’ (please we are
tired of them).”327
In the quotation, the engineer explains the hierarchy at work in the Nigerian oil industry, where
expatriates are hired over Nigerian workers as well as given better benefits. Eziechi’s survey of
offshore workers reveal that 78.1% of Nigerian respondents (out of 160) disagree that there is a
good working relationship between managers and workers,328 and that 99.4% of local workers
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surveyed disagree that there is equal pay between Nigerian and expatriate workers.329 Similarly,
Fajana (2005) argues that there is a large disparity in pay and working conditions between
expatriate workers and Nigerian workers. According to him, the average pay ratio of expatriate
workers to Nigerian workers is about 4:1.330 One can see the colonial employment logics still at
play here. The block quotation above alludes to this logic: ‘they have come…to colonize us a
second time.’ More recently, in July 2018, NUPENG reports the foreign oil MNCs operating in
Nigeria to the International Labour Organization (ILO) for unfair labor practices, what the
NUPENG President Prince Williams Akporeha describes as “slave labour.” NUPENG alleges
that, among other things, the oil MNCs do not provide sufficient personal protective equipment
(PPE) and refuse to implement rulings by the Industrial Arbitration Panel, which is an institution
that helps solve labor disputes. 331 And in July 2020, NUPENG members picket the offices of
Variant Energy for illegally terminating workers. The company is also accused of unsafe
working conditions and non-payment of benefits to terminated workers. Some of the signs the
workers hold include phrases such as “Enough is enough over master-slave dialectic” and
“Workers are not slaves.”332
These concerns about racism/colonial relations are often levied in tandem with concerns
against contract labor/casual work. NUPENG’s complaint to the ILO also mentions the
proliferation of contract staff in the Nigerian oil and gas industry and efforts by oil MNCs to
suppress NUPENG’s unionization of such staff.333 And PENGASSAN has argued that
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expatriates are often hired instead of qualified Nigerians, marginalizing Nigerian workers to
casual work. As a result, these workers are subjected to poor working conditions, low pay, and
no benefits.334 In other words, the privileging of expatriate staff in the oil and gas industry is
interrelated to the casualization of Nigerian staff. Casualization as well as redundancy are major
sources of labor precarity for Nigerian oil workers.
Casualization
During the 40th anniversary of NUPENG in December 2018, NUPENG President
Williams Akporeha states that the union has been facing “a hydra headed monster” called
casualization, which—through the anti-union employment policies of oil companies—has
depleted the union’s membership.335 In the Nigerian oil and gas industry, casualization refers to
“an industry-wide shift away from regular, full-time work toward forms of cheaper temporary
labor and short-term contracting” in the “formal” sector.336 This is not a new issue. Casualization
has been plaguing the oil and gas industry for many decades. Recessions between 1981 and 1986
followed by austerity, liberalization, and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in 1986 lead
to massive job losses in Nigeria and economic restructuring in the oil industry and other sectors.
This period sees the rise of casualization, which weakens labor rights.337 While casualization is
evident in other sectors in Nigeria—most notably telecommunications and banking—the
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dominance of foreign capital (and the importance of oil to the Nigerian state and Nigerian elites)
make the effects more profound.338
The difference between full-time and contract workers in the Nigerian oil and gas
industry is stark. Permanent or regular workers are hired by oil companies and receive contracts
detailing work conditions, wages, hours, and benefits. 339 Casual/contract workers, in contrast,
have a different relationship to oil companies. Oil companies may hire casual workers on a
contingent basis and terminate their contracts at will. These casual workers are laid off
occasionally, e.g., every three months, and then re-hired under new contracts. This cycle then
repeats endlessly.340 Or, casual workers may be employed by third-party contractors under a
variety of temporary and short-term arrangements.341 Oil companies then contract with these
third-party contractors for the services of these casual workers. This is the most common form of
casual employment in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The casual workers are the employees of
the contractors even though they work on the premises of oil companies. Thus, an oil company
may have hundreds of workers in its operation, but they are employed by some dozen third-party
contractors. Because there are variations in the terms used to describe casualization (e.g., casual,
contract, or temporary staff) as well as the structure of casualization, it is often difficult to
decipher who is employing and paying casual workers.342 This arrangement relieves oil
companies of the legal responsibilities and costs of being the employer of the workers in their
employ.343
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Attempting to calculate the number of casual workers in the Nigerian oil and gas industry
leads to the same types of problems I outline above. These employment statistics are not easily
accessible. However, there have been some attempts to do so. One source compares the number
of casual workers to junior workers in the oil industry in 2001. It finds that there are 14,559
casual or contract workers (38.7% of total workers in the oil industry) compared to 23,065 junior
workers on permanent job positions in the oil industry (61.3% of total workers in the oil
industry).344 However, other sources claim that there tends to be much more casual workers. A
2001 study finds that there are more than 6,000 casual workers in ChevronTexaco; more than
20,000 casual workers in Royal Dutch Shell; more than 8,900 in ExxonMobil; and more than
2,000 in TotalFinalElf.345 A 2010 report by the Solidarity Center claims that the ratio of casual
workers to full-time workers could be as high as 9:1.346 And a 2012 study states that there are
about 10,565 permanent workers in the Nigerian oil industry (or 39.6% of the total workforce)
compared to 16,131 casual workers (or 60.4% of the total workforce).347 Despite the imprecise
estimates, one can say that casual workers make up a sizable portion of the total workforce in the
Nigerian oil and gas industry.
Casual workers possess the same qualifications and perform the same duties as regular
workers, but they have no job security.348 And because most casual workers are not part of any
union, their bargaining power is weak. Section 40 of the Nigerian Constitution gives every
person the right to join a trade union. Additionally, Nigeria has ratified the ILO Convention on
the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise and the ILO Convention on

344

. Okafor, Emeka Emmanuel. (2007). “Globalisation, Casualisation and Capitalist Business Ethics: A Critical
Overview of Situation in the Oil and Gas Sector in Nigeria.” Journal of Social Sciences, 15:2, 174
345
. Fajana, 4
346
. The Degradation of Work…, 15
347
. Fapohunda, 267
348
. The Degradation of Work…, 15

114

the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, which both guarantee workers the right to form
and join a trade union and bargain collectively. As for casual workers, the National Industrial
Court of Nigeria held in Patovilki Industrial Planners V National Union of Hotels and Personal
Services Workers that denying temporary staff the right to join a trade union is
unconstitutional.349 However, casual workers are often denied the ability to join unions.
The regulations around casualization are complex and confusing, and employers have
become adept at finding loopholes to suppress the unionization of casual workers.350 For
example, the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment, NUPENG, PENGASSAN,
and other stakeholders create the “Guidelines on Labour Administration: Issues in Contract
Staffing/Outsourcing in the Oil and Gas Sector” in May 2011. The guidelines address the
following issues: permanent and contract jobs, unionization, and job security in the oil and gas
industry.351 The Guidelines differentiate between a labor contractor and a service contractor. The
former supplies personnel to the oil industry, while the latter supplies personnel and equipment.
The Guidelines stipulate that staff employed by labor contractors belong to NUPENG or
PENGASSAN as appropriate. But in the case of staff employed by service contractors, the
Guidelines stipulate that their trade union should be determined by the activities of the contractor
in accordance with the Third Schedule Part B of the Trade Unions Act.352 The Trade Unions Act
details the formation, registration, and organization of trade unions in Nigeria. Third Schedule
Part B defines the boundaries of all registered trade unions in Nigeria. However, when a service
contractor is engaged in a variety of activities which makes it difficult to place that contractor in
a particular area listed in the Third Schedule Part B of the Trade Unions Act, the staff in those
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contract companies can belong to a union in their contract area. Thus, NUPENG and
PENGASSAN argue that all staff deployed in the oil and gas sector, whether regular/permanent,
casual, or some other arrangements are entitled to join their unions. However, contractors and oil
companies have opposed this and have insisted that staff can only join the trade union in the area
in which the contract company works. This tension, and the lack of enforceability of the
Guidelines, has made it difficult for casual workers deployed in the oil and gas sector to join oil
unions or any union for that matter.353 Thus Nigerian oil labor unions argue that casualization in
the oil and gas industry is not just a cost-cutting measure. It is also used to “[break] workers’
strength.”354
This weak bargaining power and inability to unionize means that casual workers earn
lower wages than regular employees.355 Collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) negotiated by
NUPENG and PENGASSAN usually provide more benefits to workers than in other industries.
Thus, it benefits contractors and oil companies to prevent these workers from joining oil unions.
Casual workers can make as little as 15-50% of union wages and receive few, if any, beneﬁts.356
For instance, a casual worker could earn the equivalent of $280 a month for doing the same job
as a regular worker earning the equivalent of $2,000 or even more a month.357 A NUPENG
member claims that some casual workers are paid as low as 30,000 naira monthly,358 which is
less than $100 a month. Weak bargaining power also means that casual workers are often
subjected to unfair working conditions. This includes: 1) long or unspecified work hours; 2) low
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overtime wages; 3) no sick leave or maternity leave; 4) lack of redundancy benefits; 5) poor
health and safety working conditions; 6) no compensation for work injuries; and 7) arbitrary
pension deductions.359
Redundancy
Precarity in the Nigerian oil and gas industry has also taken the form of redundancy. The
Nigerian Labour Act, a source of employment law in Nigeria, defines redundancy as “an
involuntary and permanent loss of employment caused by an excess of manpower.”360 For those
made redundant, the employer needs to inform the relevant trade union or representative of the
reason and extent of the redundancy as well as negotiate redundancy payments to the redundant
worker.361 However, the Labour Act is limited in scope and defines a worker as “any person who
has entered into or works under a contract with an employer, whether the contract is for manual
labour or clerical work.”362 Those “exercising administrative, executive, technical or professional
functions as public officers or otherwise,” 363 such as oil workers, are not covered under the
Labour Act. Oil workers’ benefits and working conditions are specified in their collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs). While employers not bound by the Labour Act often use the
Labour Act as a benchmark for determining the benefits offered to their employees,364 there is
little data available about the specificity of redundancy in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.
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However, redundancy seems to work differently for oil workers. The NUPENG Women
Committee representative explains,
[R]edundancy is whereby they’ll say ok, we don’t have…enough money or the space to
carry everybody along...[B]ecause of the CBA (collective bargaining agreement) or
because we feel your services we will still need it in the future, you just stay
aside…Don’t be coming to work. We will not be paying you…You’re not sacked
yet…You are just there. But anytime…there’s any small window…they will call you
back. So, at that level, you cannot look for work elsewhere…You’ve not been sacked.
You cannot work. And you’re not being paid, you know? So, you will just stay at
home…You know that…when they sack somebody, the CBA, you have [a] process.
There must be reasons...and terms and conditions. Because if you say you want to sack
that person, then we have ex gratia. That is where you will calculate all the remuneration,
everything, all his or her entitlements...[A]nd of course, when you sack people, union
comes in...to defend them, to make sure that all these things are taken care of. So, the
companies now also develop another tactic…[and] say ‘ok you’re not sacking them but
let them be on redundancy.’365
In this quotation, the NUPENG member is describing the precarity of redundancy. When a
worker is fired, they are entitled to certain benefits. Thus, oil companies circumvent these
obligations by declaring workers as redundant instead. Because the worker has not been
officially fired, they are not entitled to any remuneration. This is a precarious situation for
workers because they do not know when they will be called back to work. And because they
have not been officially fired, they cannot look for work elsewhere. Like casualization,
redundancy appears to be a cost-cutting and labor control tactic. For example, some oil workers
have claimed that they are made redundant but then immediately re-hired for the same job with
no medical benefits.366
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Section IV. Gender and Labor Precarity in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry
Women Oil Workers in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry
Gender breakdowns for workers in the oil industry are also difficult to find. As I note
above, a 2003 estimate of Nigerian workers in the oil industry put the number at 55,800. Women
are estimated to account for about 15% of the estimated 55,800 workers. In 2003, women are
estimated to account for 3,000 of NUPENG’s total membership of 15,000. 367Additionally,
according to a NUPENG member, the ratio of men to women that work offshore can range from
20:1 to 50:1.368
Women Oil Workers and Precarity: Casualization and Redundancy
Given the lack of available data, the gender breakdowns for casual and redundant
workers are difficult to determine. However, interviews with the NUPENG Women Committee
representative confirm that women in NUPENG are also dealing with these issues. Speaking on
redundancy, she explains:
[S]ometimes you see people being on redundancy for 5 years…3 years…[A]nd because
anywhere you also want to go and look for work, you know, they will always make
reference [about] where you are coming from, Why did you leave there?...[Y]ou can’t say
you are sacked because if they confirm the people will say, ‘no, we’ve not disengaged
her.’ And they will also be looking for fraud. Because as soon as you gain employment
elsewhere, they will say, ‘ok, you left...you’ve gotten another job so some of those
benefits too will now be looked into as if you just bolted away.369
Because redundancy can last for years and gaining other employment puts any redundancy
benefits at risk, women oil workers made redundant have difficulty contributing to their
households.370
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Gender Precarity: Exclusion and Segregation in Waged Work
But casualization and redundancy are not the only forms of precarity women in
NUPENG experience. Conversations on labor precarity in the Nigerian oil political economy do
not take into account that gender ordering also contributes to the insecurity women oil workers
face. Recall the two types of patriarchal strategies used to control women’s labor in the waged
economy—exclusion and segregation. Women oil workers are victims of both strategies.
A member of NUPENG claims that one of the challenges women face is discrimination
in access to jobs. He explains that companies would prefer to hire a man as an electrical engineer
over a woman, for instance.371 A representative of the Nigerian Labour Congress also claims that
women face “[g]ender discrimination with respect to type of job.”372 A report by The Advocates
for Human Rights titled, Promoting Gender Diversity and Inclusion in the Oil, Gas and Mining
Extractive Industries (henceforth AHR report), explains that extractive industries are often seen
as male-dominated, and industry culture supports this notion. Employment practices in these
industries are often based on gender ideas that paint women as unsuitable employees.373 Thus,
women are excluded from certain jobs.
Women also face precarity due to segregation in the oil and gas industry. A female
engineer quoted in Eziechi laments, “We (females) are capable to work offshore but it’s almost
impossible to get a job as an offshore worker. They [oil companies] just post most female
engineers to the office and leave the field for men.”374 It is not a surprise then that Eziechi finds
82.6% of female offshore workers are dissatisfied with their professional development training
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and career progression compared to 53.4% of male offshore workers.375 This segregation is also
mentioned in my interviewees. According to the NUPENG Women Committee representative,
most of the women in their union work in the informal sector.376 Recall that NUPENG refers to
its members as either working in the “formal” or “informal” sector, where the latter tend to be
self-employed and may work in distribution, as tanker drivers, or in gas stations. The NUPENG
Women Committee representative describes women’s experiences in the informal sector as thus:
The informal sector is where you really have the women…[W]e will call them informal
because their employment or their engagement is not formalized. No agreement. No CBA
[collective bargaining agreement]…Some of them are suppliers like this...OGS, it’s Oil
and Gas Suppliers…Like, [there are] women that…go to companies to source for supply
[ask if companies need supplies]. And when they’re given [a contract to provide the
product], they go…to [a] bank to take a loan and buy these products and supply to
companies…And within that period, anything can happen. Anything can happen in the
sense that the company...you might bring a product now, and the company as they’re
discharging it, they will give you [pay you] shortage of 2,000 liters…[A]nd when they
give you that shortage, it means that at the end of the day, the money you’re expected to
be paid will not be complete…How do you face the bank...where you took the
loan?...[Additionally] the SUTAKEP [Surface Tank Kerosene Peddlers] people,
they…deal on kerosene...We call it DPK [Dual Purpose Kerosene] or HHK [Household
Kerosene]…They’re having problem. The reason is because one, most of them can no
longer afford the capital to do the business. [The prices of the] products have been
increased.377
In this quotation the NUPENG Women Committee describes the precarity women face in the
informal sector. They do not sign collective bargaining agreements, and thus they have no job
security. The interviewee describes women who take out bank loans to go into business
supplying products to oil companies. However, they might be paid less than their products are
worth. Thus, they do not make enough money to repay their loans. The interviewee also explains
that women might go into business selling kerosene that can be used to prepare food. However,
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being able to purchase the kerosene and sell it on the market often depends on the fluctuation in
oil prices. When these prices increase, women are no longer able to stay in business.
Despite these challenges, the Women Committee representative does not support a
proposed quota that would increase women’s participation in the oil and gas industry. She
explains,
I don’t believe in that 35% affirmative. I don’t believe it…[W]hy I don’t believe [it] is
that…if anything that is dashed [given] to you, you will not...one, you won’t be proud of
it. Secondly, you...might not be able to really stand your ground. They will say, ‘Ok, after
all, Wike [gave it to you]’...[B]ut if you struggle it out with them and at the end of the
day you’re able to achieve it, get it…even...in the midst of all the troubles...he will have
nothing to tell me…But whereby [the]...men sat together and say, ‘give it to her’…they
say am [they will say]...‘if you talk too much, we will take it from you.’378
The ‘35% affirmative’ refers to different policy proposals to implement a 35% quota for
Nigerian women in the political and economic spheres.379 In the above quotation, the interviewee
argues that these quotas ultimately hinder women because they make it easier for men to dismiss
them and not take them seriously. The men will just say, ‘after all, Wike [Ezenwo Nyesom
Wike—who is the current Governor of Rivers State in Nigeria] gave it to you,’ implying that the
women do not earn their positions and are thus unqualified to be there. The Women Committee
representative seems to be worried that this affirmative action could have unintended
consequences for women (e.g., silencing them), making their lives harder in the oil and gas
industry. However, the AHR report notes that quotas can be a good way to include women in all
levels of extractive industries. The report does acknowledge that women have expressed
concerns that such measures have the potential for tokenism—the same concerns that the
Women Committee representative expresses—and provide a false sense of gender parity. Thus,
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quotas alone may not be sufficient to tackle gender discrimination, but they can be a good first
step.380
Gender and Precarity: Sexual Harassment in Waged Work
Women in the oil industry also face precarity due to sexual harassment. The AHR report
finds that claims of sexual harassment in extractive industries are prevalent.381 A representative
of the Nigerian Labour Congress mentions this,382 and she is not the only one to do so. The
NUPENG Women Committee representative explains that employers might approach women
like this: “You’re qualified for this job, but you know another person is also more qualified. I can
give you this job, but you have to do this, do this, and that…”383 In other words, employers may
attempt to gain sexual favors from women in exchange for jobs.
Gender and Precarity: Balancing Household and Familial Obligations
The previous examples demonstrate the ways in which gender structures in the workplace
is a source of precarity for NUPENG workers. But for women in NUPENG, the ways in which
constraints of their workday interact with the domestic division of labor is another source of
gender precarity. As I mention before, women’s weakened bargaining power in waged labor
strengthens the domestic division of labor, tasking them with household and familial obligations.
While there have been some critiques of these obligations, women (according to the NUPENG
Women Committee representative) are more critical of the constraints of their workplaces that
have made it difficult to balance paid work and household and family responsibilities.
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When asked about the challenges women in the oil industry face, a representative of the
Nigerian Labour Congress succinctly responds, “Work time is not flexible for school runs,”384 in
other words, dropping and picking up children from school. The NUPENG Women Committee
representative explains:
They should be able to review the Labour Act—look at it because they are the ones that
will still come up and say…that women are vulnerable. But if they’re vulnerable, at that
level too, why not create space for that vulnerability? That’s by making them say ‘ok, as
a female worker, you’ll be closing 2 hours [to pick up children from school, etc.] to the
time of the other men’…But they don't do it.385
To give this quotation some context, the Nigerian Labour Act legislates women’s ‘vulnerability’
in its “Employment of women section.” For example, women are not allowed to be employed
during the night, although there are exceptions (e.g., those in the medical field). 386 Employers
found violating these sections can be fined or imprisoned. 387 The interviewee is thus arguing that
since the Labour Act already addresses women’s ‘vulnerability,’ it should do so in a way that
would help women balance their household responsibilities—allowing women to leave work 2
hours early to pick up their children. As I mention earlier, oil workers are not covered by the
Labour act, as their benefits are covered in the collective bargaining agreements negotiated
between their unions and the oil companies. However, employers not bound by the Labour Act
often use the Labour Act as a benchmark for determining the benefits to offer to their
employees.388 Hence, the interviewee’s complaint is directed at the Labour Act.
This interaction between the workday and the domestic division of labor challenges
women in other ways. The NUPENG Women Committee representative explains that their
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workplaces do not understand the amount of work women do before coming to work. Employers
need to take this into account when they structure workdays. She explains,
Definitely it [the work environment] affects the family life… It’s seriously affecting the
women in the sense that in the morning…the man will just get up, dress up, and he’s off.
But as a woman, you must make sure the children are Ok…[M]ost women do their school
run...that’s drop...off the children in the school...You also remember that you have to
wake as early as 4AM [for some] to be able to prepare breakfast for the house while the
man is still sleeping…You start preparing the children. You start making water for him to
bathe. He will just wake up, take his bath, come out, the breakfast is already on the table,
[he] takes it, and off he goes. You will now be the one dropping the children off in the
school before reporting to work. And for somebody who has passed through such
stress...that morning before getting to the office, how do you expect her to concentrate?
Then even when they manage to, they’re looking at time. Because some of them, as they
close from work too, they will branch market [stop at the market] to buy what they will
prepare for the family.389
Women experience precarity not only because paid work bleeds into family life, but because
family life can affect how women perform in their jobs. The interviewee details the morning
routine many women go through of getting their families prepared for the day. When she finally
gets to her work, she is not able to concentrate, thus affecting her working conditions.
Another challenge women face has to do with lack of childcare facilities and insufficient
maternity leave benefits. The AHR report recounts that several interviewees mention childcare
facilities as the biggest need for women working in extractive industries. This is because,
“historically, companies in the industry designed benefits packages for white men who were
either single or had a stay-at-home spouse.”390 The Nigerian Labour Congress representative
states, “Maternity leave [is] not sufficient and there are hardly workplace crèches to cater for
toddlers after resumption from three months maternity leave.”391 Thus, oil industry workday
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constraints put stress on new mothers’ nursing and daycare needs by not offering them longer
maternity leave benefits. The NUPENG Women Committee representative explains:
There’s also an issue we’re having now, this maternity leave… But women [have been]
agitating that if the maternity leave can be made 6 months. And men will come up [and
say], ‘Ah that 6 months. Before the 6 months expire, they don carry anoda belle’[if you
give women 6 months of maternity leave, they will use that time to get pregnant again
and get more time off of work].…But…look at it, 3 months is too short for a woman to
recover from both pregnancy and breastfeeding…3 months is small for her to now start
running back to work…But at least, even if it is 4 months or 6 months [that would be
better]...So if the Labour Act or if they can put it there that let…maternity leave be made
6 months…[A]t 6 months, you can also drop a child in a daycare. For companies that
don’t have crèche, at 6 months you can leave a baby...in a daycare and come to
work…[‘C]ause by that 6 months, you must have finished the period of exclusive
breastfeeding…You must have finished weaning the baby at that time. So, you can afford
to leave the baby either in a daycare or with other people and go to work so that you
concentrate...properly.392
To put this quotation into context, the Labour Act states that “a woman: (a) shall have the right
to leave her work if she produces a medical certificate given by a registered medical practitioner
stating that her confinement will probably take place within six weeks; (b) shall not be permitted
to work during the six weeks following her confinement.”393 Thus, the Labour Act stipulates that
women are entitled to 3 months of maternity leave. As I mention above, employers not bound by
the Labour Act often use the Labour Act as a benchmark for determining the benefits to offer to
their employees. Therefore, the interviewee’s complaint is directed at the Labour Act. But this is
not to say that employers, specifically oil companies, could not set their own standards above the
legal benchmarks. For example, Royal Dutch Shell announces that beginning January 1, 2018,
employees worldwide would be entitled to 16 weeks or 4 months of paid maternity leave.394 And
in 2015, Eni (an oil MNC) adopted a policy that guaranteed that the minimum standards set up

392

. Interview 10. Dissertation Fieldwork, 2017
. Labour Act, Part II, Section 54(a)-54(b)
394
. Shell Global. Global Minimum Standard for Maternity Leave. https://www.shell.com/careers/about-careers-atshell/we-are-one-team/diversity-inclusion/global-maternity-leave-standard.html
393

126

by the ILO convention 183, i.e. 14 weeks of maternity leave from work with two-thirds pay,
would be available to its employees around the world.395 However, it is unclear if and how this
works in Nigeria given the issues of casualization and outsourcing I highlight above. In June
2018, the Minister of Labour and Employment, Chris Ngige, announces that the Nigerian
government has extended maternity leave from 3 months to 4 months.396 However, this
announcement does not have the force of law until it is passed by the National Assembly, thus it
is unclear what, if any, impact this has on women oil workers.
The same interviewee further explains that allowing women to take only 3 months
maternity leave can be harmful to women working in the oil industry:
Ok, a woman that is pregnant, you’re expected to still be on duty, probably about a month
to your delivery. Some of them will even want to be on duty until when they put to bed
[go into labor] so that they can be able to get their 3 months complete. If you take a
month, let’s say from the 8th month,...you decide to go on maternity and you’re giving
birth by the 9th…you have taken 1 month out of that your 3 months...so you’re bound to
resume work after 2 months of delivery. You see?...So some of them will now want
to…manage...and be coming [into work]. It is when they put to bed that morning that
they will now send message to the company that they’ve put to bed...and from there, their
3 months will [start]…Now, if you’re working in…a company where chemicals are
sprayed anyhow...and as a woman in that condition you go to work,...you will be inhaling
these things...even if they don’t say, ‘Ok, go and operate [that] machine’ or plead for you,
‘don’t turn anything.’ But you’re in the plant. You are in that company. You inhale all
these chemicals. It will have effect on the mother. It will have effect on the child, on the
baby.397
The quotation explains that because women only have 3 months of maternity leave, they tend to
wait until they go into labor before taking time off. During that time, they will still be going into
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work and possibly inhaling harmful chemicals. Thus, maternity leave needs to be extended to
protect the mother and her unborn child.
Section V. Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that waged labor precarity is a defining feature of the capitalist
economy. The production process in capitalism works to maximize profits, which means cutting
labor costs and making labor replaceable. Thus, this labor precarity is a feature of the Nigerian
oil and gas industry. For oil workers in NUPENG (Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas
Workers), this takes the forms of casualization and redundancy. The former refers to a shift from
permanent long-term employment to temporary short-term contracting, while the latter refers to
an indeterminate loss of employment. However, conversations on labor precarity in the Nigerian
oil and gas industry need to expand to include the experiences of women oil workers.
According to the NUPENG Women Committee representative and a representative of the
Nigeria Labour Congress, women oil workers in NUPENG are exploited not just because they
experience casualization and redundancy as other oil workers do. These women’s exploitation
also results from gender ordering (exclusion and segregation) and sexual harassment in the
workplace. Additionally, the ways in which constraints of their workplaces interact with the
domestic division of labor is a source of labor precarity for these women. For instance, lack of
childcare, long working hours, and insufficient maternity leave benefits made working in the oil
industry challenging for women oil workers.
Implications of my Analyses
In the following section, I pose questions that arise from the analyses in my chapter,
specifically about the meanings attached to gender. I pose these questions for myself (and others)
to think about for future avenues of research.
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What Does This Tell Us About Femininity and Masculinity?
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, scholarship in rural sociology have explored how natural
resources affect meanings attached to gender. In this literature, the concern is about the meanings
of femininity and masculinity that are constructed by working in/being around the extraction of
natural resources. While this chapter is concerned with gendered structures, my interviews do
hint at meanings of femininity and masculinity in the Nigerian oil and gas industry that are worth
exploring. As a sample analysis, I will compare my findings to Shannon Elizabeth Bell and
Yvonne A. Braun’s (2010) research on the coal industry in Central Appalachia.
To re-cap, Bell and Braun argue that the coal industry in Central Appalachia has shaped
the meanings of masculinity and femininity in the region. The coal industry personifies
masculinity in Central Appalachia. Thus, the gender identities of men (coal miners) in the region
are intimately tied to coal. Therefore, these men are discouraged from criticizing coal’s
ecological effects lest they be seen as less “manly.” Women in the region (usually the wives of
the coal miners) have more room to criticize the effects of the coal industry because their
concerns are perceived as stemming from their identities as mothers. These differences in gender
identities can explain why there are more women in the Environmental Justice movement in the
region.398
Like Bell and Braun, my project shows that the Nigerian oil and gas industry is a
masculine domain, e.g., lack of women in the industry as well as a culture that does not consider
the nuances of maternity leave, the gendered division of labor, etc. What, if anything, do these
findings tell us about the ways in which the oil industry is tied to the gender identities of the
women who work there? Similar to the women in Bell and Braun’s study, the NUPENG Women
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Committee representative also relies on gender ideas of women as mothers to critique the oil
industry. Further research could delve into the source of these ideas. For example, the NUPENG
Women Committee representative explains,
[O]rdinarily...now let me say culturally, women are not supposed to work at all. Going
by...how we were brought up, they said women should be able to take the home front and
take care of the kids. But because of the economic situation of the country now, the man
goes out to work, the woman also goes out to work…So in that aspect of the working
condition, it’s seriously affecting the women.399
In this quotation, the interviewee suggests that women are only working because the economic
situation in the country makes a dual income household necessary. If it were not for that, culture
dictates that women stay home. Further research could define how culture is being defined
(taking into the fact that colonial capitalism entrenched patriarchal gender relations in Africa,
including Nigeria—See Chapter 2) or the ways in which the masculinity of the oil industry may
be affecting these ideas of culture.
What, if anything, do these findings tell us about the ways in which the oil industry is tied
to the gender identities of the men who work in the oil and gas industry?400 Does the fact that
men in the industry critique the industry—e.g., the process of casualization—mean that the
industry is not intimately tied to their identities as men? It is important to note that Bell and
Braun’s study critiques a different aspect of extractive industries than my project. Bell and Braun
are interested in the ecological effects of an extractive industry, while my project focuses on the
workplace conditions of workers in an extractive industry. Discussing ecological effects can be
seen as an existential threat to coal miners and thus their manhood in a way that discussing
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working conditions may not be for oil workers. Examining ecological effects of coal can imply
an interest in halting mining, while examining the working conditions of oil workers can imply
an interest in improving the business of oil extraction. Perhaps, if my questions focus on the
ecological effects of oil, I would have seen more unwillingness to critique, suggesting an
existential threat. For example, when asked how oil workers think about oil pollution, a male
representative of the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria—the umbrella organization that
PENGASSAN is affiliated with—pivots and begins talking about the role that oil communities
play in polluting the Niger Delta, e.g., oil bunkering and illegal refining.401 However, the
representative of the Nigerian Labour Congress has a different answer. In response to a question
asking whether oil workers think about oil pollution and how it affects oil-producing
communities, she says, “They strongly do…[O]il production should be done through a cleaner
process that minimizes pollution to the barest. Adequate compensation to workers, family, and
communities in the case of loss, injury, and environment pollution” [should be implemented].402
Further research could probe what aspects of the oil and gas industry oil workers are willing to or
unwilling to critique and what that means for the gender identities of the men (and women and
folks) who work in said industry.
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Chapter 5__ Oil Pollution in the Nigerian Oil Political Economy and Women’s
Domestic/Unwaged Labor
Centering Unwaged Labor in the Nigerian Oil Political Economy
In Chapter 4, I discuss the waged labor a particular class of women (women oil workers)
perform in the Nigerian oil political economy, particularly in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. I
argue that women oil workers in NUPENG (Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas
Workers) Port Harcourt branch are exploited not just because they experience casualization and
redundancy as other oil workers do. Their exploitation also results from gender ordering and
sexual harassment in the workplace as well as the interaction between workday constraints and
the domestic division of labor in the household. But waged labor is not the only labor women do
in the Nigerian oil political economy.
Thus, this chapter focuses on the unwaged labor another class of women (rural women)
perform in the Nigerian oil political economy. Specifically, it focuses on the ways in which the
Nigerian oil political economy affects rural women’s domestic labor in the Niger Delta—the oilproducing region of Nigeria. As I mention in Chapter 2, women’s unwaged/domestic labor and
its relation to the oil political economy is not adequately discussed in the literatures on women’s
labor and oil. There are studies on the effects of oil (pollution) on rural women and their labor in
the Niger Delta. While these studies describe how oil (pollution) affects women’s domestic labor
in the Niger Delta, they do not link these phenomena to a larger capitalist system and thus cannot
quite describe why. Thus, these studies imply that oil pollution is an accident of the Nigerian
political economy and not part of it.
The “resource curse” literature argues that oil rents increase household incomes in oilproducing countries, leading women to forgo waged labor and choose ‘leisure’ (staying home).
But women who stay at home—whether they prefer to or not—still work. Referring to this time
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at home as ‘leisure’ misunderstands the work involved in maintaining the household and the
importance of this work to the economy. Not recognizing women’s unwaged/domestic labor as
labor means ignoring how oil economies impact this labor. For rural women in the Niger Delta,
this means examining the impact of the Nigerian oil political economy—specifically oil
pollution—on agricultural labor. Doing so means exploring how capitalist accumulation in the
Nigerian oil political economy creates oil pollution. This accumulation of capital adversely
affects the environment, destroying rural women’s domestic labor. Thus, I contend that it is not
oil rents per se that matter as the “resource curse” literature claims; it is the accumulation of
capital.
Both literatures—albeit in different ways—undertheorize the link between oil economies
and women’s unwaged labor, particularly in the Nigerian oil political economy. To fix this gap, I
ask: How does the Nigerian oil political economy create the oil pollution that impacts rural
women’s domestic/agricultural labor in the Niger Delta?
I argue that foreign and domestic actors involved in the Nigerian oil political economy
(e.g., states, elites, oil multinational corporations [MNCs]) create oil pollution in the Niger Delta
by making decisions that prioritize profits at the expense of the environment. By engaging in
illicit financial outflows (through tax avoidance and tax evasion), shirking environmental
responsibilities (by claiming sabotage, taking advantage of the parent company/subsidiary
structure, lobbying for anti-climate change policies, and flaring gas), and devising weak (whether
intentional or not) environmental/community protections, these actors shift pollution costs from
themselves onto rural women’s domestic labor403 in the Niger Delta.
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This chapter proceeds as follows: Section I explains domestic labor’s relationship to the
capitalist political economy. Then it explains the relationship between capitalism and
environmental degradation and how this degradation impacts rural women’s domestic labor.
Section II reiterates the ways in which oil pollution impacts rural women’s domestic labor in the
Niger Delta. While this section repeats information from Chapter 2, I also add evidence
confirming this information from the focus group I do with women in a community I call
Amada404—an oil-producing community in Bayelsa state in the Niger Delta—and with workers
in local environmental rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around Port Harcourt.405
In Section III, I provide some background information about oil pollution in the Niger Delta,
with a specific focus on the politics of oil spill data in the Niger Delta. Section IV provides
examples of the ways in which domestic and foreign actors shift pollution costs onto rural
women’s domestic labor. For these actors to accumulate capital, they make decisions that
prioritize profits at the expense of the environment. Section V provides a conclusion.
Section I. Domestic Labor, Environmental Degradation, and the Capitalist Political
Economy
This chapter focuses on the unwaged labor a particular class of women (rural women)
perform in the Nigerian oil political economy, specifically the ways in which the Nigerian oil
political economy creates oil pollution that affects rural women’s labor in the Niger Delta. Doing
so necessitates understanding how domestic labor and the environment are exploited in a
capitalist political economy.

workers in the local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) I interview are not directly engaged in shadow work
in oil-producing communities, they work with women tasked with shadow work in these communities and help
them protect this labor.
404
. Amada is a pseudonym. The name of the community is changed to protect the identities of my interviewees.
405
. Chapter 6 discusses these NGOs in more detail.
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Domestic Labor in the Capitalist Political Economy
A theory of capitalist patriarchy helps us understand the importance of domestic labor to
the capitalist political economy. Zillah Eisenstein (1979) explains,
It [domestic labor] is unpaid work that is sexually assigned. Domestic labor—the work
necessary to the maintenance of the home—involves production, consumption, reproduction,
and maintenance of labor power. It is the work of bringing children into the world and trying
to raise them within the home (i.e., cooking, cleaning, laundering, loving, mothering).
Domestic labor is indispensable to the operation of capitalist patriarchal society as it now
exists [italics in the original]. It is socially necessary labor.406
Domestic labor, which is usually performed by women, involves all the unpaid labor that is
necessary to maintain a household—from cooking and cleaning to reproducing and raising
children. And this labor is not just necessary to maintain households. As Andaiye (1994)
explains, this labor keeps economies afloat since bearing children and raising them means “daily
replenishing the energies of the present labor force.”407 She explains that this labor is often
devalued because it is not given a monetary value.408 And when domestic work is not counted, it
is easier to exploit.
Neoliberal economic decisions and policies often exploit domestic labor by transferring
costs onto the household. For example, Andaiye explains that the International Monetary Fund’s
(IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and other conditionalities that are introduced
in the 1980s burden women’s work in the Caribbean and other parts of the world. In African
countries, SAPs mandate the liberalization of the market, deregulation, more foreign investment
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in resource extraction, and a limited role of the state among other things.409 In other words,
public services are cut, while private firms accumulate more capital. Andaiye explains that this
ultimately “shifts activities from the public sector to the household/community sector as though
what happens in that sector, being unwaged, carries no cost.”410 But it carries a cost. Andaiye
explains that women are tasked with more responsibilities, e.g., traveling longer distances to find
services, longer time to prepare food.411
This chapter similarly looks at the ways in which policies and decisions have burdened
rural women’s domestic labor. I argue that decisions and policies pursued in the Nigerian oil
political economy are based on accumulating capital. This then shifts pollution costs—thus
pollution itself—onto households in oil-producing communities. Vandana Shiva (1993) explains,
Nature’s economy—through which environmental regeneration takes place—and the
people’s subsistence economy—within which women produce the sustenance for society
through ‘invisible’ unpaid work called non-work—are being systematically destroyed to
create growth in the market economy.412
In other words, policies and decisions that prioritize ‘growth’ have destroyed the environment
and significantly impacted and altered rural women’s domestic labor, although in a different way
than SAPs. However, some of these impacts are the same such as traveling longer distances to
find food.
But this chapter is not focused on documenting how oil pollution burdens rural women’s
domestic labor in the Niger Delta, although I do provide evidence to support this. Instead, the
chapter primarily focuses on the policies and decisions that create pollution in the Niger Delta.
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Doing so means theorizing pollution and the environment more broadly. In the next sections, I
highlight a common understanding of environmental pollution—pollution as an externality. I
then critique this understanding and argue that explanations of pollution must consider the ways
in which the exploitation of the environment is inherent to capitalism.
Environmental Pollution as an Externality
One of the main fields to study environmental pollution is environmental economics.
Environmental economics mainly uses externality theory to address the causes of and
recommend solutions for pollution.413 An externality “occurs whenever the activities of one
economic actor affect the activities of another in ways that are not reflected in market
transactions.”414 While externalities can be either good or bad,415 the environmental economics
literature “characterizes pollution as a public ‘bad’ that results from ‘waste discharges’
associated with the production of private goods.”416 Pollution is thus a transaction cost not borne
by the buyer or seller.417 The price of the good produced is not reflected in the costs. Once these
costs are considered, the literature argues, ‘the market’ will solve pollution.418
In externality theory, the primary ways to account for these costs are taxation, subsidies,
quotas, and doing nothing and letting the market solve the problem.419 Taxation “would take the
form of a levy per unit of waste emissions into the environment.”420 A subsidy would be given
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for “per unit of emissions reduction.”421 Quotas include issuing “emission permits equal in the
aggregate to the efficient quantity and allow firms to bid for them.”422 The last solution, doing
nothing, comes from the Coasian tradition.423 This tradition argues that “in the absence of
transactions costs and strategic behavior, the distortions associated with externalities will be
resolved through voluntary bargains struck among the interested parties.”424 However, all the
solutions work within the capitalist/market-based framework and just posit a tweak to the market
(in the case of the first three solutions). They do not see that capitalism itself is the problem.
Environmental Degradation and the Capitalist Political Economy
In his dissertation, William Fisher (2014) argues that the environmental economics
literature asks the (capitalist) state to enforce solutions but does not consider that the state is not
neutral to environmental pollution. He explains,
The first three methods of social cost theory—taxation, subsidization and pollution
credits—all rely on a governmental authority to impose restrictions on the offenders. As
a result, each requires that the State maintain the resolve to implement and enforce
policies restricting the pollution that occurs. Thus, neoclassical externality theory
assumes that the government is neutral theoretically and does not serve the interests of
any particular group in society.425
However, as Fisher continues, this is not the case. He argues that “the capitalist state is
constrained to do the bidding of the capitalist class by its very nature.”426 And because the state
is not neutral, the state cannot be counted on to regulate pollution, especially if the state benefits
or works in tandem with the class interests that benefit from this pollution. As Victor Ogbonnaya
Okorie (2018) explains, weak environmental regulations create an environment conducive to
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capitalist accumulation as they “provide the nomadic pirate class of financial capital an ambient
environment to transfer the cost of externalities inherent in its production and consumption
systems to the masses.”427 In other words, weak environmental regulations create opportunities
that allow capital to transfer pollution costs onto the environment. While Okorie is specifically
talking about oil pollutants in the groundwater of the Ogale community in the Niger Delta, I
argue that this describes most of the environmental legislation dealing with oil pollution in the
Niger Delta. To understand why the capitalist state and other capitalist actors exploit the
environment in this way, one must understand how the environment is viewed.
David Harvey (1996) argues that current ideas about the environment can be traced back
to the Enlightenment period. Enlightenment principles stress that good can be attained by making
men the masters of nature, and those ideas still shape thinking about the environment today.428
Harvey explains that “this tends…to breed a highly instrumental view of nature as consisting of
capital assets—as resources—available for human exploitation.”429 Thus, the capitalist political
economy “[dictates] profit-driven transformation of environmental conditions and an approach to
nature which treats of it as a passive set of assets to be scientifically assessed, used and valued in
commercial (money) terms.”430 Shiva (1993) notes the patriarchal and racist underpinnings of
this approach because it is not only nature but “women and non-white people [who] merely
provide ‘raw’ material”431 for the ‘profit-driven transform’ of the political economy. This leads
to the devaluation of and degradation of nature (and women and non-white people).
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Nnimmo Bassey (2012) makes a similar argument, speaking specifically about resource
extraction in Africa. He argues that racial capitalism is leading to ecological devastation on the
continent because the Global North “pushes for commodification and, as some say,
financialisation of everything, including life.”432 Bassey argues, “The extractive industries would
like to have everyone believe that they operate a level playing field whether they are working in
North America, Europe, South America, Asia or Africa,” 433 but that is not the case. He explains
global policies often disadvantage Africa, as they reflect the idea that “anything that secures the
wealth of the mighty even if it kills or diminishes the capacity of the weak to survive”434 is
acceptable. Evaristus Oshionebo (2018) similarly argues that oil MNCs working in the Global
South often deploy corporate power “for the selfish objective of private wealth maximization,”
which includes “[externalizing] the adverse impacts of their activities by polluting the
environment in which they operate” and “[gaining] special benefits and avoid meeting the
normal obligations of an entity that makes use of public services and infrastructure.”435 This
means that pollution is not an “accident” but a cost oil companies are willing to accrue.
The political economy of resource extraction in Africa—with its focus on profits over
African lives—contributes to environmental pollution on the continent. My primary focus here is
investigating the ways in which foreign and domestic actors involved in the Nigerian oil political
economy (e.g., states, capitalists, oil multinational corporations [MNCs]) make decisions that
shift pollution costs onto the Niger Delta—the oil-producing region of Nigeria.
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Section II. Oil Pollution and Women’s Domestic Labor
Oil Pollution and Domestic/Agricultural Labor
As I describe in Chapter 2, oil pollution has been shown to affect rural women’s
agricultural labor in the Niger Delta. For example, Francisca I. Omorodion (2004) argues that oil
spills reduce the amount of water-based food sources, making women’s fishing expeditions take
longer than they used to. Sometimes women come back from these expeditions with little or no
fish. Also, some women find that their traditional fishing tools are not adequate for fishing in
deep waters.436 Additionally, the Kebetkache Women Development & Resource Centre’s (2015)
study in the Ibeno community in the Niger Delta finds that ExxonMobil’s oil spills in the area
are hampering women’s inability to fish and farm.437 And Edward Uche Omeire et al. (2014)
argue that gas flaring, the burning of gas as waste, reduces crop yields. This reduction of crops,
they argue, disproportionately affects women since they are the ones responsible for food
production in the Niger Delta. This often leads to high levels of poverty for the women.438
Some eco-feminists argue that environmental pollution disproportionately affects women.
For example, Shiva argues that ecological destruction creates “costs that are invariably heavier
for women” because women are more often engaged in the subsistence economy.439 But men in
the Niger Delta also engage in fishing, planting, clearing, etc., as I will soon show. Thus, my
intent is not to argue that women engaged in agricultural work are disproportionately affected
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than men who do the same work. The goal is to hear (from the perspective of these women) how
oil pollution has affected this agricultural work.
These impacts on rural women’s agricultural/domestic labor are evident in my focus
group in the Amada community in Bayelsa state. These eight women (of varying ages) discuss
the ways in which oil has impacted their livelihoods. For example, one participant says: “Oil has
affected us in terms of production, our farm produce. We no longer have good production
because of the oil on our farmlands.”440 She claims that the “inability to farm on a good land…is
the number one challenge women face due to oil spills.”441 Another participant adds, “[W]e
cannot affect [generate] good product because of the oil that affect the land. We plant some
crops…[I]nstead of the crops to give us good harvest, …we reap bad harvest…[W]hen the oil
spilled, we can no longer catch fish because it kills the fish and damage [the water].442 Another
participant states: “The crude [oil]…damaged all the soils. There’s no good harvesting and
[crops] cannot grow well.”443 The Woman Leader (as she is called) of Amada explains,
[T]he crops are no longer doing well…[T]he land has been destroyed by oil, affected by
oil, so even if we plant, we no longer have good harvest. So right now, as you’re seeing,
hunger strike [has stricken] in Niger Delta. But we’re the people that have lands. We
have different kind of crops. But it is not doing well again [anymore]. Because of that, we
are hungry. That is why, most of the times, you can see…some NGOs helping us
bringing some kind of relief material like food items, even now.444
These quotations show the adverse impact of oil pollution on the domestic labor of women in the
Amada community of the Niger Delta This is in line with the literature.
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Oil Pollution and Women’s (Reproductive) Health
Oil pollution has also been shown to affect the health of women in these oil-producing
communities. As I mention in Chapter 2, Charles Ukeje et al. (2002), Augustine Ikelegbe (2005),
and Oluwatoyin Oluwaniyi (2011) and argue that because of their role in food production—the
process of fetching water, farming, fishing, etc. to procure food—women have direct contact
with pollution and may suffer adverse health effects.445 And according to women in the
Kebetkache study, these health effects include miscarriages.446
The potential reproductive effects of oil pollution are not just anecdotal and have, to
some extent, been borne out in the data. One of the most comprehensive reports about oil
pollution in the Niger Delta is the 2011 report by the United Nations Environment Programme,
Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland. This report, commonly known as “the UNEP report”
details the environmental impact of oil on Ogoniland (a region in the Niger Delta). The report
touches on, among other things, the potential reproductive impact of some of the oil pollutants
found in Ogoniland: “Effects of oil exposure on the developing foetus are also not well
understood, although adverse effects have been observed in studies involving individual
petroleum hydrocarbons, including benzene and some PAHs.”447 The report continues, “As
pollutants, they [PAHs] are of concern because some compounds have been identiﬁed as causing
cancer, changing genetic structures and aﬀecting embryos and fetuses.”448 And Anna Bruederlea
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and Roland Hodler’s study (2019) compares siblings conceived before and after nearby oil spills
in Nigeria. The study finds that oil spills double the neonatal mortality rate, the likelihood that
the infant would die in their first month of life.449
Health effects, including reproductive issues, are also mentioned by my interviewees. A
representative for the Centre for Environment, Human Rights, and Development (CEHRD)
explains her experience talking to women in an oil-polluted community,
So, we went there and found out that a lot of women are farmers, and they fish too.
That’s what they do for a living…[W]hen water is polluted, when there is a breakdown of
oil pipes, the water flushes into their farms…Some of them come back with skin diseases
just by going to the farms. Then those that, you know, they have to get into the water to
fish…they have to have contact with the water. So, a lot of them have said they’ve
noticed that they now have vagina diseases from...the water…And some said they’ve
mistakenly taken [swallowed] the water, and they’ve been stooling from there. [T]hey
just experience miscarriages and…just a lot of complications.450
As the quotation explains, having direct contact with polluted water has led to reproductive
issues for women in oil-polluted communities. Another of my interviewees, a journalist who
focuses on the issues women face in the Niger Delta, also mentions that women in oil-polluted
communities have reproductive issues. She claims, “[T]hey [women] have health consequences.
A lot of people itch. There’s infertility. Women are forced to go on early menopause.”451
During the focus group in Amada, the women also lament that oil pollution is making
their children sick. These children suffer from cough and catarrh, and air pollution affects their
breathing.452 A CEHRD representative explains, “So, they [women] have kids that are sick. They
have kids that have catarrh and cold like all through the year. [They suffer from] [l]ung diseases
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[a]nd there’s been even an increase in cancer.”453 The aforementioned journalist highlights a
community that “in one year, they lost 200 children…And it’s a community that is not up to
5,000 and you lose 200 children.”454
Oil Pollution and the Household
Oil pollution and the resulting destruction of livelihoods have also affected the dynamics
in the household. The Woman Leader of Amada explains says,
[T]here are conflicts…when the food is not ready, conflicts between the husband and
wife, between the children and the mother. We’re hungry…That is why you see some
persons say, ‘Niger Delta girls are prostituting, this, this, this.’ You don’t know the
reason, what they’re passing through, you don’t know. When you’re hungry, you can put
your hand in any bad thing, which you know that this is bad thing just to survive yourself.
So, that is why you see things going wrong like that. [It’s] [n]ot that we don’t know, we
don’t like better things or good thing, or our children don’t like to be in a good position
not like that…Since morning to now, you have not eaten and you see look around, no
food for you to eat, how do you do? So, these are the conflict that…the oil spill is
bringing within our household. Both husband and wife, children and mother, because
mothers are supposed to bring food, normally. But…the crops are no longer doing well
because of the land; they’re being destroyed by the crude [oil].455
As the quotation explains, oil spills have disrupted household dynamics in Amada. Some women
have resorted to sex work to make up for the destruction of their livelihoods. The lack of food
has brought conflicts into households between husband and wife and parents and children. She
further describes the conflicts that happen between parents and children when there is no food in
the house:
The children too because of hungry [hunger], they misbehave… ‘Cause when there’s
hungry [hunger], it will lead you to go and even steal, go and...put your hand into what
you’re supposed not to do. That is why you see Niger Delta children, this, this, this, this.
You can’t blame them. It’s…because of hungry [hunger].456
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As the quotation explains, children also suffer the effects of oil pollution as hunger drives them
to steal. She claims that these problems did not exist prior to oil exploration in the community:
[In the past] we eat together in one place. Not plate, we have…one mortar…It would be
wide. But, even if you’re 10 in number in the house, you will eat together there, not real
plate…That is sign of oneness, sign of unity, sign of peace...and love…But now that this
people [Shell] have come…to find oil since, disunity has come. The misunderstanding
and crisis have started. That is how everything started. There is no unity. There is no
peace…There is no love again [anymore]. You cannot trust even your own sister. You
cannot trust your own brother. Your own sister can betray. Your own brother can betray.
In them days, it wasn’t like that. And we have…good harvest...[M]y grandmother
normally used canoe to put our harvest, which is yam. If you see the yam, very good like
this thing. Even the cassava, very nice tuber to give you good harvest. But now, we
cannot harvest any good thing. So to my own view, as a grandmother, I see that that time
that this oil had not been found...the life was going more easier and peaceful and
enjoyable than today…[O]lden days, money was very scarce, yes, fine. But that money
was worth [more]...than today’s money…But now a days, that they said…there’s money
everywhere, it is not to everybody. Everybody is not seeing that money. It is not going
‘round. So, we see that, we the mothers, we see that olden days we enjoy more than
today. Today, you cannot move in the night hour. Even in your own community, you be
afraid because of cultism. Because they’re hungry, so they put their hands into every bad
group. But, as of then, you don't hear anything cultism. Everywhere was peaceful. In the
night, you can trek ground to anywhere. Your friends can come and visit you. You can
lead...them to anywhere. You come back and live peacefully. There is no fear. But now
today, even if night has come, you cannot go…from here to the next community. You
will be afraid. These are the differences.457
According to the interviewee, oil exploration brought the promise of wealth to oil-producing
communities. This promise has remained unfulfilled, upending household and community
relations in the process. Oil pollution is a major part of that process.
Section III. Oil Pollution and the Politics of Knowledge Production in the Niger Delta
The Niger Delta, where most of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry is located, has been called
one of the most polluted places in the world.458 As I mention in Chapter 1, the Niger Delta is host
to many oil MNCs, including Royal Dutch Shell (a British/Dutch company), ExxonMobil (a U.S.
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company), Chevron (a U.S. company), Total/Elf (a French company), and Eni (an Italian
company). According to Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas (2003), each phase of the oil
exploration process—seismic survey, drilling, and oil and gas production—adversely affects the
Niger Delta environment. Land is disfigured, vegetation is destroyed, waters are polluted, and
the air is contaminated.459
A source of oil pollution in the Niger Delta is gas flaring. When oil is brought to the
surface of a drilling site, associated natural gas is also brought to the surface. This gas is often
flared or burned off as waste.460 For the first couple decades of the Nigerian oil industry, most of
the associated natural gas is flared. For instance, in 1981, 92% (2.1 billion cubic feet per day) of
all associated natural gas is flared in Nigeria.461 The amount of gas flared has decreased, but
Nigeria still ranks among the top gas flaring countries. In 2018, Nigeria is the 7th largest gas
flaring country in the world (in terms of the yearly volume of natural gas flaring).462 Flaring gas
contributes to air pollution because it releases harmful gases like carbon dioxide and methane
into the environment.463 In 2018, gas flaring accounts for about 24% of Nigeria’s carbon
emissions.464
A major source of oil pollution in the Niger Delta is pipeline oil spills. A large network of
oil pipelines connecting many oil and gas fields cuts across the Niger Delta. These pipelines are
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located next to homes and farmlands and go through rivers and swamps, and yet they are poorly
maintained. Thus, pipeline oil spills cause enormous damage to the landscape and communities
in the Niger Delta.465 This is not a new problem. A 2011 report by Amnesty International and
CEHRD (Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development), The True ‘Tragedy’ Delays
and Failures in Tackling Oil Spills in the Niger Delta, reveals that oil MNCs have known about
these faulty pipelines for decades. The report cites a 1996 TV appearance by Bopp van Dessel,
Shell’s former Head of Environmental Studies in Nigeria. van Dessel claims that Shell has long
ignored warnings that its operation is causing damage in the Niger Delta. He explains, “They
[Shell] were not meeting their own standards; they were not meeting international standards. Any
Shell site that I saw was polluted. Any terminal that I saw was polluted. It was clear to me that
Shell was devastating the area.”466 Additionally, a Wikileaks cable from 2008 uncovers that a
subcontractor with 17 years of experience working for oil MNCs in the Niger Delta warns the
U.S. consulate about these pipelines. According to the cable, the subcontractor:
estimated that 73 percent of all pipelines there are more than a decade overdue for
replacement. In many cases, pipeline with a technical life of 15 year are still in use thirty
years after installation. Because the equipment is corroded and relatively close to the
surface, making it more vulnerable to intentional and unintentional damage from natural
and human causes, spills occur daily, and it often takes many hours to find the location of
the spill and deploy the necessary clean-up equipment.467
As the quotation explains, many of the pipelines in the Niger Delta are due for replacement and
thus corroded. Therefore, oil spills occur frequently.
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As I mention earlier, the UNEP report is one of the most comprehensive studies on oil
pollution in the Niger Delta, detailing the environmental impact of oil on Ogoniland. This report
is released decades after the people of Ogoni first voice their complaints. In the 1990s, with Ken
Saro-Wiwa as the spokesperson, the people of Ogoni formed the Movement for the Survival of
the Ogoni People (MOSOP) to protest the environmental destruction of their land. MOSOP
argues that Shell is polluting their lands and demand compensation for the destruction. The
movement comes to a tragic end when the Nigerian government (which is under military rule at
the time) in collusion with Shell arrest Saro-Wiwa and eight MOSOP activists on trumped on
charges and murder them on November 10, 1995.468 While the UNEP report does not make up
for the murder of Saro-Wiwa and others, it does vindicate MOSOP and the people in Ogoniland.
The UNEP report concludes that oil pollution is widespread throughout Ogoniland, and it
has adversely affected the environment. Although the oil industry is no longer operating in the
area, oil spills occur often.469 More specifically, the report finds that soil contamination due to
crude oil is pervasive. Two-thirds of the oil contaminated land exceed Nigerian national
standards. And at 41 sites, the pollution has reached groundwaters in levels that exceed Nigerian
national standards. The report also finds that oil pollution in mangroves have decreased fish
stocks. Spills have damaged crops on farmlands. Thus, contaminated farms that can yield crops
tend to yield less than non-impacted farms. Also, fires often break out when an oil spill occurs on
land, destroying the vegetation and creating a crust over the land that makes revegetation
difficult. The report also discovers that surface water in creeks across Ogoniland contain
hydrocarbons.
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It is not only the environment that is suffering. The Ogoni people are exposed to
hydrocarbons in the air and in their drinking water. They also come into contact with
contaminated soil and surface water. Benzene, a known carcinogen, is found at elevated levels in
some of the drinking water and in the air as well. Communities use the water for drinking,
bathing, washing, and cooking because they do not have any alternatives.470
Beyond the UNEP report (which only covered Ogoniland), the exact scale of oil pollution
in the Niger Delta is hard to assess. Michael Watts and Anna Zalik (2020) find that oil pollution
data in the Niger Delta is difficult to find and access, and available data often vary depending on
the reporting agency.471 For instance, according to the Nigerian Oil Spill Data Response Agency
(NOSDRA), from 2006—when the agency is set up—to March 2020, there have been a total of
13,091 oil spill events that have released a total of 692,761 barrels. 86% of these spill events are
linked to oil operations owned by five oil MNCs—Eni, Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, and
Chevron.472 But NNPC’s (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) Annual Statistic Bulletin
claims that pipeline vandalizations for the country has amounted to 35,000 incidents since 2005.
This is 40 times larger than what the NOSDRA oil spill monitor has recorded.473 Additionally,
oil MNCs often report much lower spill volumes than NOSDRA (although, oil MNCs have
recorded oil spills that NOSDRA has not474). For example, Shell reports 1,010 spills have
occurred in the Niger Delta since 2011, with 110,535 barrels released. And Eni reports 820 spills
since 2014, with 26,286 barrels released. However, the Nigerian government records 1,369 spills
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for Shell and 1,659 spills for Eni in the same period.475 Therefore, it is often difficult to gauge
the accuracy of available oil spill data. As Watts and Zalik explain, “some [the difficulty] of
which may result from direct obfuscation.”476
What also makes the scale of oil pollution in the Niger Delta hard to assess is the quality
of oil spill remediation or cleanup in the Niger Delta. For example, the UNEP report finds
Shell’s oil spill cleanup of Ogoniland inadequate. The report claims, “The difference between a
cleaned-up site and a site awaiting clean-up was not always obvious.”477 The report finds that 10
of the 15 sites Shell says have been cleaned up still have pollution exceeding Shell and the
Nigerian government’s remediation values.478 This is partly due to the inadequate remediation
system being used by Shell. The UNEP report explains that Shell uses a RENA (remediation by
enhanced natural attenuation) system on oil polluted sites, which attempts to degrade or transfer
the hydrocarbons discharged onto the land.479 But the UNEP report claims that there are many
problems with the way this approach is carried out in Ogoniland. For instance, the remediation
process assumes that the released hydrocarbons have not moved beyond the surface level of the
land. But observations have shown that the hydrocarbons have penetrated deeper into the soil.480
Thus, while Shell (or another company) may claim that an oil spill has been cleaned up and is no
longer an issue (polluted), this may not be the case.
As Watts and Zalik conclude, “The data problem can only be grasped by unpacking the
means through which knowledge is produced and organized and the powerful interests involved
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in shaping the nature of spill data and the attribution of cause (and liability).”481 This chapter
seeks to highlight these ‘powerful interests’ involved in shaping not only oil spill data but oil
spills themselves.
Section IV. Capitalist Accumulation and Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta
As I mention earlier, my primary focus here is investigating the ways which foreign and
domestic actors involved in the Nigerian oil political economy (e.g., states, capitalists, oil
MNCs) create oil pollution in the Niger Delta by prioritizing profits at the expense of the
environment. I argue that this is done by: engaging in illicit financial outflows (through tax
avoidance and tax evasion), shirking environmental responsibilities (by claiming sabotage,
taking advantage of the parent company/subsidiary structure, lobbying for anti-climate change
policies, and flaring gas), and devising weak (whether intentional or not)
environmental/community protections. This effectively shifts pollution costs from themselves
onto the environment/ rural women’s domestic labor in the Niger Delta.
As I mention before, the major oil MNCs in Nigeria are Royal Dutch Shell
(British/Dutch), ExxonMobil (U.S.), Chevron (U.S.), Total/Elf (French), and Eni (Italian). Thus,
these are the oil MNCs that are discussed. In addition to oil MNCs, it is important to talk about
the role of states in accumulating capital at the expense of the environment. As I mention earlier,
weak environmental laws enable oil MNCs to shift pollution costs onto the environment. Thus, I
will focus on a few Nigerian laws and policies that enable oil MNCs, the Nigerian state, and
elites to shift pollution costs onto the environment. Global North states, particularly the U.S.,
UK, and the Netherlands, have often used their power to influence these laws and policies, and I
will discuss them when relevant. The laws and policies I examine are mentioned by my
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interviewees as important to understand environmental pollution and other issues plaguing the
Nigerian oil political economy. This is not meant be an exhaustive list of how these actors
interact to accumulate capital but merely demonstrate that these actors do play a part in the
environmental degradation of the Niger Delta.
Illicit Financial Outflow (Through Tax Avoidance and Evasion) and Environmental Crime
In 2005, Wale Okediran, a member of the Federal House of Representatives in Nigeria,
announces that the government will audit the financial records of the major oil companies in the
country because many oil companies in Nigeria cannot account for about 2.4 million barrels of
oil per day.482 Nigeria ranks 7th among countries with illicit financial flows (IFFs), defined as
money that is illegally transferred or used.483 In Africa, extractive industries are prone to produce
illicit financial outflows, with transfer mispricing (manipulating the price of goods between
related entities/subsidiaries),484 secret/bad contracts, under-invoicing, excessively generous tax
incentives, and tax avoidance and evasion as the main mechanisms.485 In this chapter, I
specifically focus on tax avoidance and evasion.
A report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
Economic Development in Africa Report 2020: Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable
Development in Africa, explains that IFFs go hand in hand with “environmental crime”—

482

. Okediran, Wale. (2005, October 5-7). Parliamentary Initiatives in Energy Legislation and Sustainable
Development in the Nigerian Perspective. [Paper Presentation]. The Parliamentary Forum on Energy Legislation and
Sustainable Development, Cape Town, South Africa.
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/parliamentarian_forum/okediran_nigeria.doc, 9
483
. Nnadozie, Emmanuel. (2013). Illicit Financial Flows (IFF): Track it, Stop it, Recover it! [PowerPoint slides]. The
African Capacity Building Foundation. http://www.acbf-pact.org/sites/default/files/IFF%20presentation.pdf
484
. Ibid.
485
. African Union Commission/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (AUC/ECA) Conference of African
Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. (2015). Illicit Financial Flow: Report of the High Level
Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, 67. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/40545-docIFFs_REPORT.pdf; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2020. Economic Development
in Africa Report 2020: Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa, 103
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/aldcafrica2020_en.pdf

153

breaking environmental laws and causing harm to the environment.486 Telita Snyckers (2006)
argues that tax avoidance (and evasion) enables corporations operating in Africa to shift the costs
of their operations to others.487 In the case of the Niger Delta, oil MNCs pollute and dodge
paying for the pollution by avoiding and evading taxes.
In 2010, some members of the Ugborodo community in Delta state sue Chevron Nigeria
Limited (CNL), Nigeria’s Chevron subsidiary, for environmental damages caused by gas flaring.
The suit alleges that the company violates their rights by gas flaring, which is illegal under
Nigerian law (discussed below) and not undertaking an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
(also discussed below) before flaring gas in their community. Thus, the plaintiffs are seeking an
injunction against Chevron and payment for damages. In 2012, the plaintiffs (in Theophilus G.
Metsagharun v Chevron Corporation, 2012) use the U.S. federal Foreign Legal Assistance
statute to file a lawsuit in U.S. court to force Chevron USA to provide environmental records on
the impact of gas flaring in Nigeria to assist with their lawsuit in the Nigerian case.488 In 2014,
the parties agree to settle the U.S. case, but the Nigerian case is still ongoing as of 2018.489
In August 2004, a few years before the initial lawsuit is filed in Nigeria, the Economic
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) of Nigeria alleges that CNL is avoiding paying petroleum
profit tax (PPT) to Nigeria. When CNL’s books are examined, they reveal that CNL has evaded
approximately $2.7 billion in tax with the help of Nigerian tax officials. Ultimately, CNL is
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assessed $8.1 billion in penalties.490 Thus, while Chevron is evading paying taxes in Nigeria, it is
polluting the environment. This shifts pollution costs onto others.
As I will discuss below, Shell has been brought to court multiple times for polluting the
Niger Delta. Despite shirking its environmental responsibilities, Shell has expressed concerns
about the taxes it has to pay in Nigeria. Communications from the UK’s Foreign &
Commonwealth Office (FCO) reveal a February 19, 2015 meeting between Baroness Anelay
(Minister of State of the FCO), Rob Connelly (Senior Regional Advisor Europe & Sub-Saharan
Africa, Government Relations), a Deputy Head of UK Government Relations at Shell, and
Managing Directors at SPDC (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria)—Shell’s
Nigerian subsidiary. The meeting notes read, “Shell was in Nigeria for the long haul, but they
had two concerns: security of their facilities in terms of theft of oil (bunkering) and the tax
regime. If Nigeria got the tax regime right Shell was…”491 The rest of that section is blacked out,
but the sentence seems to imply that Shell is concerned about Nigeria’s tax regime affecting its
profits. The meeting notes continue, “But there was a view in some quarters of the Nigerian
Government that this should be taxed heavily, and Shell welcomed advice around this issue from
key countries to the Government of Nigeria: heavy tax tariffs would mean this investment was
not viable for Shell.”492 In this quotation, Shell seems to be implicitly asking the UK to lean on
Nigeria to get it a favorable tax regime. Both examples show that Shell is not keen on paying its
taxes in Nigeria. This is not merely talk. Some years later, Shell is caught engaging in dubious
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dealings over oil field OPL (Oil Prospecting License) 245, a deal that is estimated to cost the
Nigerian government billions of dollars in lost tax revenue.
In December 2017, an Italian court begins prosecuting procedures against Shell, Eni, and
over 10 individuals for corruption over OPL 245. By September 2018, the first 2 suspects (an
Italian and a Nigerian intermediary) are convicted in the OPL 24 case. And by March 2019, the
Dutch Public Prosecution Service confirms it has also begun criminal proceedings against Shell
for corruption in the OPL 24 case.493 But the story of OPL 245 begins decades earlier. On April
29, 1998, Nigerian Minister of Petroleum Dan Etete awards OPL 245—a deep-sea oil field—to
Malabu Oil & Gas Ltd, an energy company he controls. Shell Nigeria Ultra Deep (SNUD) joins
the project as a partner to Malabu in 2001. Shell later claims that it is not aware that Etete
controls Malabu, but internal emails prove this is untrue. Nigeria changes leadership that same
year, and the concession is subsequently taken away from Malabu. This is because after Nigeria
transitions to civilian rule in 1999, it reassigns many contracts the military regime awards during
the 1990s because those contracts are believed to be questionable. In 2003, SNUD acquires a
production sharing contract (PSC) for the development of OPL 245. But in 2006, Malabu
reacquires OPL 245 after it sues the government for taking away its concession. This leaves
Shell with no share of the oil field.494
On January 28, 2007, Shell’s CEO at the time, Jeroen van der Veer, attempts to pressure
then Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, to acquire the oil field. van der Veer threatens legal
action against Nigeria for revoking OPL 245, arguing that Nigeria’s action violates the bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) Nigeria has with the Netherlands. The Netherlands signs BITs with
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countries to ensure that investments for their MNCs are protected. If their investments are
negatively impacted by regulations of the host country, corporations can bring the case to an
international arbitration tribunal. Shell thus uses the threat of an arbitration between the
Netherlands and Nigeria to put pressure on the Nigerian government to acquire OPL 245.495 On
April 26, 2007, SNUD submits a request for arbitration to the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington D.C.496 The panel does not have authority to
compel Nigeria to give up OPL 245. It can only award compensatory damage to Shell.497 Thus,
Shell uses this threat of damages to get Nigeria to negotiate. In 2010, Nigeria, Shell, and Eni
(who joins the negotiation as Shell’s partner) reach a “resolution agreement” for the oil field.
According to the Italian prosecutor on the case, Eni, on behalf of Shell, pays $1,092
billion to the Nigerian government. The Nigerian government then pays $800 million of that
money to Etete, the owner of Malabu. Etete is alleged to have sent most of the money to current
and former Nigerian government officials as bribes. Shell and Eni claim that they are unaware of
the bribes, but the prosecutors in the corruption case dispute this.498 Not only is this a case of
bribery, but it has resulted in a significant loss of money for the Nigerian government since OPL
245 is considered one of the richest oil fields in Nigeria.499 Since the deal allows Shell and Eni to
pay greatly reduced taxes than Shell would have had to under its 2003 contract, Nigeria is
estimated to lose more than $4.5 billion on OPL 245.500
ExxonMobil has not escaped controversy either. On May 1, 2010, ExxonMobil’s pipeline
in Akwa Ibom state bursts, spilling one million gallons of oil over seven days. Community
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members protest the company demanding compensation for the spills, but they are attacked by
security forces.501 It turns out that while ExxonMobil is refusing to take responsibility for this
spill in Akwa Ibom, it is making deals to underpay (thus avoid taxes) on the renewal of its oil
licenses.
In June 2015, a public interest watchdog petitions the Nigerian Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission (EFCC) to investigate ExxonMobil’s oil license renewals. The petition
claims that in 2009, ExxonMobil’s Nigerian subsidiary, Mobil Producing Nigeria (MPN), pays
$600 million to the Nigerian government to renew its 40% share of three oil licenses. This deal is
questionable since the Ministry of Petroleum has valued MPN’s shares at $2.55 billion. Thus,
MPN severely underpays for the licenses. Also, a Chinese company is said to have offered to pay
$4.85 billion for 30% of the same three oil licenses. According to the petition, MPN is initially
asked to pay $2.55 billion by the Nigerian negotiating committee. MPN refuses. After a series of
meetings, MPN’s fee is set at $600 million. MPN also pledges to build a megawatt power plant
in Nigeria that would cost around $900 million. In 2011, 18 months after the MPN deal closes,
the Minister of Petroleum Resources Diezani Alison-Madueke annuls the licenses. In February
2012, Minister Alison-Madueke said that MPN has regained the licenses after further
negotiations. MPN refuses to state how much it eventually paid, and thus there is no way to
know how much taxes ExxonMobil is avoiding.502
ExxonMobil is likely to continue to avoid paying taxes by paying below market-value in
its deals since it has backed rulings that do not require oil companies to reveal how much they
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pay for oil licenses. In 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives vote to kill a rule by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that would require oil, gas, and mineral companies
to disclose money they pay to foreign governments for licenses or permits to operate in a
country. Then Republican House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy (now House Minority
Leader) claims the rule would make American businesses less competitive. The American
Petroleum Institute (API)—a powerful climate obstruction lobbying force in the U.S.—and
ExxonMobil—one of API’s top members—echo these same sentiments. ExxonMobil
representatives make several comments and attend meetings with SEC commissioners
concerning the rule.503 Since ExxonMobil has already been involved in payment scandals in
Nigeria, this vote is likely to exacerbate the problem.
Shirking Environmental Responsibilities
Claiming Sabotage and Taking Advantage of the Parent Company/Subsidiary Structure
One of the ways in which oil MNCs shirk their environmental responsibilities is by
claiming sabotage. Oil MNCs contend that oil spills in the Niger Delta are mainly caused by the
sabotage of oil pipelines, while oil-polluted communities argue that poor maintenance of these
pipelines or operational failure is to blame. This distinction matters for awarding compensation.
A 2018 Amnesty International report, Negligence in the Niger Delta: Decoding Shell and Eni’s
Poor Record on Oil Spills, explains that oil MNCs have an incentive to blame oil spills on
sabotage rather than operational failure since the latter compels them to pay compensation to
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communities.504 This tension plays out in lawsuits Niger Delta communities file against the oil
MNCs operating in their communities.
For example, on May 9, 2008, Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth Netherlands) sues
Shell in a Dutch court on behalf of four Nigerian farmers from the villages of Goi, Ikot Ada Udo,
and Oruma. The farmers want Shell to pay them compensation for the oil spills that Shell’s
pipelines cause in Goi and Oruma and an oil well leak in Ikot Ada Udo. Shell maintains that the
spills and oil well leak are caused by sabotage. Friends of the Earth bring the case against Royal
Dutch Shell (parent company) as well as SPDC (Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary). Royal Dutch Shell
owns 100% of the shares in SPDC, so Friends of the Earth’s logic is that the parent company
should also be found liable for damages done by its subsidiary. Shell disagrees. Oshionebo
(2018) claims that MNCs often use a parent company/subsidiary structure to shield itself from
liability. He explains,
The complex ownership structure usually associated with TNCs [transnational
corporations] inhibits attempts through litigation to hold parent companies liable for the
actions of their subsidiaries in developing countries. While it is theoretically possible to
pierce the corporate veil and impute liability to parent companies for the actions of their
subsidiaries, the numerous levels of ownership separating the parent company from the
subsidiary makes it impracticable to do so. The task of piercing the corporate veil is
extraordinarily difficult where TNCs are structured in such a manner that the parent
companies based in the developed countries do not, at least on paper, have direct control
over the affairs of the subsidiaries in developing countries.505
In other words, in addition to claiming sabotage, oil MNCs avoid taking responsibility for oil
spills by arguing that the subsidiary. and not the parent company, is liable for damages.
These tactics work for Shell at first. In January 2013, the court rules that Royal Dutch
Shell (parent company) is not liable for any of the damages. However, the court finds SPDC
liable for the oil well leak on the land of Friday Alfred Akpan of Ikot Ada Udo and is ordered to
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pay compensation to the affected plaintiff. SPDC is not found liable in the cases of the other
three farmers. In the cases of Goi and Oruma, the court rules the leaks are caused by sabotage.
Milieudefensie and the farmers disagree, and they appeal the decision in 2013. Shell also appeals
the guilty verdict in the case of Ikot Ada Udo, which is a surprise to the plaintiff since Shell
initially agrees to accept the verdict of the court.506 On January 29, 2021, the plaintiffs receive
some measure of justice. The Hague Court of Appeal rules that SPDC is liable for oil spills in
Goi, and Oruma and must pay compensation to the farmers. The court rules that the oil well leak
in Ikot Ada Udo is caused by sabotage, but it makes no decision on SPDC’s liability in the case.
Thus, this case continues. The court also rules that SPDC and its parent company (Royal Dutch
Shell) must install a warning system in the Oruma pipeline so that future spills can be detected
earlier. Thus, the court holds both the parent company and its subsidiary liable. This is the first
case where a parent company is held liable for failing to provide a duty of care507 to citizens in
its host state.508
Shell has had to answer for its environmental records in other cases as well. On May 23,
2012, members of Bodo community file a lawsuit against SPDC in the London High Court for
two oil spills that occur in 2008 and 2009. The plaintiffs, who number around 15,000, want
compensation for the loss of their livelihoods and the health effects they have suffered because
of the spills. They also want Shell to clean up the spills. The plaintiffs allege that the pipelines
that cause the spills are over 50 years old and not properly maintained. While Shell admits that
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SPDC is liable for the spills, it argues that the spills are mostly caused by oil theft and sabotage.
It also disputes the size and area affected. In January 2015, Shell agrees to pay a £55 million
($70 million) out of court settlement as compensation for the spills. Shell also agrees to
participate in the Bodo Mediation Initiative sponsored by the Dutch government. As a result, the
Bodo community decide to put the lawsuit on hold but retain the right to resume the lawsuit if
the cleanup is inadequate. In June 2017, Shell tries to strike down the lawsuit, claiming that some
members of Bodo are trying to obstruct the cleanup. The Court dismisses the claim. Then Shell
tries to prevent the community from going back to court, requesting a clause in the settlement
that said that any disruptive act by the Bodo community would lead to the termination of the
lawsuit. On May 24, 2018, a UK judge rules that Bodo community retains the right to resume the
lawsuit for another year without any conditions attached if the cleanup is not adequately done.
According to the community, Shell has made little progress in the cleanup. Contractors have only
been appointed since July 2019. Thus, members of Bodo have threatened to go back to court to
reinforce the claim against Shell.509
Shell is also embroiled in another lawsuit in the UK. In May 2015, UK law firm, Leigh
Day, brings a lawsuit in a UK court against Royal Dutch Shell on behalf of 40,000 farmers from
the Ogale and Bille communities in Rivers state. Leigh Day argues that SPDC has polluted both
the Ogale and Bille communities. Shell does not dispute that its pipelines have polluted the
communities or that it has not taken sufficient action to remedy the situation. Shell’s argument
again rests on the claim that it should not be held liable for the actions of SPDC. In 2017, the UK
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High Court rules in favor of Shell, saying that the parent company does not have control over its
subsidiary. As of 2019, Leigh Day has appealed the decision.510
These lawsuits notwithstanding, pipeline sabotage does happen in the Niger Delta. The
2018 Amnesty International report claims that “deliberate interference” of oil pipelines and other
infrastructure does occur in the Niger Delta. Militant groups, criminal gangs, and others do
sabotage oil infrastructure for political or financial reasons.511 However, the report finds claims
by oil MNCs (specifically Shell and Eni) attributing most of the oil spills to sabotage less then
credible. As I mention above, the report argues that oil MNCs have an incentive to blame oil
spills on sabotage rather than operational failure since compensation to communities often
depend on who is at fault.512 A representative of CEHRD explains,
[T]here are clear cases of sabotage…But most of the cases are equipment failure. I say it
is systematic because this thing is coming directly from...EGASPIN [Environmental
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria]. EGASPIN is the
Nigerian law on oil and gas…It spells clearly that any oil spill that is sabotage will not be
compensated. And so, compensation determines on how the oil company is able to justify
that the case is sabotage.
The interviewee explains that oil MNCs systematically label oil spills as sabotage rather than
operational failure since Nigerian policies, such as EGASPIN (discussed below), relieve them of
compensation responsibilities when a spill is caused by sabotage. Therefore, these claims of
sabotage cannot be fully trusted. Additionally, the oil spill investigation process lacks
transparency.
A 2013 report by Amnesty International and CEHRD, Bad Information: Oil Spill
Investigations in the Niger Delta, details the lack of transparency in oil spill investigations.
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When an oil spill occurs in the Niger Delta, an oil spill investigation process—commonly known
as a Joint Investigation Visit (JIV)—is triggered.513 The joint investigation team includes
representatives from governmental agencies, the affected community, the oil company, and
security forces. The regulatory agencies that participate in the JIV are NOSDRA, the Department
of Petroleum Resources (DPR), and representatives of the State Ministries of Environment. The
joint investigation team investigates the spill and then writes up a report. This report—the JIV
report—describes the affected area and cause and volume of the spill. The team then signs the
report and gives it to the affected community to sign.514
Although the members of the team are supposed to jointly come to an agreement, “the
process is heavily dependent on the oil companies: they decide when the investigation will take
place; they usually provide transport to the site of the spill; and they provide technical expertise,
which the regulatory bodies lack. 515 A representative from CEHRD explains,
So, when there’s an oil spill, who determines whether the spill is sabotage or an
equipment failure? It is the oil company. So...we have NOSDRA, which is...the legal
commission that is responsible for dealing with the issues of oil spill…We also have
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) that is also responsible. Sometimes their roles
seem to be clashing. And...where there’s an oil spill, there’s what you call a JIV (Joint
Investigation Visit). Ok, during the JIV, for instance…if it’s on Shell pipeline that you’re
having the oil leak or the oil spill, now Shell invites the community, he invites NOSDRA,
he invites DPR. And it is Shell that has the methodology to determine if it is sabotage or
not sabotage. It is Shell equipment that will be used. So, nobody knows the
methodology.... If we’re flying on the helicopter, it is Shell that brings all the equipment.
And then the NOSDRA and the DPR personnel, they lack the capacity…So, they [Shell]
have all the capacity to maneuver...and always paint the issue at the end of the day that it
is all sabotage. Now, this community people don’t...know much about this. So, what most
times Shell would do, they’ll bring a graph for them [the community] and ask them to
sign. So, as soon they endorse, Shell can go and fill and eventually when there’s
investigation, they say they [the community] signed [admitting fault].516
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As the quotation explains, NOSDRA and other government agencies on the joint investigation
team do not have the necessary equipment to investigate oil spills. NOSDRA is the government
agency responsible for preparing, detecting, and responding to oil spills in Nigeria.517 However,
NOSDRA is said to be weak at enforcing its mandate and can only make estimates about the
seriousness of an oil spill.518 Therefore, it is Shell (or another oil company) that determines
whether a spill is sabotage or not. And even if NOSDRA finds that the spills are caused by
neglect/equipment failure, it does not have the power to require oil companies to pay
compensation to victims.519
The above quotation also notes that oil MNCs often engage in dubious practices during
the JIV to get communities to admit fault. For example, communities are often asked to sign the
JIV report forms without proper information. The 2018 Amnesty International report finds that
community representatives have been asked to sign incomplete forms520 or are paid to sign
forms.521 All these problems make claims that oil spills are mostly caused by sabotage not
reliable.
But even if these spills are sabotage, assigning blame is not so clear cut. First, many of
the oil spills occur from the same cluster of pipelines. Thus, the 2018 Amnesty International
report argues that oil companies still deserve fault for failing to prevent these spills and making
sure the pipelines are up to date.522 Second, sometimes sabotage occurs at the behest of an oil
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company. For instance, in 2020, Milieudefensie uncovers that Shell/SPDC employees have been
recruiting youths in Ikarama to sabotage pipelines in their community. The youth are
subsequently hired by SPDC to clean up the mess. The profits are then shared between the
employees and the youth.523 Third, as Watts and Zalik explain, “Decades of pollution and its
impact on local agrarian production, arguably, have created the conditions in which tapping of
pipelines is one of the few sources of reliable income available to many local youth—which
complicates the question of ‘cause’ even in the case of clear sabotage.”524 In other words,
instances of sabotage need to be contextualized against a Nigerian oil political economy that
makes communities feel that sabotage is their only means of survival.
Anti-Climate Change Lobbying and Flaring Gas
Oil MNCs in the Niger Delta also shirk their environmental responsibilities by engaging
in anti-climate change lobbying. According to a 2016 Influence Map report, ExxonMobil has
spent about $27 million on climate obstruction lobbying. The report finds that ExxonMobil has
contributed $6 million to the American Petroleum Institute (API).525 Since 1977, ExxonMobil
executives have understood the impact of fossil fuels on climate change. However, they have
been trying to block climate-related regulations since the 1980s. Even as late as 2016,
ExxonMobil is opposed to renewable energy.526
Shell has also been shirking its environmental responsibilities through lobbying. It has
spent about $22 million on climate obstruction lobbying, with $3 million going to the API.527
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This is egregious since Royal Dutch Shell documents obtained by De Correspondent show that
the company has long privately recognized that fossil fuels contribute to climate change. For
example, in 1984, Shell understands that 4% of all CO2 emitted worldwide come from Shell’s
own products.528 And in a December 1994 report, The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect—A Review
of the Scientific Aspects, Shell acknowledges that climate science is real and cannot be ignored.
The report concludes, “It is thus not possible to dismiss the global warming hypothesis as
scientifically unsound.”529 However, the report continues: “on the other hand any policy measure
should take into account explicitly the weakness in the scientific case.” 530 Despite what Shell
knows about climate change, its business as usual. This is evident in Shell’s practice of flaring
gas—the burning of gas as waste—in Nigeria.
Shell/BP begins oil exploration in the Niger Delta in the 1930s. The first oil field is found
in 1956, and oil exports begin in 1958 towards the end of Britain’s colonial rule. Shell/BP begins
flaring gas immediately.531 In 1979, Nigeria enacts the Associated Gas Re-injection Act. It
stipulates that by October 1, 1980, every oil and gas company in Nigeria must submit a plan
detailing how they will either re-inject all associated gas they produce or use the gas.532 The Act
also announces no oil and gas company will be allowed to flare gas by January 1, 1984 without
written permission.533 Despite this law, Shell (and other oil MNCs) continue to shirk their
environmental responsibilities by flaring gas.
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On November 30, 2005, Jonah Gbemre, representing the Iwherekan community in Delta
state, brings a lawsuit in a Nigerian court against SPDC and NNPC (Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation) for gas flaring in his community. He argues that gas flaring violates his
right to life and human dignity enshrined in the Nigerian constitution and The African Charter.
Additionally, he claims that gas flaring negatively impacts the environment and the health of the
community. On April 11, 2006, the court orders SPDC and NNPC to end gas flaring by April
2007. The court also orders the managing director of SPDC and NNPC as well as other
government officials to appear in court on May 31, 2006 to present a plan on how they intend to
discontinue the flaring of gas. When that day arrives, lawyers for the plaintiff reveal that the
judge has been removed from the case and the case file cannot be found.534 As I will discuss in
the next section, cases involving oil MNCs brought in Nigerian courts are often fraught with
extra-judicial pressures that disadvantage communities.
The Nigerian government continues to try to curb gas flaring, but these efforts have not
been successful. In 2007, the Nigerian government announces that it will fine oil companies $3.5
for every 1,000 standard cubic feet of gas flared starting January 1, 2008. Oil fields still burning
gas after December 30, 2008 would be shut off. An official from Chevron, speaking on behalf of
the oil companies in Nigeria, complains that the deadline is not practical and would have
enormous costs. But this deadline is not arbitrary. It is agreed upon by the government and oil
companies a decade ago. Thus, the government accuses oil companies of dragging their feet on
this issue.
However, oil companies argue that they are not to blame for this failure to end gas
flaring. They argue that the government has not produced its share of the funding needed to build
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the gas gathering infrastructure to end flaring.535 This point is echoed by one of my interviewees,
a representative of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), an umbrella organization of senior staff
trade unions in Nigeria.536 In Chapter 1, I explain that most of Nigeria’s oil and gas projects are
funded through joint ventures (JVs) between the state (through NNPC) and oil MNCs. For
example, Chevron’s Nigerian subsidiary, MPN, has a 40% share in the JV with NNPC. NNPC
has the remaining 60%. For a gas gathering infrastructure to be built, MPN would have to come
up with 40% of the money and NNPC would have to come up with 60%. Oil MNCs argue that
gas flaring continues in Nigeria because NNPC has failed to bring in its share of the money as
outlined in the JVs. Thus, Nigeria also fails to hold up its end of the bargain when it comes to
protecting communities and the environment. This is also evident when examining the legislation
and policies guiding Nigeria’s oil and gas industry.
Weak Environmental/Community Protections
Legislation and Policies
As I demonstrate above with gas flaring legislation, oil MNCs do not always obey the
Nigerian policies guiding the oil and gas industry. However, these legislation and policies are
themselves a problem. They do not adequately (intentional or not) protect the environment and
communities. As I mention earlier, I focus on the following laws and policies because they are
mentioned by my interviewees. The TUC representative explains,
A lot of the laws that have been written about this industry…are archaic and outdated and
are not 21st century compliant. And as a result of that...those laws cannot be expected to
actually regulate the industry in a 21st century way…[The] Associated Gas [Re-injection
Act], I think that was between 1970 and 1980…So when you look at all the laws, none of
the laws were made in 1990 down.537
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What is important to note is that the TUC representative says that ‘none of the laws were made in
1990 down.’ As I mention earlier, military rule in Nigeria ends in 1999. Thus, the interviewee is
explaining that these laws are not made under a democracy and are thus not beneficial to
communities. Thus, Nigeria’s legislation and policies benefit the major actors in the Nigerian oil
political economy at the expense of the environment and communities.
The Land Use Act (formerly Decree)538 (LUA) of 1978 is such a law. The LUA vests all
lands in the hands of the governor in each state while just granting rights of occupancy to the
citizens.539 But these rights of occupancy are tenuous since they can be revoked due to overriding
public interest (OPI).540 Section 28(2)(c) and Section 28(3)(b) of the LUA lists “the requirement
of the land for mining purposes or oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith” as one
of the reasons that a right of occupancy can be revoked.541
It is difficult to say for certain that the LUA is specifically enacted to aid the oil industry,
however. But given that it greatly benefits oil companies,542 this could mean that the law is
motivated, at least in part, by concerns over oil. In the Government Views on the Report of the
Land Use Panel: May-November 1977 report, the military government justifies the
nationalization of land for the following reason:
While Government does not intend to dispossess any Nigerian of his acquired property,
which is being lawfully and optimally used, Government cannot remain indifferent to the
problem of land utilization which is widely acknowledged as an obstacle to rapid national
development. A situation whereby Government, public institutions and individuals
538
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encounter serious problems in acquiring land for development should no longer be
allowed to continue in the overall public interest.543
The phrase ‘public interest’ may hint at concerns over oil since, as I mention before, the LUA
allows rights of occupancy to be revoked due to ‘overriding public interest’—which includes the
oil industry.
The robust literature on the LUA suggests that oil-producing communities
disproportionately bear the brunt of this state ownership of land. Ignatius Adeh (2010) explains
that the public interest exception is often used against oil-producing communities because of the
importance of oil to Nigeria. He says,
In light of the LUA and the Petroleum Act, oil companies’ no longer have to worry about
compensating ‘individual property owners’ since government can simply expropriate
such property on grounds of overriding public interest (OPI) even with a certificate of
occupancy issued after governors [sic] consent…[T]he question is rarely posed in the
Niger Delta whether the acquisition of a property in the pretext of OPI is nevertheless in
the ‘interest of the public’ if such a public decision produces environmental harm.544
There are two important points in this quotation. First, Adeh explains who benefits from the
LUA—oil MNCs and the Nigerian state—since this Act makes it easy for them to expropriate
lands for oil operations. Second, he questions a ‘public interest’ that does not consider the
damage done to the land and the environment due to oil extraction. This idea of ‘public interest’
is biased against oil-producing communities.
Another way the LUA affects oil-producing communities is through the idea of “surface
rents.” Cyril Obi (2001) explains,
Having legally lost the ownership of their land to the government, the most the oil
communities could claim from the oil multinationals was compensation or “surface rents”
(covering assets on the surface—economic crops, fish, trees, etc.). The oil communities
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were not entitled to any royalties and taxes, and in the absence of fixed rates, the
communities became bogged down in the politics of compensation.545
As Obi explains, the LUA requires that compensation for acquired land be paid to the governor
of each state and only allows compensation for “improvements” on the land, e.g., crops and
trees. Oil communities cannot seek compensation for the destruction of the land itself.546
Adeh argues that “whenever perpetrators of environmental crimes accept liability for oil spill
they no longer have to worry about payment of damages for destroying the land on which the
communities rely for existence but only for any surface rights like economic crops.”547 As the
degradation of land is more detrimental to the livelihood of the communities than damage to
‘surface’ property (land degradation is more permanent than the loss of crops, etc.), this
compensation scheme has been deleterious to the communities of the Niger Delta. One of my
interviewees, a representative from CEHRD, echoes this point,
[T]he Land Use Act is one unjust law that has actually robbed the Niger Delta people of
their land, their resources…[I]t empowers the government to own everything on the land.
In fact, you don’t own your land. And, what that has also done is that...if, for instance, the
government sees a land to be beneficial to the government,...it means they only come and
then they can pay for…the crops or trees...[T]he land is not paid for because the land is
said to belong to the government.548
It is important to note that the LUA does not preclude payment for damaged land per se,
it just precludes payment to oil communities for damaged land. Adeh writes, “The LUA and the
Petroleum Act laws have made compensation to individual victims difficult while making it easy
for compensation to be paid to the government as the primary landowner.”549 In other words, the
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LUA does not preclude the state from seeking compensation from oil companies for destruction
of land. This is because, as Kenneth Omeje (2006) explains,
The [Land Use] Act makes a theoretical distinction between payment for land (a property
of the state) and compensation for investments (e.g. destroyed buildings, economic trees,
crops, etc) made by previous owners on land. Whereas compensation and rents for the
former are paid to the State Governor under the new legal regime, compensation for the
latter, usually a one-off payment determined by the State government’s valuers are paid
to the indigenous landowners.550
As the quotation explains, the way the LUA differentiates between land and investments
simultaneously marginalizes the rights of oil-producing communities in relation to the rights of
oil companies and ensures that the state benefits from the marginalization of oil communities. In
addition, Omeje explains that the LUA ensures that compensation doled out under this law
cannot be challenged.551 The LUA is thus written to ensure that the people in the Niger Delta
have no recourse to fight back against this theft of their land. The TUC representative echoes this
point. He explains,
When…you look at Land Use Act...it’s an act of injustice...In Nigeria, land belongs
to...communities and families...until somebody wake up and say that all land will be held
by the governor in trust for the people. It’s funny. So, if government wants to take your
land...the best government can do is to pay you compensation, and they will take the land
from you. Whether you like it. You don’t like it, any court you go to will say that what
they’ve done is the land in the law. They’re not saying that it’s just, but that is the law.552
The Petroleum Act of 1969 is another law that does not adequately protect communities.
This Act allows exploration of petroleum in the territorial waters and continental shelf of
Nigeria. It also vests onshore and offshore oil revenue in the Nigerian federal government.
Section 37 of the Act says that the holder of an oil exploration license or oil mining lease is
responsible for paying compensation for disturbing the ‘surface’ rights to anyone who owns the
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affected lands.553 However, the compensation provision is said to be weak. The Act says that
victims are entitled to ‘adequate compensation’ only if they prove the owner of the oil license or
lease acted ‘unreasonably.’554 As I mention above, Adeh argues that both the LUA and the
Petroleum Act make compensation to communities difficult. The TUC representative mentions
that the Petroleum Act is enacted in “1969 during the civil war”555 to emphasize the erratic
political context under which the law is passed. The law is thus not written with the environment
or communities in mind.
The Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 1992 has also been criticized for its weak
environmental/community protections. This Act calls for an environmental impact assessment
(EIA) to be done before any activity that is likely to significantly affect the environment or have
environmental effects.556 The Act lists what activities automatically trigger a mandatory study.
Sections 11 and 12 of the ‘Mandatory Study Activities’ section lists mining, sand dredging, oil
and gas development, offshore pipeline construction, construction of oil and gas facilities,
construction of oil refineries, and construction of oil and gas depots as the activities that
automatically trigger a mandatory study.557 But the Act has a weak enforcement mandate, and oil
companies do not always do EIAs. For example, Shell and ExxonMobil are sued in a Nigerian
court in 1998 for not adequately conducting EIAs before Shell’s Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas
(NLNG) and Mobil’s Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) projects are undertaken.558
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Additionally, EIAs miss many issues that affect communities. A representative of
CEHRD, while not mentioning the EIAs directly, touches on what they do not include. He says,
We want to have a health impact [assessment]…Because if we do not do a health impact
of the people to know what people will suffer in the near future, honestly, it’s going to be
a disaster…The people have just been mapping the social impact, the impact on sociocultural life of the people. But no scientific research has been conducted...on the health
impact of it. And that is very needed…I think people have rights to know what they are
vulnerable to in [the] nearest future…[B]ecause if you go to the village, the children are
still bathing [in] this water. People are still coming close to pollution. People are still
perceiving [breathing in polluted air]. So, if people know what they are vulnerable
to...they’ll reduce their contacts...with this pollution. People will be more careful.559
This quotation laments the fact the health impact assessments are not undertaken in oilproducing areas. While other assessments are taken that look at the social impact of oil
exploration, e.g., EIAs, they do not look at the health impact of oil exploration, especially oil
pollution. This is important since communities are still coming into contact with pollution and
not realizing the long-term health effects.
EGASPIN, while not a law, is an important policy guiding the Nigerian oil and gas
industry. It too is characterized by weaknesses. The Environmental Guidelines and Standards for
the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) are developed (in 1991 but revised in 2002) by
the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) to standardize procedures for preventing and
monitoring pollution in the petroleum industry. 560 It touches on different sources of pollution—
oil spills, gas flaring, and liquid waste—and sets guidelines for how they should be handled. For
example, Section 2.6.3 advises that oil spills should be cleaned up with 24 hours of the spill and
should be done in a way that does not cause additional damage to the environment. EGASPIN
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says that gas flaring is not allowed, but it also lists exceptions (as first outlined in the Petroleum
Act) and sets rules on how this gas should be flared.561
However, there are gaps in this policy that leave the environment and communities
vulnerable. First, as one of my interviewees mentions above, EGASPIN encourages oil MNCs to
claim that spills are caused from sabotage since they only have to pay damages for spills in
which they are held liable.562 Second, it gives DPR discretion to allow the discharge of waste
even when pollution limits are exceeded. This raises questions about how well the environment
is being protected.563 Lastly, questions have been raised about DPR’s ability to enforce
compliance on environmental pollution standards given that DPR is the authority that provides
licenses for oil operations.564
Sometimes the weaknesses in Nigeria’s laws and policies are deliberate. However,
sometimes these laws and policies are weak because Global North states use their power to
influence them. The saga of the Petroleum Industry Bill is a perfect example of this.
The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) is proposed in 2008 to reorganize the oil and gas
sector. In addition to restructuring the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the bill
would create six new agencies. One of the most controversial parts of the bill is the proposed
creation of the Petroleum Host Communities (PHC) Development Fund.565 The fund is supposed
to be used for the social and economic development of oil-producing communities. The bill
would require that oil companies remit 10% of their profits on a monthly basis to the fund. When
561
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oil facilities are damaged by vandalism or sabotage, money for the repairs would be deducted
from the fund. But this fund is also an attempt to ensure that oil-producing communities see (and
protect) oil facilities as their own. The logic is that communities will be less likely to sabotage
the oil facilities (or be more willing to protect the facilities from sabotage by outsiders) since
money for the repairs will be deducted from the fund, money the community could have
otherwise use for their benefit.566
The response to the bill (and fund) has been mixed. Nigerian government officials against
the bill argue that, among other things, oil-producing communities already have funds accruing
to them by way of the Niger Delta Development Commission and Ministry of Niger Delta.567
However, many NGOs in the Niger Delta are in favor of the bill. A CEHRD representative
explains:
[W]e’ve been trying to push the Petroleum Industry Bill. Now…the Petroleum Industry
Bill is like a kind of repeal of some part of the EGASPIN [Environmental Guidelines and
Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria]. For one, there is oil spill, whether
sabotage or not sabotage, the oil company is supposed to be responsible…[W]e also
know that…the only way to formulate a policy that will work is through a bill that will
become a law.568
The Petroleum Industry Bill is supposed to do what EGASPIN does not—make oil MNCs
responsible for spills caused by neglect and by sabotage since the latter will be paid for by the
money they deposit in the community development fund. Even if the fund has dubious
intentions, it is still a gain for oil-polluting communities overall.
The PIB has been considered controversial outside Nigeria as well. WikiLeaks cables
from 2009 and 2010 reveal that Shell and some Global North governments secretly try to prevent
the PIB from being enacted into legislation. Shell, other oil MNCs, the U.S., Britain, and
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Denmark are opposed to the legislation, particularly the stricter enforcement of environmental
laws and a commitment to development projects in the Niger Delta, because it would affect
profits.569 The bill goes through several iterations, and in July 2012, a new draft of the PIB is
submitted to the National Assembly by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources.570 By 2015, the bill
is still pending. And meetings between Shell and the UK’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office
(FCO) in that same year reveal that the two are still keeping an eye on the PIB. Meeting notes
from a February meeting read, “Looking beyond the elections, Shell will welcome reassurance
that HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] will continue to push the new [Nigerian] Government to
take action on issues that affect their operations. This includes the Petroleum Industry Bill, which
is crucial for improving transparency and prohibits investments but has been long delayed.”571 As
one can see, Shell is pressuring the UK to ensure its interests are not ignored. It is not known
how the UK responds to this suggestion. But in 2016, the PIB is broken down into separate bills,
with the proposed Petroleum Host Communities Development Fund not in the bill that is given
priority.
In an attempt to make the enaction of the PIB easier, the National Assembly breaks down
the PIB into four components: the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB), the Petroleum
Industry Administration Bill (PIAB), the Petroleum Industry Fiscal Bill (PIFB), and the
Petroleum Host and Impacted Communities Bill (PHICB). The PIGB is the primary focus. 572 In
May 2017, the Nigerian Senate passes the PIGB,573 and the lower house passes this same version
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in January 2018.574 On August 29, 2018, President Muhammadu Buhari declines to sign the
PIGB and sends it back to the National Assembly. It is reported that the President disagrees with
the PIGB reducing the powers of the president and oil minister in awarding oil licenses and
contracts.575 On April 19, 2019, the Senate passes a revised version of the PIGB. The Senate is
waiting on the House of Representatives to finalize details, and then the bill will be sent back to
President Buhari.576 This effort fails, and in 2020, Buhari proposes a new iteration of the PIB.
This bill is still quite contentious. For example, the bill proposes that oil companies should remit
2.5% (instead of the earlier 10%) of their profits to a host community fund, angering
representatives from the Niger Delta. Additionally, ‘host community’ is defined in a way that
could include communities outside the Niger Delta.577
On July 1, 2021, the PIB bill is passed by both chambers of the National Assembly. Each
chamber—the House of Representatives and the Senate—adopt their own version of the bill. For
the bill to be passed on to the President, the two chambers must harmonize their bills. The
harmonization of the bill is successful, but old and new controversies plague the process.578 For
instance, the bill in the House of Representatives initially proposes that oil companies remit 2.5%
of their profits to the host community fund. After some debate, this percentage is amended to
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5%.579 In the Senate, the Senate Joint Committee on Downstream Petroleum Sector, Petroleum
Resources (Upstream) and Gas recommends that 5% of oil profits be remitted to host
communities, but 2.5% is what is adopted. This causes an uproar among the Senators from the
Niger Delta since earlier iterations of the PIB call for 10% of profits to be remitted to host
communities. The bill eventually passes with 3% of profits remitted to host communities.580
Another point of controversy is the exploration of oil in the frontier basins in the northern states
in Nigeria. The bill stipulates that 30% of NNPC’s profit from oil and gas would be used for
“production sharing, profit sharing, and risk service contracts to fund exploration of frontier
basins.”581 This provision angers officials from the Niger Delta, as they perceive this 30% to be
an affront to the percentage of oil funds accruing to communities in the Niger Delta.582 There
have also been questions from the public about whether oil exploration in the frontier basins is a
sound investment and why Nigeria is making the decision to deepen its reliance on fossil fuels.583
Although, the rising tide against fossil fuels seems to have motivated this provision in the bill.584
I describe the PIB in detail in order to show that while some of the weaknesses in
Nigeria’s legislation can be blamed on Nigerian lawmakers, sometimes the story is more
complicated. In the case of the PIB, oil MNCs and Global North states seem to have played a
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role in the delay and watering down of the PIB to the detriment of the environment and oilproducing communities.
Courts
Nigerian courts have also insufficiently protected Nigerian communities from
environmental pollution. In a study on litigation between oil companies and communities in
Nigeria, Jedrzej Georg Frynas (2000) claims that access to courts is a major problem faced by
potential litigants. A survey of lawyers in Nigeria reveals that a significant proportion of
respondents believe that access to courts is harder for litigants facing oil companies.585 While the
financial burden facing litigants have decreased, lack of money is the main barrier preventing
litigants from accessing the courts. Communities must hire a lawyer and witnesses themselves,
which is too costly for most potential litigants.586 Additionally, potential litigants are often
discouraged from pursuing a case against oil companies in the first place.587 And even if litigants
make it to court, Frynas finds that the success of litigants is limited because oil companies are
able to use procedural and other rules to defend themselves against oil-related litigation.588
Frynas concludes that although it may be difficult to prove, it seems that oil MNCs use their
“political influence” to deter potential litigants.589
Frynas also discovers that Nigerian courts tend to be biased towards oil companies,
especially in environmental cases. But even if oil companies are found liable, a court order
against the oil industry might not be enforced if it is seen as going against the government’s
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interests in the oil industry.590 Additionally, Frynas finds that 71.6% of oil company lawyers
believe these compensation payments are unfair to opposing litigants.591
Section V. Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that foreign and domestic actors involved in the Nigerian oil
political economy (e.g., states, elites, oil multinational corporations [MNCs]) create oil pollution
in the Niger Delta by making decisions that prioritize profits at the expense of the environment.
By engaging in illicit financial outflows (through tax avoidance and tax evasion), shirking
environmental responsibilities (by claiming sabotage, taking advantage of the parent
company/subsidiary structure, lobbying for anti-climate change policies, and flaring gas), and
devising weak (whether intentional or not) environmental/community protections, these actors
shift pollution costs from themselves onto rural women’s domestic labor in the Niger Delta. This
pollution, I argued, adversely impacts women’s domestic labor—farming and fishing, their
(reproductive) health, their children, and their household and community dynamics.
I argued that oil MNCs—with the help of Nigerian government officials—engage in
illicit financial outflows through tax avoidance and tax evasion. I show that oil MNCs that are
often sued for oil pollution have also been caught evading and avoiding taxes. Thus, oil MNCs
pollute and shift pollution costs onto communities by not paying taxes—taxes that could be used
to clean up this pollution.
I also demonstrated that oil MNCs shirk their environmental responsibilities, which
comes at the cost of the environment and communities. The Niger Delta is one of the most
polluted places in the world. Oil-polluted communities (and NGOs) argue that poor maintenance
of oil pipelines or operational failure is to blame for the majority of these oil spills, while oil
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MNCs contend that these spills are mainly caused by the sabotage of their oil pipelines. These
claims by oil MNCs are dubious since the oil spill investigation process lacks transparency and
some Nigerian laws and policies incentivize oil MNCs to claim sabotage since that releases them
from liability. This tension plays out in the many lawsuits oil-producing communities file against
oil MNCs. What oil MNCs also do in these lawsuits is take advantage of the parent/subsidiary
structure to shield themselves from liability. For instance, Shell might argue that its Nigerian
subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), is liable for a spill and
not the parent company (Royal Dutch Shell). This structure makes it harder to hold oil MNCs
responsible for their behavior because power is situated with the parent company and not the
subsidiary.
I also argued that oil MNCs shirk their environmental responsibilities by lobbying for
anti-climate change policies and flaring gas. Oil MNCs operating in the Niger Delta have
contributed millions of dollars to the American Petroleum Institute (API)—a powerful climate
obstruction lobbying force in the U.S. This is egregious since oil MNCs continue to flare gas—
burn gas as waste—in the Niger Delta, which releases carbon dioxide and methane into the air.
Lastly I argued that Nigerian laws and policies guiding the oil and gas industry (whether
intentional or not) and the courts adjudicating these laws do not adequately protect the
environment and oil-producing communities. I also show, using the saga of the Petroleum
Industry Bill (PIB), that this weak enforcement is sometimes due to the influence of oil MNCs
and states such as the U.S. and UK.
Implications of my Analyses
In the following sections, I pose questions that arise from the analyses in my chapter. I
pose these questions for myself (and others) to think about for future avenues of research.
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Is Domestic Labor Always Unwaged Labor?
In this chapter, I analyze the domestic/agricultural labor as unwaged labor. However, this
may not be the case. For instance, Maria Mies (1981) finds that the “housewives” in Narsapur,
India are actually the primary producers for the lace industry in the region. Mies explains, “[T]he
social definition of women as housewives serves mainly the purpose of obscuring the true
production relations and to consolidate their exploitation.”592 This is not to say that housewives
or those mainly involved in domestic work are not exploited. This is to say that labeling them as
“housewives” may hide the fact that they are being exploited both within and outside the home.
Further research on agricultural households in the Niger Delta could delve into this issue. For
instance, some of the literature on the effects of oil pollution on women refer to oil-pollution
destroying income-generating activities,593 but this is not discussed further. Other research could
delve into what these income-generating activities entail.
What are the Nuances of Agricultural Labor and the Gendered Division of Labor?
While this chapter is primarily focused on explaining the actors that create the oil
pollution in the Niger Delta, more research could delve into the specifics of the domestic labor of
these rural women. Dzodzi Tsikata (2009) argues that time use studies are a good way to capture
the differences in the gendered division of labor, particularly the difference men and women
spend on domestic labor in rural households in Africa.594 This might be particularly helpful in
getting at the nuances in agricultural labor in the Niger Delta since men and women in the region
both labor in this sector.
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Where Is the Rest of the International Community?
In this chapter, the international community’s role in oil pollution in the Nigerian oil
political economy is limited to oil MNCs and states, such as the U.S., and UK, attempting to
influence Nigerian laws and policies. However, the role of the international community in
Nigeria’s oil pollution is much larger than this. For example, the other side of tax evasion is tax
havens. A report commissioned by the African Union Commission and United Nations
Economic Commission states that “a major enabler or pull factor for IFFs from Africa is the
existence of financial secrecy jurisdictions and/or tax havens.”595 According to the UNCTAD
report, about 20% to 30% of private wealth from African countries is held in tax havens.596 The
top five tax havens/ offshore financial centers are the Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland,
Singapore, and Ireland.597 As I mention above, most of Africa’s illicit financial outflows come
from extractive industries. Thus, further research could examine the ways in which tax havens
are contributing to oil pollution in the Niger Delta.
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Chapter 6__The Exploitation of Women’s Labor and Resistance
Not Just Victims of Exploitation
In Chapters 4 and 5, I focus on the ways in which the waged work of women oil workers
and unwaged work of rural women in oil-producing communities, respectively, are exploited in
and around the Nigerian oil industry. However, the story about women laboring in the Nigerian
oil industry is not just about them being victims. Women are also resisting these structures of
exploitation. This chapter tells some of their stories. It asks: How are women in the Niger Delta
shaping the Nigerian oil political economy?
As I mention in Chapter 2, Michael Ross (2008) argues that oil rents limit female
political influence in oil-rich countries because these rents reduce the number of women in the
waged-labor force. Women who are not engaged in waged work, Ross argues, are not socialized
into politics. This leads to less influential women’s movements and groups, decreasing the
chances of gender reforms including more female representation in the government.598 However,
this argument rests on multiple assumptions that this chapter challenges. First, Ross assumes that
waged work is the only way women are socialized into politics and does not consider other
avenues. A theory of capitalist patriarchy recognizes other avenues. Zillah Eisenstein (1999)
explains,
The potential for revolutionary consciousness derives from the fact that women’s lives
under capitalist patriarchy are being squeezed from the most intimate levels, such as how
they feed their children, to the more public levels of their monotonous, tiring, low-skill,
sex-defined, low-wage jobs. Women are working in the labor force, and for less, and they
are maintaining the family system, having less to make do with. This is the base from
which consciousness can develop.599

598

. Ross, Michael L. (2008). “Oil, Islam, and Women.” American Political Science Review, 102:1, 114-120
. Eisenstein, Zillah. (1999). “Constructing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism.” Critical
Sociology, 25: 2/3, 213-214
599

186

Because women are ‘being squeezed from the most intimate levels’ of their lives under capitalist
patriarchy, the labor they do—whether waged or unwaged—allows them to be socialized into
politics/develop consciousness. Thus, because Ross cannot see that labor exploitation fuels
consciousness and that women also labor outside of waged work, he cannot see that women’s
movements/mobilizations can and do occur in oil economies and they happen because of, and
not despite, the existence of oil.
A second Ross assumption is that participation in formal political processes is the only
way to measure political influence. However, political influence can be measured in a variety of
ways. In many countries—oil-rich and not oil-rich—the formal political sphere is not accessible
to women. Therefore, it is necessary to look outside formal political processes to see where
women exert political influence. This is not to say that questions about the lack of female
representation in oil-rich countries (and elsewhere) are not important. This is only to say that
claiming that political influence is reduced bar none in oil-rich countries because one is only
looking at formal political processes ignores the many ways that women are shaping oil political
economies.
Because of these assumptions, Ross does not see the ways that Niger Delta women have
been engaged in politics in and around the Nigerian oil political economy. Women in the Niger
Delta have a long history of protesting against oil grievances in their communities.600 As I will
explain, Terisa E. Turner and her co-authors (1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2002, 2004a, 2004b)
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argue that the proliferation of these “peasant” resistance movements are due to women ‘being
squeezed from the most intimate levels.’601 Craig S. Benjamin and Terisa E. Turner (1992) adapt
Ivan Illich’s concept of ‘shadow work’ to women’s protests in the Niger Delta (and elsewhere).
They argue that rural women often engage in shadow work—hidden work in a capitalist
economy that produces labor power and the labor power of others—through their work as
subsistence laborers.602 When these women’s livelihoods are threatened by environmental
pollution, Terisa E. Turner and Craig S. Benjamin (1995) explain, they “develop the potential
social power rooted in the particular relationship between themselves and the basis of their own
survival and autonomy”603 which leads to counterplanning from the commons. In line with
theories of capitalist patriarchy, Turner et al. link women’s mobilizations and protests to the
gendered division of labor.
In this chapter, I argue that the work done by the Women Committee of the Nigeria
Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) Port Harcourt zone and local
environmental rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around Port Harcourt continue a
Niger Delta tradition of organizing against structures that make laboring as women exploitative. I
argue that the dynamics Turner et al. observe in women’s ‘peasant resistance’ in the Niger
Delta—shadow work and counterplanning from the commons—can be found (although not in
the exact ways) in the work done by NUPENG’s Women Committee and these local NGOs. I
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focus my analysis on NUPENG’s Women Committee and local NGOs because they are
organizing against the exploited labors I analyze in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section I provides an overview of the frameworks
Turner et al. use to explain rural women’s mobilizations, focusing on their concepts of shadow
work and counterplanning from the commons. While the major contention of this chapter is that
the work done by NUPENG’s Women Committee and local NGOs continue the tradition of
mobilizing against structures that exploits women’s labor because they deal with shadow work
and counterplanning from the commons, there are other reasons why these mobilizations are
linked. Section II explores these connections. In Section III, I reiterate the ways in which oil
women workers engage/are expected to engage in shadow work (discussed in Chapter 4) and
explain how NUPENG’s Women Committee shows aspects of counterplanning from the
commons. In Section IV, I explain that although the workers in three local NGOs are not directly
engaged in shadow work in oil-producing communities, they work with women tasked with
shadow work in these communities and help them with counterplanning from the commons.
Section V provides a conclusion.
Section I. Rural Women’s Mobilizations: Shadow Work and Counterplanning from the
Commons
As mentioned above, Eisenstein argues that because women are ‘being squeezed from the
most intimate levels’ of their lives under capitalist patriarchy, most of the labor they do—
whether waged or unwaged—allows them to be socialized into politics/develop consciousness
and organize. The frameworks by Terisa E. Turner et al. specifically analyze and explain rural
women’s protests and other mobilizations by “link[ing] popular struggles and the gendered
division of labour under capital.”604 Benjamin and Turner (1992) argue that those who are
604
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expected to reproduce their own labor power and the labor power of others in the gendered
division of labor are in a unique position to defend capitalist intrusions against “capitalist
enclosure.”605 Despite how important reproducing labor power is to the capitalist economy, this
labor is devalued, thus hidden.606
Benjamin and Turner (1992) adapt Ivan Illich’s concept of ‘shadow work’ to “name this
hidden, yet ubiquitous form of labour under capitalism.”607 They explain that shadow work is:
the hidden character of the work of producing labor power within capitalist relations of
production….[S]hadow work is not a constant set of specific work activities, but rather a
particular relationship both among workers and between workers and capital. These
relationships operate in the home or the community where the greater part of the
unwaged labor of producing labor power is performed. This relationship also operates in
the waged work place where women and other shadow workers are expected to provide
additional social and sexual services for the benefit of bosses, supervisors, and male
dealing co-workers. 608
In other words, shadow work refers to the social production/taking care of workers and soon-tobe workers. This includes taking care of the household (e.g., cooking, taking care of children),
providing emotional support, caretaking, etc. They explain that although all workers produce
their own labor power, some workers do more of this labor than others. In many cases, women
are responsible for this shadow work. This hierarchical gender division of labor power is
reinforced by the male deal.609 The male deal refers to “the imperative under capitalist relations
of production that male wage earners serve as intermediaries eliciting, coercing, supervising, and
regulating the exploitation of shadow labour.”610 Shadow work, and thus the exploitation of
shadow work, occurs in the unwaged or waged economy. In the unwaged economy, this shadow
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work often takes place as household or domestic labor. For example, the unwaged
labor/agricultural labor of rural women in the Niger Delta I discuss in Chapter 5 can be
considered shadow work. For the waged economy, Benjamin and Turner (1992) explain that
“even when women work for a wage they are employed by capital on the understanding that they
are responsible for additional unwaged labour to reproduce their own labour power and the
labour power of others despite their wage.” 611 In other words, women working for a wage are
still expected to perform the shadow work in the household and the shadow work in the
workplace, with the latter including expectations of ‘social and sexual services’ for male bosses
and co-workers.612
Benjamin and Turner continue that it is in the interest of workers who primarily produce
their labor power and the labor power of others to organize against exploitation of the “natural
and built environment”613 that aids in this labor. They refer to this ‘natural and built
environment’ as the “commons.”614 When shadow workers organize against and resist this
exploitation, this is called ‘counterplanning from the commons.’ 615 The authors explain,
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[W]omen and other shadow workers…rely on access to non-commodified resources in
the built and natural environments as a condition of the particular labour they perform in
capitalist relations of production. Furthermore. it is within this relationship that women
find the concrete potential to exercise social power in their own gendered class interests.
We call the exercise of this social power ‘counterplanning from the commons.’616
Through producing their labor power and the labor power of others, shadow workers gain
“experiential knowledge of the social and natural environments from which subsistence is
drawn.”617 Shadow workers can use this knowledge, the autonomy from wage-earning family
members that this knowledge provides, and the re-appropriated symbolic connection between
women and nature to power their organizing and resistance. As Benjamin and Turner explain,
because reproducing labor power relies on the ‘non-commodified’ aspects of the natural and
built environments, this gives shadow workers some autonomy from the control of wage-earning
kin. And while connecting women to nature has been used to dominate women, shadow workers
can re-appropriate these images as sources of power for their organizing.618
Turner and Benjamin’s analyses mostly focus on the natural environment, as they explain
why women figure prominently in ‘peasant’/rural ecological struggles. They argue that their
framework can be used to explain women’s movements around the world, including Nigeria.
Benjamin and Turner (1992) and Terisa E. Turner and M.O. Oshare (1993) argue that these
dynamics explain the 1984 Ogharefe women’s uprising in Nigeria. This uprising begins when
women in Ogharefe demand that the U.S. oil company operating on their lands, Pan Ocean, pay
them for the lands seized and the oil pollution damaging their lands. The women argue that they
have been denied compensation and the provision of basic amenities.619 In other words, the
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women are “expressing their specific gendered class interest as [shadow] workers dependent on
access to communal lands.”620 Several thousand women stage a mass protest in front of the
Ogharefe Production Station. They block workers from entering the station to relieve the workers
inside the station. Those inside the station make calls to Pan Ocean’s managing director. The
women threaten to strip naked if the director comes.621 Turner and M.O. Oshare explain that
women exposing themselves in public is considered a curse. This curse is supposed to discredit
and shame those that are on the receiving end. When Pan Ocean’s managing director arrives in
the area, the women have already disrobed. When Pan Ocean’s director and another official
witness this, they flee and decide to give the women what they want.622 After the uprising, the oil
company pays compensation for the lands taken and damaged by oil spills. They also provide
water and electricity for the community.623 Benjamin and Turner (1992) explain that class
solidarity within the working class is strengthened in Ogharefe as “disinherited” young men, also
dispossessed from land by oil, ally with the women to protect the wins gained.624 These alliances,
what Terisa E. Turner and Leigh S. Brownhill (2002, 2004a, 2004b)625 call gendered class
alliances, confront the male deal among husbands, chiefs, etc. and capital.
Therefore, from the discussion above, we can infer that counterplanning from the
commons includes the following aspects:
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•
•
•
•
•

Women tasked with performing shadow work (producing labor power and labor power of
others)
Shadow workers using knowledge from the non-commodified natural and built
environment (“the commons”) to form and express gendered class interests
Shadow workers expressing their gendered class interests by organizing to stop capital
and/or male dealers from intruding onto the commons/exploiting their labor
Shadow workers, especially those seeking to defend the natural environment, reappropriating the connection between women and nature as a source of power626
Shadow workers’ organizing includes and/or leads to a realignment of alliances to
include other ‘disinherited’ people to break the ‘male deal’ in communities (gendered
class alliance)

I list these aspects in this way not to signify linearity but only to distinguish distinct parts of
counterplanning from the commons. In fact, as one can see from the examples above, these
aspects often take place at the same. Thus, what is important in Turner’s framework is that these
aspects are present when shadow workers engage in counterplanning from the commons.
In Section III and Section IV, I use these aspects of counterplanning from the commons
to argue that NUPENG’s Women Committee and work done in local NGOs continue a tradition
of mobilizing against the exploitation of women’s work in the Niger Delta. I do not argue that
these aspects show up in the exact same way as Turner et al. describe them. But I do argue that
there are similarities in what Turner et al. observe in rural women’s protests/mobilizations to
what I observe in the work done in NUPENG’s Women Committee and local NGOs in Port
Harcourt.
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Section II. Other Connections Between Rural Women’s Mobilization and Work in
NUPENG’s Women Committee and Local NGOs
While the main analysis focuses on counterplanning from the commons, there are other
connections that link work done by NUPENG’s Women Committee and local NGOs to these
rural mobilizations that bear mentioning. First, women in NUPENG’s Women Committee relate
their organizing to past women’s mobilizations in Nigeria. For instance, a NUPENG Women
Committee representative, says the following, “But...if you really want to trace the origin
of…women participation, you can take it as far back as…Ekpo [and]…the Aba women’s riots….
Then, even the late Ransome-Kuti [is an example].”627 In this quotation, the interviewee traces
the work of NUPENG’s Women Committee to women’s anti-colonial struggles. What makes
this comparison relevant is that scholars have argued that these anti-colonial struggles have
similarities to women’s protests against oil. Turner and Oshare and Charles Ukeje (2004) link
women’s anti-colonial mobilizations to women’s protests/mobilizations against oil. According to
Ukeje, these struggles “are not contextually or significantly different.”628
The ‘Aba women’s riots’ in the quotation refers to the Aba women’s riots/wars 19281929, which are highlighted by Turner and Oshare as well as Ukeje. These wars are protests
against the British colonial government. Women in Eastern Nigeria fear that the British
government is going to levy taxes on them when the government announces that it would begin
taking a headcount of women in the area. The women are already concerned about the taxes
levied on their husbands and sons, which are putting economic pressures on their communities.
Additionally, the women have concerns about the warrant chiefs the British government install to
rule over them. The chiefs are accused of working against the communities they are supposed to
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represent.629 Other grievances include unnecessary imprisonment, low prices assigned to farm
products (especially palm oil and palm kernel), and high prices for imported goods.630 All this
leads to women staging protests on November 24, 1929. The women engage in a practice of
censoring the men by singing songs and engaging in dances that ridicules them throughout the
night. By December 1929, the women force the chiefs to surrender their caps, effectively ousting
the chiefs.631
‘Ransome-Kuti’ in the quotation refers to Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, who is an anticolonial and women’s rights activist.632 She is also connected to the Egba women’s riots, which
Turner and Oshare and Ukeje highlight. From the 1930s to the 1950s, women in Western Nigeria
stage a series of demonstrations against the British colonial government and the Alake (king) of
Egbaland, who is said to be colluding with the colonial government. The women’s grievances
include taxation and market closures.633 The women successfully force the king to abdicate his
throne.634 In 1953, Ransome-Kuti forms the Federation of Nigerian Women’s Societies (FNWS)
to increase the status of women in Nigeria and make them equal to men.635 While Ifi Amadiume
(2000) criticizes this organization as elitist and shifting Nigerian women’s political arena away
from the concrete issues of rural women to the abstract issues of urban ones,636 she argues
nonetheless that Ransome-Kuti “was ahead of her time and in the wrong socio-political setting
for her level of political awareness and ideological commitment.”637
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And ‘Ekpo’ in the quotation refers to Margaret Ekpo. While she is not mentioned by
Turner and Oshare or Ukeje, she is also an anti-colonial and women’s rights activist. Ekpo is a
colleague of Ransome-Kuti and heads the FNWS with Ransome-Kuti. But according to
Amadiume, Ekpo does not exhibit the same ideological commitments as Ransome-Kuti. For
example, at the World Congress of Women in 1963, Ekpo criticizes Ransome-Kuti for
portraying a negative picture of the status of Nigerian women.638 Nevertheless, Ekpo does align
with market women, when she forms the Aba Market Women Association in 1954. This
association keeps market women informed about political meetings in Aba and mobilizes them
to register to vote.639
According to Turner and Oshare, these colonial struggles are examples of women
mobilizing against the British colonial state and men in their communities that are colluding with
the state. This also describes women’s protests against oil.640 Similarly, Ukeje argues that these
anti-colonial struggles and protests against oil are examples of women organizing to “negate the
crisis of capitalist accumulation and…challenge the contradictions that allow the crisis facing the
Nigerian project to fester.”641 What is important here is that NUPENG’s Women Committee sees
their work as similar to anti-colonial struggles, which have similarities to the types of protests
Turner uses her frameworks to analyze. Therefore, I argue that adapting Turner’s framework to
the work of the NUPENG’s Women Committee is reasonable.
Second, oil workers have joined these women-led protests against oil. For example,
Terisa E. Turner (1997) describes the 1994 oil workers’ strike by NUPENG as a strike in support

638

. Amadiume, 50
. Ukpokolo, Chinyere. (2020, June 3). Ekpo, Margaret. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History.
https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734e-476
640
. Turner and Oshare, 336
641
. Ukeje, 607
639

197

of oil communities’ demands.”642 Turner and Brownhill (2002) also argue that the 2002 oil
workers’ strike are to support rural women’s occupation of oil facilities.643 Thus, the fact that oil
workers join these protests suggest they see a connection between their place in the capitalist
economy and women in oil-producing communities.
Third, like the protests Turner et al., describe women in local NGOs are organizing
around ecological issues. As I detail later, these NGOs are environmental rights organizations
that work on the intersection of oil and gender, although not exclusively. Therefore, their work is
around protecting rural women’s access to the commons.
Section III. Shadow Work and Counterplanning in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry
In this section, I argue that the work of NUPENG’s Women Committee have aspects of
counterplanning from the commons. A notable difference between the analysis of Turner et al.
and my own is that counterplanning from the commons describes a specific moment of
organizing, a particular protest. In my analysis, I describe the different events the Women
Committee coordinates as a specific moment of organizing since they are all happening through
the Women Committee. Additionally, while the women in the framework by Turner et al. and the
women oil workers in my analysis both organize against capitalist patriarchy in the Nigerian oil
and gas industry, they focus on different dimensions of this issue. The rural women in the
frameworks of Turner et al. organize against oil MNCs polluting their lands and destroying their
subsistence labor from oil MNCs as well as colluding male dealers in their communities. The
Women Committee, however, organize against the unfair wage-labor policies and practices
women oil workers face within oil MNCs.
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In Chapter 4, I explain that NUPENG is one of the two main oil labor unions in the
Nigerian oil and gas industry. It is considered the “blue-collar” workers union of the oil and gas
industry and the more militant oil labor union. In that chapter, I argue that women oil workers in
NUPENG are exploited not just because they experience casualization and redundancy as other
oil workers do. Their exploitation also results from gender ordering and sexual harassment in the
workplace as well as the interaction between workday constraints and the domestic division of
labor in the household. Thus, these expectations of sexual services from those at work and
domestic services from those at home mean that women oil workers are tasked with shadow
work. I only focus on the latter issue and explore the ways in which women oil workers—
through the Women Committee—organize to protect their home lives from exploitative labor
policies and practices.
In the same chapter, I mention that the Women Committee is formed to integrate women
into NUPENG. This is what the Women Committee does today as well as tackle issues women
face in their workplaces and homes. The Committee does this by helping the women form
gendered class interests. The representative of the Women Committee explains:
“[T]he women themselves will have these, what I call, pulling down syndrome…. You
are a woman. I am there. Maybe you are more educated, and the election is coming up.
There’s a position you’re vying for. I know very well that you can be able to handle it.
But I will rather work with the men and opposition to get you down than having you be
there…[T]hat is why we have these trainings, leadership qualities, how to make the
women see ourselves as sisters, as one, you know? We should be able to form an
indivisible entity...[M]y [union] president and zonal chairman, they’ve given us all the
necessary assistance that we need to be able to move forward. So, why should we now
kind of become an obstacle to ourselves?”644
In this quotation, the representative explains that the Women Committee hosts leadership
trainings to foster consciousness-raising and feelings of sisterhood and solidarity amongst the
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union members. Since these trainings are designed to help the women in the union ‘form an
indivisible entity’ and stop them from collaborating with male opposition, this implies the
realization of and desire to protect and assert gendered class interests in the oil and gas industry.
This quotation is also important because it mentions a cross-gender alliance, as some men (the
union president and the zonal chairman) ally with the women to put on these trainings. This
cross-gender alliance is mentioned in another instance, as the representative says, “[A]nd I really
want to thank my National President...who has been so gender friendly. He’s always taking
women to one seminar or the other…[T]hey’re...carrying women along, making sure that women
actually realize their dreams.”645 As mentioned above, counterplanning from the commons often
includes class solidarity among working class men and women in order to challenge the
exploitation of women. However, this is not to say that these men in this quotation ally with the
Women Committee in all instances. In fact, in other instances, they are the targets of the
Committee’s organizing. This is just to say in this specific instance, we see a case of a crossgender alliance.
The formation of gendered class interests has allowed the Women Committee to fight for
accommodations for nursing mothers in oil companies. The Women Committee representative
explains what maternity benefits they have secured:
[A]fter the 3 months of maternity, [oil] companies are supposed to have creche, where
you still come with your baby. That is, if you really want to promote...exclusive
breastfeeding…[Y]ou have a creche where if you come, you will keep the baby there.
The company will employ nannies to be there…So when the baby is crying or if there’s
anything, they’ll call you from your office. You come and attend, breastfeed the
baby...and go back…So we have been able to establish that in all our...units and zones,
branches, even in most of these formal sector offices to make sure they have creche for
the women. And again, you know, this idea of making women to work all through the
day like their male counterparts,…we have also looked at it and said no. If a woman
is…nursing, at least within the first six months to 1 year, I think the law says 6 months,
645
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within the first 6 months, she closes about 2 hours earlier than male…counterparts…
[W]e’ve been able to achieve that.”646
This quotation shows how the Women Committee has organized for and won daycare services
and shorter workdays for nursing mothers. Nursing, the Committee argues, should be protected
from intrusions of the capitalist workday. The Committee uses their knowledge of exclusive
breastfeeding—infant receives only breastmilk for at least six months647—and Nigeria’s
promotion of exclusive breastfeeding648 to make their arguments.
The formation of gendered class interests has also allowed the Women Committee to help
members manage relationships with their husbands. The representative explains,
What we normally do…we…have…general meetings, where we advise women on how
to manage their homes and all those things. Then at the end of the day, after every
meeting, we normally bring out time, like 3-4 hours for counseling…As leaders, we’ll
bring out time...we will announce it, then within that period...we will be in a room like
this. Women come in, one by one, you know. Then you see women having
challenges...marital issues...and everything. I’m a woman so I cannot advise her to pack
out of your husband’s house. But we will now put our heads together...and see how to
proffer solution to it. Sometimes we even go to the extent of meeting with the man on a
friendly basis...to see how we’ll get these issues taken care of. But officially, union
they’re not supposed to...involve in…your marital affairs...because before what makes
you our member is because you are working here...and you’re paying your dues. And
before you get an employment or engaged in any work, it’s something you must have
discussed with your husband…You understand? If maybe if you’re already working
before getting married, the man knows you’re working…And after marriage, he has not
asked you to stop. You see the issue there is this, men they want you to contribute
financially. But they still want you to be under them, still play that...second class role to
them…If you said you’re the head, why not head everything…including my financial
upkeep and everything?...So that is the thing. We do try. We call them one on one. We
talk to them. We counsel them. Advise them on how to manage their home front.
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supposed to do, these are what you’re supposed to do...And at the end of the day...it has
paid off.”649
In this quotation, the representative explains that the Women Committee provides counseling to
their members and their husbands to ensure that work is not intruding into and straining
marriages. But we also see the Women Committee asserting the autonomy of their members,
which, as I mention earlier, Turner et al. claim is a benefit that comes with being tasked with
shadow work. The Women Committee representative asserts this autonomy by re-appropriating
patriarchal ideas about women’s role in the household in the same way Turner et al. argue
women can re-appropriate the connection between women and nature as a source of power. As
the representative explains, if the man is supposed to be the head of the household and wants
control over the house and his wife’s decision-making, then he should take care of her financial
needs. But if he wants his wife to work and contribute to the household financially, then he
cannot really protest the job his wife has.
Additionally, the Women Committee has organized to retrain women put on redundancy
so they can continue providing for their families. As I described in Chapter 4, redundancy is a
labor control strategy that is used by capital in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. It is a temporary
loss of employment. But because redundant workers have not technically been fired, they are
unable to seek employment elsewhere, which puts them in a limbo. This and other measures
contribute to the precarity of oil workers in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. To help with this,
the Women Committee provides skill acquisition trainings for redundant workers. The Women
Committee representative explains,
Some time ago, the [union] president now said instead of just training, let us now kind of
go into skill acquisition, something that these women can do that will be able to be
helping them out financially. So, we went into skill acquisition...[W]omen were trained
on how to make detergent…how to make liquid soap...Dettol [a brand of antibacterial
649
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soap], Izal [a brand of disinfectant products], bleach…We also taught them how to use
materials…to do shoes and bags…And another thing we do is that after training these
people….we encourage them or we kind of instruct them to take this back and also train
the other women...that are at home…[B]ecause Port Harcourt zone comprises of 10 states
of the federation: Anambra, Imo, Enugu, Abia, up to Benue.…[S]o they’re expected that
after learning these things, they will go back and now gather the other women and train
them because knowledge is better shared.”650
As this quotation explains, the Women Committee, with the help of the union president, has
found a way to help women make a living when capital makes them redundant. Redundancy
does not allow the members to find work elsewhere, so the Women Committee circumvents this
by teaching women how to make household products and other items that they can sell to be able
to provide for themselves and their families. And once these women receive these trainings, they
share it with other union members.
While the above examples show the union largely supporting programs for the Women
Committee, this is not always the case. A Women Committee representative explains,
[W]e’ve had some challenges whereby you want to come up with programs, they will say
there’s no money. You want to go for international trainings, where is the money?...So
we women now, like when I...came on board, such issue was on ground—how to now
look for a way to raise [money]…[W]e went for financial drives, meeting our companies
and…some of our branches to see how we can raise money to do one or two things.651
As the quotation explains, the union sometimes uses its control of funds to stymie the Women
Committee’s efforts to offer different trainings and programs for its members. Thus, in addition
to having to agitate against oil companies for better working conditions, the Women Committee
sometimes must convince the union heads that their concerns are worth funding. Men, the
Women Committee representative explains, sometimes think the women are asking for too
much, that they do not know their place. But the Women Committee representative retorts, “Men
will tell us that they’re the head. We say, ‘yes, you’re the head but we are the neck. And without
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the neck, the head cannot...stay. And as the neck, the neck turns the head anywhere...it wants the
head to go.’”652 Again, we see the representative re-appropriating patriarchal ideas about women
to assert women’s ability to lead and make decisions. In this quotation, she does not dispute that
women are in the lesser position of the ‘neck.’ What she does show is that some qualities of the
neck allow it to control/be in a superior position to the head—it ‘turns the head anywhere.’ Thus,
the Women Committee does not allow the “lesser” position of the neck to dissuade it from its
goals, as it is able to use other relationships to raise money for trainings.
Furthermore, the Women Committee has ensured that the oil and gas industry is not
intruding into the quality of life and health of its members. The representative explains,
“[W]e’ve also been able to make sure that…like this PPE [Personal Protective
Equipment], that’s all this helmet and everything they use: …nose masks, everything for
work...that the safety aspect of it is provided for both male and female…Even if
you’re…working…in a fertilizer company and...you are in the office, whether we like it
or not, you still perceive [inhale] some of the chemicals…So [we] make sure that area is
also taken care of. These are part of the challenges women were having and we’re
coming in to see how we can be able to handle it.”653
As the quotation explains, women oil workers are not always provided the same equipment as
the men. Therefore, the Women Committee has been able to make sure that women have access
to adequate equipment for their work, whether they are in a field or office. Implicit in this
statement is that those who work in offices are not thought of as needing equipment, that their
work is not as dangerous and, therefore, less important. As I mention in Chapter 4, many women
are found in these positions in the oil and gas industry. Thus, the quotation is also asserting the
importance of the female-dominated work done in these spaces.
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Section IV. Shadow Work and Counterplanning within Local NGOs in Port Harcourt
In this section, I argue that work done by men and women in local environmental rights
NGOs in Port Harcourt has aspects of counterplanning from the commons. Again, I am not
focusing on a specific moment of organizing but instead analyzing the work of the different
NGOs as an instance of organizing. The three NGOs I discuss focus on the intersection of gender
and oil (although not exclusively), are within the same network, and often collaborate with each
other. Therefore, I treat them as (loosely) working together on the same issue. In Chapter 5, I
situate oil pollution and the resulting impact on rural women’s domestic labor (shadow work) in
the Niger Delta in the larger context of the Nigerian oil political economy. The framework by
Turner et al. explains how the rural women I analyze in that chapter mobilize to protect the
commons through protests. I argue that one’s labor does not have to depend on the commons for
survival to mobilize around it (although some of the NGO workers I spoke to are from oilproducing communities). The men and women in these local NGOs work with/on behalf of rural
women to protect the latter’s shadow work and commons. This work has aspects of
counterplanning from the commons.
As I mention above, these NGOs work around environmental issues, particularly the
intersection of oil and gender. For instance, Kebetkache, one such NGO, focuses on five issueareas: gender-based violence; women participation in governance and decision-making
processes; women, peace, and security; HIV and AIDS issues; and environmental issues. A
Kebetkache representative explains that “specifically on environmental justice issues, we create
awareness in communities, or we mobilize women to speak out about how they are impacted by
the oil and gas industry.”654 The Centre for Environment, Human Rights, and Development
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(CEHRD) is another such NGO. CEHRD is a human rights organization that focuses on helping
those impacted by Nigeria’s extractive industry.655 The organization works at the intersection of
gender and oil by, as a CEHRD representative explains carrying out “sensitization campaigns
[and] creating awareness on the impact of oil spill on women and the entire population.”656 She
continues, “[W]e’re here to address this gender differences and see how we could strengthen
women’s participation when it comes to decision-making and being in relevant institutions.”657
Another such NGO is Society for Women and Youth Affairs. The organization is founded as a
way to reach out to women, children, and youth in the Niger Delta. Because of the oil pollution
in the Niger Delta, this organization organizes trainings that help women become economically
independent. 658 The purpose and mission of these NGOs show they organize around the shadow
work of rural women.
These NGOs work to protect commons from the intrusions of capital and colluding men
in oil-producing communities. For example, a CEHRD representative explains how Shell gets
away with polluting the Niger Delta. He explains,
[W]e have been engaging Shell that your JIV [Joint Investigation Visit] regime is not
transparent. So, we have to come up with a standardized JIV regime, a standardized
methodology that will be known to community, known to NOSDRA [National Oil Spill
Detection and Response Agency], known to DPR [Department of Petroleum Resources].
We’ve also been trying to…raise the capacity of the DPR and NOSDRA so that all of us
will be on the same page, but that has not worked ‘til I speak. So, in any oil spill, the
communities have been…at the side.659
As I explain in Chapter 5, a Joint Investigation Visit is an investigation that occurs when there is
an oil spill. As the quotation says, Shell (or some other oil MNC) are the primary investigators of
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oil spills in the Niger Delta. Their methodology for determining if a spill is sabotage or
equipment failure, which has implications for communities getting compensation, is not known
by communities or the Nigerian government agencies that deal with oil like NOSDRA and DPR.
Because of this, oil communities have been ‘at the side.’ Thus, CEHRD tries to push back on this
dynamic. The representative explains the work CEHRD does to try to combat this:
One, when there is a spill, they [the community] should not rush in to sign any forms.
Then secondly, when there is a spill, the issue of volume of spill needs to be an issue.
Shell might or the oil company…will not [document] the very date where we have the
spill because the volume and the date of the spill matters a lot. So, what we’ve been
trying to do is to train the communities on how to capture or how to report, how to collect
data on oil spill, as soon as there is spill. So, we empower them with some smart phones
that can actually capture the date, time…And then...because sometimes, what Shell does
is to go to the location and then make the whole thing seem as if it was sabotage [instead
of] equipment failure. So, if the community people can get there before...and they can
capture the scene before the JIV, they will be able to present an accurate information
about what actually transpired. So, we [work on]...how they can record, how they can
report, also how they can collect data so that…they can show as evidence.660
As the quotation explains, CEHRD tells community members not to sign any forms Shell
provides (which might absolve Shell of liability) and provides community members with smart
phones to enable them to become oil spill monitors. CEHRD is trying to ensure that Shell does
not get away with polluting community lands if the spills are caused from equipment failure.
CEHRD targets women for its oil spill monitoring program. They want to help
community women take a more active role in documenting and reporting oil spills. A CEHRD
representative who works on gender explains,
So, with our training on the JIV [Joint Investigation Visit] issue, we try to tell them, ‘No,
look, on JIV when you see spill like this…you have your phone, you can take pictures.
You can report to the company. If the company, you report to them, they’re not taking
action, you go to NOSDRA [National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency] or you
go to any NGO, you know like ERA [Environmental Rights Action]. You can report to
them and they carry it up from there.’ Because when we interview them [community
women], they say, ‘Ah, we really don't know what to do. It’s men that...used to do all
that.’ We say, ‘No, it’s your environment. It’s your farm [because]…as a woman…you
660

. Interview 6. Dissertation Fieldwork, 2017

207

do the planting.’ [Just because] you’re…a woman does not mean that ‘Ah because of [my
gender] men need to do this.’661
In this quotation, the representative explains that CEHRD wants to empower women to use smart
phones to document oil spills. The joint investigation visit team usually only includes men from
the affected community,662 and “[e]stablishing the start date of an oil spill is important in relation
to both timely action to address the spill and calculations about the amount of oil spilt.”663
Women tend to be some of the first witnesses of an oil spill because they are responsible for
subsistence labor in their communities, the shadow work. She explains that “most of the farming
activity that go on in the Delta are done by women. So, even when you think these are unpaid
care, she feeds the family. So immediately you destroy this source of income, it has a rippling
effect.”664 Thus, part of CEHRD’s work seems to be helping these women form and express
gendered class interests. One of the ways CEHRD does this is by re-appropriating the connection
between women and nature as a source of power. The CEHRD representative further explains,
But now we’ve been able to make them [rural women] understand that you also have a
stake in all of this…It affects you either one way or the other…And you’re a mother, it
also affects your children… So, I mean normally, by nature, women are already seen as
nurturers. So, it’s also our duty to protect the environment.665
In this quotation, the representative uses patriarchal ideas about women as nurturers of the
environment to get rural women to resist patriarchal ideas about the role women can play in their
communities. By arguing that women are nurturers of the environment, the representative
convinces women in oil communities to take on roles as oil spill monitors.
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Another way these NGOs fight capitalist intrusions into these rural women’s lives is by
helping these women find other ways to make a living when their primary livelihoods have been
polluted. A representative for Society for Women and Youth Affairs explains,
We’re trying to see how we can empower the women in such skills like the sewing,
teaching in the area of fashion and designing. Then catering. Then there’s the agro-based
training. You’re looking at not the regular way we do our farming ‘cause they’re better
ways now, improved ways of farming. So, we have instructors. In December [2017],
precisely, we did an alternative livelihood training in Kana and Gokana because of the
cleanup…[S]o while cleanup will be going on, the women, how are they supposed to
sustain their families…? We actually trained 50 women in Kana, 50 in Gokana.666
As I mention in Chapter 5, the United Nations Environment Programme releases a report in 2011
(commonly known as “the UNEP report”) that details the environmental impact of oil pollution
on Ogoniland in the Niger Delta. The report concludes that during its operations in Ogoniland,
the oil industry severely pollutes the area. Pollution is widespread throughout Ogoniland, and it
has adversely affected the soil and groundwater, vegetation, aquatic life, and people of Ogoni.667
As a result of the report, Nigeria established the Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project
(HYPREP) in 2016 to implement the recommendations of the UNEP report. The Nigerian
government, with the help of oil MNCs in the Niger Delta, began the “remediation of soil and
ground water contamination in impacted communities”668 (“the cleanup”). The communities of
Kana and Gokana are part of the cleanup, but as the quotation explains, these areas are still not
suitable for farming. In the meantime, the Society for Women and Youth Affairs provides
training for these women to continue being able to provide for their families.
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These NGOs also work to protect the commons from male colluders in oil-producing
communities. For instance, Kebetkache focuses on ensuring women are involved in decisionmaking bodies in their communities. It does this by conducting reviews of development boards
of oil MNCs. The Kebetkache representative explains,
Shell has clustered development boards and has also set up community trust funds. So
there are a few women as members…[F]or the most cases, they are there as
numbers…I’ll give you an example…[In] December 2014, I was in a team and assessing
the impacts of the GMOUs [Global Memorandum of Understandings].…[M]y interests
was how are women participating…So women are part of the cluster development
boards. Yes. Women are part of community trusts. Yes. But how do…women contribute
to…identifying projects...that are implemented with the money, the funds that Shell is
giving...through the community development trust? [Someone said]…‘Women also do
this, women also do that...women also do this.’…And one elderly woman stood up and
said, ‘I don't know what you people are talking about. I know very well that we said we
need adult education, and we have not seen. We said we need fertilizer, and we have not
seen. We said...’ And the woman listed and listed and listed and listed and...they did not
know how to tell her stop…[A]nd she kept talking. And when she finished, we now said
all those things she mentioned, is it part of your list of projects that was adopted to be
implemented? [T]hey said no…[T]hey didn’t even know what to say….So you can
imagine that we could have two women as members of the board, but they’re not even
invited to meetings…They are included there because it’s a requirement.669
In some communities in which they operate, Shell (and other MNCs) set up development boards
to provide funds to oil-communities to implement projects. While women are often on these
boards to advocate on behalf of the women in the community, they are usually there for
representation and not given substantive powers. Thus, we see women in this community are not
able to procure funds to support the ‘adult education’ and ‘fertilizer’ they requested. Something
similar happened in another community, she continued,
[T]here were other communities like that…[T]here was an argument between two
women. One woman stood up to mention how the GMOU has benefited them. They
bought hoes. They bought this one. They bought this one…And we were just looking at
her…And then another woman stood up and said, ‘SHUT UP!...and sit down. When did
they give you?’...It was drama…So the men were so embarrassed…And then she too
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didn’t know...[S]he couldn't hide it. She just said, ‘but that is what they asked me to
say.670
As these quotations explain, Kebetkache helps to ensure that rural women fight back against
male colluders and gain power in decision-making bodies that aim to mitigate the impact of the
oil industry on shadow work. And although the existence of these development boards seems to
suggest benevolence from oil MNCs or a sense of responsibility, some of my interviewees
critiqued the corporate social responsibilities of these oil companies. A journalist who focuses on
the issues Niger Delta women face remarked that in the “corporate social responsibility [of oil
MNCs], there’s no special mention of women…But we have established that they are the burden
bearers.671 A CEHRD representative explained that these oil MNCs,
[carry] out their…corporate social responsibility…[by] employing a top-down approach.
And it’s…very very bad…They don’t do needs-mapping. They just...give and say...build
a town hall. Who says they need a town hall?...[Y]ou have to leave the top-down
approach and do more of the bottom-up approach...and come to the grassroots [to] know
what the challenges are, what the barriers are, what the needs are. And then you say, ‘Ok,
I owe you this.’ 672
Thus, these development boards seem more like attempts to shirk from, rather than accept,
responsibility to protect rural women’s shadow work and the commons.
Section V. Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that the work done by the Women Committee of the Nigeria
Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) Port Harcourt zone and local
environmental rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around Port Harcourt continue a
Niger Delta tradition of organizing against structures that make laboring as women exploitative. I
argued that the dynamics Terisa E. Turner et al. (1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2002, 2004a, 2004b)
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observe in women’s ‘peasant resistance’ in the Niger Delta—shadow work and counterplanning
from the commons—can be found (although not always in the exact ways) in the work done by
NUPENG’s Women Committee and these local NGOs.
I argued that women oil workers are tasked with shadow work in the Nigerian oil and gas
industry, as they can be expected to provide sexual services at work and domestic services at
home. The Women Committee’s work shows aspects of counterplanning from the commons
since the women express a gendered class interests and often have to organize against the
intrusion of the capitalist workday into their lives (e.g., ensuring provisions for nursing mothers,
protecting their health by ensuring they get access to proper protective gear in oil companies)
and push back against men who do not necessarily take their concerns seriously. Additionally,
we see the Women Committee re-appropriating patriarchal ideas about women’s role in the
household as a source of power to secure the resources it needs. We also see instances of
working class-solidarity, as male union members collaborate with the Women Committee to
support its members.
I also analyzed three NGOs in the Port Harcourt area to show that they mobilize to
protect, not their own shadow work, but the shadow work of rural women they work on behalf
of/with. These NGOs show aspects of counterplanning from the commons since they help these
women form gendered class interests and re-appropriate patriarchal ideas about women as
nurturers of the environment to do so. These NGOs also protect the intrusion of capital into the
commons by ensuring that Shell (and other MNCs) do not get away with polluting oil
communities and empowering women in these communities to be oil spill monitors so they can
actively protect their shadow work. We also see examples of these NGOs mitigating the
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influence of male colluders by ensuring that women have decision-making power in
development bodies of oil MNCs.
Implications of my Analyses
In the following sections, I pose questions that arise from the analyses in my chapter,
specifically about the idea of resistance. I pose these questions for myself (and others) to think
about for future avenues of research.
Whose Interests Do Oil Labor Unions Serve?
Without taking away from the work of the Women Committee, what does it mean for
labor unions to be avenues of resistance when women’s issues are confined to a separate wing of
the union? When I spoke to male representative of NUPENG about the main issues oil workers
face, I heard about issues of outsourcing, redundancy, and the fall of global oil prices.673 I also
heard about oil companies resisting unionization, the casualization of workers, and oil
management refusing to come to the negotiating table.674 It is when I speak to the representative
of the Women Committee that I hear about the specific conditions affecting women. As the
Women Committee representative explains, the Committee’s work is sometimes supported by
union leaders. But what does it mean that, for example, oil workers have not threatened
to/carried out strikes for issues that specifically affect women oil workers (e.g., Nigeria’s labor
policy on maternity leave)? This is worth nothing since NUPENG (and many other unions in
Nigeria) threaten to strike regularly. For example, in August 2020, NUPENG threatened to strike
on two different occasions—the Nigerian government’s withholding of salaries675 and Chevron
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illegally firing union members.676 Can women oil workers effect substantive changes to their
working conditions when these issues are thought of as women’s/the Women Committee’s
concerns and not the union’s concerns?
The NGO-ization of Resistance?
There have been many debates about whether NGOs in the Global South co-opt women’s
resistance. In recounting women’s organizations in Africa (particularly Nigeria), Ifi Amadiume
(2000) distinguishes between “daughters of imperialism” and “daughters of the Goddess.” The
latter describes women whose gendered class interests necessitates that they challenge
patriarchy, which puts them in solidarity with grassroots women. The former describes elite
women in organizations that do not challenge patriarchy and often work with the government
establishment to purse interests that do not benefit the majority of women.677 Amadiume argues
that the development sector in Africa is dominated by daughters of imperialism. They, along
with “local elites, development advisers and workers, donor agencies, and global women’s
conferences,” are legitimized as leaders over rural and peasant women.678 While the workers in
the NGOs I discuss seem to have more in common with the daughters of the Goddess than the
daughters of imperialism, the fact remains that attention needs to be paid to who is doing the
resistance organizing and what form the organizing takes.
Arundhati Roy (2004) once remarked that “[r]eal political resistance offers no such short
cuts. The NGO-ization of politics threatens to turn resistance into a well-mannered, reasonable,
salaried, 9-to-5 job. With a few perks thrown in. Real resistance has real consequences. And no

676

. “NUPENG issues 7-day strike notice over members’ sack via WhatsApp messages.” (2020, August 20). Vanguard
News. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/08/nupeng-issues-7-day-strike-notice-over-members-sack-viawhatsapp-messages
677
. Amadiume 2000, 7
678
. Ibid., 8

214

salary.”679 In other words, the criticism is that ‘real resistance’ cannot happen in the confines of
paid work since this work usually requires workers to follow the rules and not be too
intimidating. These criticisms have also been levied about NGOs in Africa. Signe Arnfred (2004)
argues that the professionalization of NGO-ization of women’s movements in Africa merits
concern because NGOs are often sustained by donor money, which means these NGOs are more
accountable to the donors than the people they are presumed to serve.680 However, Arnfred
argues that these concerns do not mean that activist work through NGOs is ineffective. She
claims,
NGOs are, however, many different things. Setting up an NGO may also be a way of
strategising for getting money up from donors’ pockets and into necessary political
activist work. Some innovative researcher/activist NGOs seem to be emerging—
including in the fields of women’s issues and feminist research. And donors also differ,
after all.681
In other words, we cannot discount the fact that setting up an NGO could be a particular strategy
to achieve feminist goals—whether that is to access donor money or something else. One the
CEHRD representative I interview says the following about why civil society in the Niger Delta
has moved to advocacy: “[T]here is also a huge challenge to that [direct action] because having
access to those company officials...is not easy…Having access to them is not easy.”682 In other
words, the proliferation of NGOs in the Niger Delta that focus on women’s oil grievances could
be a result of the fact that staging protests on or near oil facilities has become much more
difficult. With that said, there remains a need to ensure that those of us who research NGOs as a
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site of resistance makes sure that these organizations are amplifying grassroot women and
challenging the patriarchal structures that restrict women and not tempering their outcries.
Re-appropriating Patriarchal Ideas as a Source of Power?
In footnote 626, I briefly mention that Naminata Diabate (2020) calls into question the
idea that disrobing, what she terms “naked agency,” is an empowering tool for the African
women who use it. She argues that this strategy does not necessarily challenge patriarchy, as it is
rooted in indigenous and biological ideas of motherhood. But, Diabate argues, a major issue with
our readings of disrobing is that we do not know the intent of the women using the strategy.
Disrobing may be rooted in these patriarchal ideas. Or the women may be, as Turner et al. claim,
re-appropriating these ideas, which denotes strategic use rather than unquestioned belief. This is
why the term “agency” in Diabate’s concept of “naked agency” designates a “women’s ability to
act or react” while “disavow[ing] the dominant liberal mode that is equivalent to autonomy,
intentionality, free will, sovereignty, and transcendence.”683 Naked agency, furthermore, takes
into account that “from the event [disrobing] and its manifestations emerges a cycle of
contestation, exploitation, and misreading that may differ from the women’s original plan.”684 In
other words, readings of disrobing must also take into account how the disrobing is viewed from
the targets as well as what results from the disrobing, which has led to backlash and state
repression in some cases.685 Therefore, Diabate argues that events of disrobing “should be read
on their own terms but also in conjunction with larger sociopolitical and aesthetic
frameworks.”686
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While this chapter does not discuss instances of disrobing, I do use the claim by Turner et
al. that we can observe women re-appropriating patriarchal ideas and apply that to work done by
NUPENG’s Women Committee and local NGOs. With Diabate’s intervention in mind, I want to
briefly revisit that. My interviews do not capture whether the women intended to use these ideas
strategically or if they believe these ideas they are asserting. As Diabate notes, this issue of intent
really speaks to whether the use of these ideas is empowering. To some extent, it is. For instance,
the Women Committee is able to get accommodations for nursing mothers. But we do not know
how these ideas are received by their targets. Yes, these nursing accommodations are granted,
but does it change the targets’ ideas about gender? Most important, does it fundamentally change
the structures that make these accommodations necessary?
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Chapter 7__Conclusion
Research Overview
In this dissertation, I explored women’s labor exploitation in the Nigerian oil political
economy by asking: How are different types of labor (waged and unwaged) performed by
different classes of women (urban and rural) in the Niger Delta—the oil-producing region of
Nigeria—integrated into, impacted by, and shaping the Nigerian oil political economy? To
answer this question, I divided my project into three sub-questions:
•

Sub-question 1: How are Nigerian women oil workers integrated into the Nigerian oil and
gas industry in the Niger Delta?

•

Sub-question 2: How does the Nigerian oil political economy create the oil pollution that
impacts rural women’s domestic/agricultural labor in the Niger Delta?

•

Sub-question 3: How are women in the Niger Delta shaping the Nigerian oil political
economy?

To answer these questions, I used a theory of capitalist patriarchy to examine the relationship
between oil and women’s labor in the Nigerian oil political economy. As I explained in Chapter
2, using a theory of capitalist patriarchy allowed me to theorize the exploitation of women’s
waged and unwaged labor and link labor exploitation to resistance.
For my methods, I conducted over six months of fieldwork (semi-structured interviews
and focus groups) in the Niger Delta—with women (and men) who work in the oil and gas
industry, who live in oil-polluted communities, and who work in local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) around oil-related issues—and analyzed primary and secondary source
materials. Chapter 3 not only discussed the research methods I used in my dissertation but also
explained the African feminist research methodologies that influenced the project. By detailing
the ways in which I navigated issues of positionality and ethics during my fieldwork trips, I
contextualized my data collection process and my dissertation findings.
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I concluded that the Nigerian oil political economy exploits the waged labor of women
oil workers and unwaged labor of rural Niger Delta women by integrating these labors into
precarious positions and shifting costs onto households. However, women in the Niger Delta—
through oil labor unions and NGOs—are organizing against structures that make laboring as
women exploitative.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section I provides more in-depth summaries of my
main dissertation findings. In Section II, I situate women’s labor exploitation in the Nigerian oil
political economy within the phenomenon of extractivism. I show that the challenges of resource
extraction on the African continent extend to other resources besides oil and to other countries
beyond Nigeria. And in Section III, I focus on the work of WoMin, a Pan-African ecofeminist
alliance that mobilizes against extractivism on the African continent. In Chapter 1, I introduce
the idea of a just energy transition in Nigeria, which aims to shift Nigeria from a capitalist
system dominated by oil multinational corporations (MNCs) to a democratized renewable energy
system controlled by the people. In this section, I return to this idea of a just energy transition but
through an African ecofeminist lens. I detail the ways in which WoMin is centering peasant and
working-class African women in their fight against extractivism and their search for a more just
Africa and world.
Section I. Main Dissertation Findings
In Chapter 4, I focused on the waged labor a particular class of women (women oil
workers) perform in the Nigerian oil political economy. I argued that waged labor precarity is a
defining feature of the capitalist economy. The production process in capitalism works to
maximize profits, which means cutting labor costs and making labor replaceable. Thus, this labor
precarity is a feature of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. For oil workers in NUPENG (Nigeria
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Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers), this takes the forms of casualization and
redundancy. The former refers to a shift from permanent long-term employment to temporary
short-term contracting, while the latter refers to an indeterminate loss of employment. However,
conversations on labor precarity in the Nigerian oil and gas industry need to expand to include
the experiences of women oil workers.
According to the NUPENG Women Committee representative and a representative of the
Nigeria Labour Congress, women oil workers in NUPENG are exploited not just because they
experience casualization and redundancy as other oil workers do. These women’s exploitation
also results from gender ordering (exclusion and segregation) and sexual harassment in the
workplace. Additionally, the ways in which constraints of their workplaces interact with the
domestic division of labor is a source of labor precarity for these women. For instance, lack of
childcare, long working hours, and insufficient maternity leave benefits made working in the oil
industry challenging for women oil workers.
In Chapter 5, I focused on the unwaged labor a particular class of women (rural women)
perform in the Nigerian oil political economy. In this chapter, I argued that foreign and domestic
actors involved in the Nigerian oil political economy (e.g., states, elites, oil multinational
corporations [MNCs]) create oil pollution in the Niger Delta by making decisions that prioritize
profits at the expense of the environment. By engaging in illicit financial outflows (through tax
avoidance and tax evasion), shirking environmental responsibilities (by claiming sabotage,
taking advantage of the parent company/subsidiary structure, lobbying for anti-climate change
policies, and flaring gas), and devising weak (whether intentional or not)
environmental/community protections, these actors shift pollution costs from themselves onto
rural women’s domestic labor in the Niger Delta. This pollution, I argued, adversely impacts
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women’s domestic labor—farming and fishing, their (reproductive) health, their children, and
their household and community dynamics.
I argued that oil MNCs—with the help of Nigerian government officials—engage in
illicit financial outflows through tax avoidance and tax evasion. I show that oil MNCs that are
often sued for oil pollution have also been caught evading and avoiding taxes. Thus, oil MNCs
pollute and shift pollution costs onto communities by not paying taxes—taxes that could be used
to clean up this pollution.
I also demonstrated that oil MNCs shirk their environmental responsibilities, which
comes at the cost of the environment and communities. The Niger Delta is one of the most
polluted places in the world. Oil-polluted communities (and NGOs) argue that poor maintenance
of oil pipelines or operational failure is to blame for the majority of these oil spills, while oil
MNCs contend that these spills are mainly caused by the sabotage of their oil pipelines. These
claims by oil MNCs are dubious since the oil spill investigation process lacks transparency and
some Nigerian laws and policies incentivize oil MNCs to claim sabotage since that releases them
from liability. This tension plays out in the many lawsuits oil-producing communities file against
oil MNCs. What oil MNCs also do in these lawsuits is take advantage of the parent/subsidiary
structure to shield themselves from liability. For instance, Shell might argue that its Nigerian
subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), is liable for a spill and
not the parent company (Royal Dutch Shell). This structure makes it harder to hold oil MNCs
responsible for their behavior because power is situated with the parent company and not the
subsidiary.
I also argued that oil MNCs shirk their environmental responsibilities by lobbying for
anti-climate change policies and flaring gas. Oil MNCs operating in the Niger Delta have
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contributed millions of dollars to the American Petroleum Institute (API)—a powerful climate
obstruction lobbying force in the U.S. This is egregious since oil MNCs continue to flare gas—
burn gas as waste—in the Niger Delta, which releases carbon dioxide and methane into the air.
Lastly I argued that Nigerian laws and policies guiding the oil and gas industry (whether
intentional or not) and the courts adjudicating these laws do not adequately protect the
environment and oil-producing communities. I also show, using the saga of the Petroleum
Industry Bill (PIB), that this weak enforcement is sometimes due to the influence of oil MNCs
and states such as the U.S. and UK.
In Chapter 6, I examined the work of women (and men) in oil labor unions and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). I argued that the work done by the Women Committee of
the Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) Port Harcourt zone and
local environmental rights NGOs around Port Harcourt continue a Niger Delta tradition of
organizing against structures that make laboring as women exploitative. I argued that the
dynamics Terisa E. Turner et al. (1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2002, 2004a, 2004b) observe in
women’s ‘peasant resistance’ in the Niger Delta—shadow work and counterplanning from the
commons—can be found (although not always in the exact ways) in the work done by
NUPENG’s Women Committee and these local NGOs.
I argued that women oil workers are tasked with shadow work in the Nigerian oil and gas
industry, as they can be expected to provide sexual services at work and domestic services at
home. The Women Committee’s work shows aspects of counterplanning from the commons
since the women express a gendered class interests and often have to organize against the
intrusion of the capitalist workday into their lives (e.g., ensuring provisions for nursing mothers,
protecting their health by ensuring they get access to proper protective gear in oil companies)
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and push back against men who do not necessarily take their concerns seriously. Additionally,
we see the Women Committee re-appropriating patriarchal ideas about women’s role in the
household as a source of power to secure the resources it needs. We also see instances of
working class-solidarity, as male union members collaborate with the Women Committee to
support its members.
I also analyzed three NGOs in the Port Harcourt area to show that they mobilize to
protect, not their own shadow work, but the shadow work of rural women they work on behalf
of/with. These NGOs show aspects of counterplanning from the commons since they help these
women form gendered class interests and re-appropriate patriarchal ideas about women as
nurturers of the environment to do so. These NGOs also protect the intrusion of capital into the
commons by ensuring that Shell (and other MNCs) do not get away with polluting oil
communities and empowering women in these communities to be oil spill monitors so they can
actively protect their shadow work. We also see examples of these NGOs mitigating the
influence of male colluders by ensuring that women have decision-making power in
development bodies of oil MNCs.
Section II. Beyond Oil in Nigeria: Extractivism in Africa
While this dissertation focuses on oil in Nigeria, the challenges of resource extraction on
the African continent extend to other resources besides oil and to other countries beyond Nigeria.
While I do not explicitly name it, I imply that the Nigerian oil political economy is an extractivist
economy. In its first release of 2021, Feminist Africa dedicates the issue to the theme,
Extractivism, Resistance, Alternatives. Charmaine Pereira and Dzodzi Tsikata (2021a), the
editors of the issue, describe extractivism as thus:
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Extractivism refers to the longstanding colonial and imperialist phenomenon of
accumulating wealth by extracting a wide range of natural resources from countries
colonised in Africa, Asia and the Americas, and exporting this wealth to the metropoles.
The natural resources involved are oil, gas and minerals, as well as the resources
extracted from agriculture, seeds, land and water. This is the process at the heart of socalled “development”, but the process leaves former colonised countries underdeveloped
and impoverished. Affected communities face the violence of having their land and
resources seized from them, the unravelling of social bonds, and the destruction of
ecosystems.687
Pereira and Tsikata (2021a) explain that extractivism is a distinct process in contemporary
capitalism. In industrial capitalism, accumulation takes place through ownership and direct
control over production sites. In extractivist economies, on the other hand, accumulation takes
place globally. Corporations have control over the flow of resources, which creates poverty in
the sites of production and concentrates wealth elsewhere.688 This is not to say that extractivism
manifests the same way in each place. Pereira and Tsikata (2021b) argue that extractive
economies share commonalities and differences. For example, traditional extractives (e.g., oil,
gas, and minerals) and extractive agriculture differ in the ways in which they displace or
integrate rural communities.689 However, corporations, states, and local elites are key actors in
the different manifestations of extractivism. In my project, for instance, I identify the U.S. and
the UK as important to capitalist accumulation in the Nigerian oil political economy. Pereira and
Tsikata claim that the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have
been playing a larger role in resource extraction in Africa more recently. Despite high hopes that
these countries would not continue the underdevelopment of Africa, Pereira and Tsikata argue
that the BRICS should be seen as supporting destructive extractivism rather than offering an
alternative.690
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Although extractivism is a gendered process, Pereira and Tsikata (2021b) argue that the
literature on extractivism in Africa is largely gender-blind. However, feminists have long argued
that the exploitation of women’s bodies and labor—including domestic labor—is key to
capitalist accumulation. Feminist analyses have also focused on how ideas around gender sustain
institutions, including extractivist economies.691 Thus, this Feminist Africa issue remedies these
omissions by highlighting the gendered effects of different extractivist economies in Africa,
resistance movements against extractivism, and pursuits for better alternatives.692
While I acknowledge the importance of noting the different consequences of extractivism
in different contexts, noting the similarities can help with documenting patterns. Although the
Feminist Africa issue focuses on the gendered consequences of extractive agriculture, the
consequences bear similarities to my research findings. For example, Dzifa Torvikey (2021)
examines the impact of extractivist agricultural production, specifically an industrial cassava
company, on women’s land access, labor, and resistance strategies in South-eastern Ghana.
Torvikey explains that colonial and post-colonial governments have long relied on exploited
mineral mining, e.g., gold, diamond as well as agricultural exports e.g., cocoa. Cassava
exploitation is another line in this chain.693 Similar to the women oil workers I interviewed at
NUPENG (Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers), Torvikey finds that women in
the cassava company are mainly incorporated as casual laborers. This is despite the fact that
many of the women have worked at the company for as long as eight years. Just like the women
in NUPENG, women working in the cassava company, have no social security benefits, sick
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leave, or maternity leave. They also lack access to protective equipment or tools that would make
their work easier.694
In my dissertation, I also explain the ways oil pollution destroys rural women’s
agricultural labor and affects their ability to provide for their families and households. Torvikey
similarly finds that extractivist agriculture affects rural women’s ability to provide for their
families and households, although not through pollution. Participation in the outgrower
scheme—where women (and men) use their farms to grow cassava that is then bought by the
cassava company—affects access to food.695 For example, households in the outgrower scheme
no longer have access to a variety of crops since the company requires monocropping. And the
crops the companies do allow the families to grow with the cassava are alien to the communities.
Additionally, the industrial cassava the women grow are not suitable for local consumption and
cannot be sold in local markets.696
And in the same way I link women’s resistance to labor exploitation in the Nigerian oil
political economy, Torvikey explains that the women working in the factory and using their
lands to grow cassava resist (e.g., by protesting, absenteeism, and withdrawing from the
outgrower scheme) to preserve their traditional ways of production.697
This discussion of my and Torvikey’s findings suggests that extractivism produces
similar effects on women and their labor across the continent. WoMin organizes around this
issue.
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Section III. WoMin and the Struggle for a “Just” Economic System
In Chapter 1, I mention that WoMin is a Pan-African ecofeminist alliance that conducts
research on and mobilizes against the adverse effects of extractivism on African women and their
communities.698 Founded in October 2013, WoMin also works with African women to imagine
and then build a better development alternative for Africa.699 I first learn about WoMin while
conducting interviews in Nigeria. The Feminist Africa issue mentioned above features a profile
on the organization, demonstrating its importance in the struggle against extractivism on the
continent.
WoMin explains that extractivism is a racist and patriarchal process, relying on the cheap
labor of African workers laboring under dangerous conditions. Extractivist economies also
operate and profit off of the bodies of African women—through sexual violence and unpaid care
work.700 The latter is further explicated in WoMin’s 2015 report, The Africa Mining Vision: A
Long Overdue Ecofeminist Critique. Based on primarily on seven community studies carried out
by WoMin alliance members in East, West, and Southern Africa, the report argues that
extractivist economies misuse important resources that are often undercounted or not included in
development policymaking—community wealth, food production, and women’s labor.701 The
report explains that resource extraction causes displacement, separating rural families from the
source of their community wealth—lands. Lands also provide food for rural communities.
Pollution from resource extraction, especially oil extraction, destroys farmlands and waters. This
disrupts community food production systems. Women often bear the burden of food production,
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thus the loss of their agricultural labor pushes them into less productive activities, such as trading
in petty goods, so they can provide for their families. Additionally, women often subsidize health
care and social service costs in extractive economies, caring for workers who fall sick or get
injured on the job. This burdens women’s labor inside and outside their homes.702 These impacts
are seen “[f]rom the Niger Delta to the oil fields of Uganda to the diamond fields of Marange,
Zimbabwe.”703
Given these adverse impacts, WoMin builds with “rural and marginalized women across
the continent [to] dream of a different community, nation, and Africa.”704 WoMin primarily does
this by advancing an African ecofeminist perspective on a just energy transition for Africa. As I
discuss in Chapter 1, panelists at the Just Energy Transition conference in Nigeria mention the
need to dismantle the patriarchy in order to transition Nigeria to a just economic system.
However, the specific role patriarchy plays in creating Nigeria’s current unjust economic system
is not a central part of the framework. WoMin fills this gap in their 2016 report, Women Building
Power: Towards Climate and Energy Justice for Women in Africa, explaining that greenhouse
gases are not the only drivers of climate change. WoMin continues, “Climate change is also
driven by social forces like patriarchy and racism that marginalise women, and [B]lack workingclass and peasant women in particular, and undermine their solutions and voices in decisionmaking on energy, climate and general development.”705 Thus a just energy transition that
dismantles patriarchy and racism would center the experiences of Black working class and
peasant women and listen to their perspectives on development. WoMin declares,
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We need a radical shift to a paradigm which places people and care at the centre of
development. With this new logic, development—who makes decisions, what strategies,
plans, laws and policies are developed—will look very different. The people involved in
making development decisions will also be very different. Ordinary people, especially
women, peasants and the working class, and their nominated or elected representatives,
will make decisions which are in their best interests.706
The Mogale Declaration represents the beginnings of this new paradigm.
The Mogale Declaration
In July 2018, a group of feminists and climate justice activists meet in Mogale in
Johannesburg, South Africa to discuss the changes needed for a just future. The group agrees that
because many of the proposals on a just energy transition come from trade unions, the proposals
do not conceptualize a just transition from an African feminist perspective or consider ideas from
below. The group also agrees that the exploitation of women’s paid and unpaid labor goes hand
in hand with the large-scale exploitation of nature. This results in “development” projects that
destroy ecosystems and peasant and working class communities in Africa. Yet, women have
limited power making decisions concerning development in their communities.707 These
agreements birth the “Mogale Declaration: Living the Future,” the beginnings of a process to
build an African ecofeminist charter for a just transition.
The Mogale Declaration lists 26 principles/practices that characterize an African
ecofeminist just transition. They are:
1) Ecological balance—a harmonious co-existence with nature
2) Social and economic justice for all
3) Food sovereignty
4) Socialised renewable energy, which benefits women
5) Clean air and water
6) Valuing and reclaiming African traditional knowledge
7) Living simply and sharing
8) Living Ubuntu in our relations with each other and nature—‘I am because you are’
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9) Land, held as commons, to support human reproduction
10) Living well not better
11) Collective democratic horizontal leadership in our movements, organisations and
collectives
12) Collective right to commons
13) No women should be left unorganized
14) Unifying struggles across rural & urban-walk together
15) Respect different forms of people’s resistance
16) Acknowledging, valuing and redistributing care work
17) Participatory democracy
18) Individual and collective self-determination—‘I am because we are’
19) Respect for community territories and customary rules of decision making/use
20) Right to basic services
21) Right to resources necessary for life (commons)
22) Respect for diversity
23) Solidarity with and between people in struggle
24) Right to say NO
25) Safe transport
26) Right to lives free of systematic violence708
In creating this charter, the goal is to “test, refine and build on” these practices in a process that
“puts the voices, experiences and knowledge of poor and working-class African women at the
centre.”709 Thus, women in communities, grassroots women’s groups, and community
organizations will be asked: “what is the world you want?” or “what do women in your
community want from development?”710 WoMin understands that creating this charter and
imagining a new world will not be an easy process but nothing less will suffice. WoMin
explains,
Tinkering at the margins of change by reinventing capitalism and its spawn extractivism
into ‘green’ capitalism is not delivering, and will never give us, the kind of change we
require. An uncritical approach to the alternatives, including a technologically and
politically agnostic view on renewables is also unlikely to work for the majority of people
on the planet, or for nature. WoMin believes that the seeds of change lie within the spaces
where nature and people meet and create harmony. Indeed, it is built from the ground up,
where women are resisting exploitation of their lands, water, and forests, and seeking to
preserve and honour what nature gives to us. And yet we cannot be naive that this kind of
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approach will not bump up against very strong forces which seek to preserve the status
quo. It is in the clarity, conviction, and determination that an alternative world is possible
and that it will be created.711
WoMin asks: “If another world is possible, who is doing the imagining?”712 But this question is
merely rhetorical. For WoMin boldly states that ‘it [an alternative world] will be created’ and
boldly implies by us.
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